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Dissertation
ABSTRACT
The  research  questions  of  this  thesis  are  all  related  to  the  performance  of  the
occupational health services (OHS) system. The first study examined whether a
company’s expenditure on preventive OHS predicts its economic performance
two  or  four  years  later.  If  the  OHS  is  effective  it  would  reduce  the  costs  of  ill
health and improve productivity, which would finally also lead to a better
economic performance of the organization. Although the claim of OHS being
profitable  for  employers  is  a  fairly  common  statement,  we  found  no  proof  for
the  claim.  The  second  study  showed  that  the  obligation  by  law  to  organize
preventive services and the reimbursement from the Social Insurance Institution
secure the provision of occupational health services irrespective of the financial
situation of the employer.
The  Finnish  OHS  system  with  different  provider  types  and  market  structures
provides a chance to examine ownership, competition and payment systems.
Studies  3  and  4  examine  if  intensity,  productivity,  share  of  medical  care,  unit
price and revenues differ according to the ownership of the provider and the
market environment. Competition had only little impact. All provider types
increased the share of medical care in a more competitive environment. Only
for-profit providers reacted according to the assumptions of economic theory:
they had lower unit prices and revenues in a more competitive environment. An
interesting  result  was  that  the  public  providers  increased  their  prices  and
revenues more in a competitive environment after the abolition of their price
regulation.  Differences  due  to  ownership  were  greater  than  what  could  be
achieved with increasing competition – ownership seems to be the means to
control or allocate resources to OHS.
Keywords: regulation, incentives, competition, occupational health services
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Väitöskirja
ABSTRAKTI
Suomalainen työterveyshuoltoa koskeva lainsäädäntö velvoittaa työnantajat
järjestämään ehkäisevän työterveyshuollon ja korvaa noin puolet
kustannuksista. Lainsäädäntö on luonut hyvin vankan järjestelmän,
työterveyshuollon toimivuus ei ole riippuvainen yrityksen taloudellisesta
tilanteesta (artikkeli 2). Työterveyshuoltoa on myös markkinoitu kannattavana
investointina työnantajalle. Tässä tutkimuksessa ei kuitenkaan löytynyt tukea
tälle väitteelle: yrityksen investoinnilla ehkäisevään työterveyshuoltoon ei ollut
positiivista yhteyttä sen taloudelliseen menestykseen (artikkeli 1).
Lainsäädäntö on mahdollistanut kansainvälisestikin mielenkiintoisen
terveyspalvelujärjestelmän. Alueelliset markkinat vaihtelevat julkisesta
monopolista erittäin kilpailtuihin markkinoihin ja tuottajatyyppejä on useita.
Tämä mahdollistaa omistuksen, maksujärjestelmien ja markkinaympäristön
tutkimisen; miten ne vaikuttavat intensiteettiin, sairaanhoidon osuuteen,
tuottavuuteen, yksikköhintaan ja tuottajan tuloihin (artikkelit 3 ja 4).
Markkinoiden kilpailullisuudella oli yllättävän vähän vaikutusta. Kaikki
tuottajat lisäsivät sairaanhoidon osuutta tuotannostaan kilpaillummassa
ympäristössä. Vain lääkärikeskukset reagoivat kuten talousteoria olettaa, niillä
oli alhaisemmat yksikköhinnat ja tulot kilpaillummassa ympäristössä.
Kiinnostava tulos oli se, että kilpaillummassa ympäristössä terveyskeskusten
työterveyshuollot nostivat yksikköhintojaan ja siten tulojaan enemmän kuin
vähemmän kilpaillussa hinnoittelun vapauduttua. Erot tuottajatyyppien välillä
olivat suurempia kuin mitä saataisiin aikaan lisäämällä kilpailua – omistajuus
näyttää toimivan keinona rajoittaa tai allokoida resursseja työterveyshuoltoon.
Asiasanat: säätely, insentiivit, markkinat, työterveyshuolto
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1 Introduction
Finnish occupational health services (OHS) existed before there were any
international or national policies on occupational safety and health. Historically
these services have included curative medical services. Finnish occupational
health services could be described as services with a strong preventive emphasis
provided  by  a  general  practitioner  (GP)  and  a  nurse  for  employees.  The
Occupational Health Care Act was built on existing models for organizing OHS
and  therefore  there  is  a  variety  of  different  kinds  of  providers  in  Finland.  The
legislation obliges each employer to organize preventive services, either by
purchasing or  providing the OHS itself,  or  together  with other  employers.  The
relationship between the employer and the provider is based on a contract, and
different provider types have different payment systems. Occupational health
services are mainly provided by private non-profit or for-profit providers.
Municipalities are in charge of organizing primary health care, and this
obligation also includes the provision of OHS within its region. The market
structure for OHS varies geographically from regions with public monopolies to
regions with numerous, mainly private providers.
The Finnish occupational health services offer a context and a chance to
study  the  functioning  of  an  incentive  structure.  The  incentive  structure  -  the
“sticks and carrots” - market environment, regulations, social codes and
payment systems set the limits and creates the opportunities for both employers
and providers to achieve their goals. Therefore, the impact of the incentive
structure should be interpreted in light of employers’ and OHS providers’ own
objectives. Understanding the functioning of an incentive structure is crucial for
the success of health care reforms in health care, also outside OHS.
The research questions of this dissertation are all related to the performance
of the occupational health services system. The way performance is assessed
does not differ from the objectives set for health care systems in general. Health
care  reforms  have  aimed  at  improving  access  by  removing  financial  barriers.
Then the reforms have been characterized more by the need to control the rise in
health  care  expenditure  subsequent  to  improving  access.  Later,  in  addition  to
equal access and control of total health care expenditure, reforms have aimed at
improving the efficiency with which health services are produced and used.
The dissertation is structured as follows. First, Chapter 2 presents a
description  of  the  Finnish  OHS  system:  the  history  and  the  legislation
concerning  employers’  obligation  to  organize  OHS.  In  addition,  information  is
presented from registries and surveys on features of the system relevant for the
purposes of the dissertation: how employers have organized the OHS and how
provider types differ in their resources and services provided and payment
systems. Chapter 3 describes the theoretical framework: how the incentive
structure is created by legislation, competition and payment system and the
objectives of both employers and OHS providers. Chapter 4 reviews theoretical
and empirical research on purchasing and payment systems, and on competition
and  markets.  Based  Chapters  3  and  4,  the  hypothesis  will  be  presented  in
Chapter  5,  together  with  the  research  questions.  The  study  design,  data  and
methods  are  presented  in  Chapter  6,  the  results  in  Chapter  7.  Chapter  8
summarizes the results and discusses their relevance for the occupational health
services  system.  In  addition,  the methodological  choices  will  be  discussed and
proposals  for  further  research  are  presented  in  Chapter  8.  Finally,  Chapter  9
concludes.
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2 Description of the Finnish
Occupational Health
Services System
2.1 HISTORY AND LEGISLATION
The history of the Finnish occupational health services (OHS) dates back to the
19th century. Big companies started organizing health services for their
employees and their families. Employment also provided disability insurance
and  old  age  pension.  In  the  1920s  half  of  employed  people  were  members  of
employer-specific sickness and pension funds. Thus, in addition to government,
municipalities and non-governmental organizations, employers have had a role
in social policy. Jaakkola et al. (1994, p. 149-158) regard this shared (or split)
responsibility of social policy as a special feature of the Finnish social policy.
Occupational health services developed without any legislative basis until
the introduction of compulsory health insurance in 1964, Finland being the last
country in Europe to do so (Jaakkola et al. 1994, p. 237). Until then the
occupational health services were financed by employers and the services
covered only 20 per cent of the employed population (Koskiaho 1987, p. 44). The
Social  Insurance  Institution  (SII,  Kansaneläkelaitos  or  KELA  in  Finnish)  was
charged with reimbursing the costs of private health services and employers
were also entitled to reimbursement for the medical care they provided for their
employees. Later, in 1969, preventive occupational services were also included
in the services covered by health insurance (Mattila 2006). The occupational
health services acquired a more formal status when in 1979 the Occupational
Health Care Act made it compulsory for employers to arrange preventive
services. The OHS has strong connections to labour market policy. For example,
the national planning, approval and implementation of any measures
concerning OHS always involve employers’ and employees’ representatives,
and occupational health professionals’ representatives in addition to the
government (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2010).
The legislation obligates employers to organize preventive services. The
purpose of the Act is to promote 1) the prevention of work-related illnesses and
accidents, 2) the healthiness and safety of the work and the working
environment, 3) the health, working capacity and functional capacity of
employees at the different stages of their working careers, and 4) the functioning
of the workplace community (2001). Occupational health care professionals
conduct workplace surveys and assess health risks at workplaces. They also
offer guidance on how to carry out interventions to improve working conditions
and  well-being  at  work  and  assist  employees  in  maintaining  their  health,  for
instance through regular checkups. They also carry out interventions
themselves, organize groups e.g. for people with neck problems or obesity,
participate in the planning and implementation of return-to-work policies, and
act as facilitators in organizational development projects. In addition to
statutory occupational health care, employers may provide other medical and
health care services for their employees. The medical services are general
practitioner (GP) services, and occupational physicians may refer employees to
specialists for consultation. (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2010, 2001,
Taskinen 2004). In 2009, 8 per cent of health checkups and 5 per cent of
appointments for curative medical care were conducted by specialists
(Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland) 2011b).
According to a population survey conducted in 2009, 70 per cent of the
employees had attended an occupational health checkup, and around half of
them had had occupational health personnel assessing their workplace.
Although organizing curative medical services is voluntary for employers, over
90 per cent of employees can obtain GP level services from their OHS unit. Over
40 per cent of the primary care level GP visits by these employees take place
within OHS (Perkiö-Mäkelä et al. 2010).
Employers  can apply for  reimbursement  of  the costs  of  OHS.  The funds for
the Social Insurance Institution have been collected from insured, both
employed and pensioned persons, and from employers. Before the last reform of
the national health insurance in 2006, the percentage of the payment used to be
regulated  annually  by  law.  It  was  therefore  sensitive  to  economic  trends  and
politics.  The  employees’  payment  varied  from  0.75  to  2.2%  of  their  taxable
income. The average percentage for all employers varied between 0.45 and
3.25%, but the percentages have varied according to the employer sector. Private
employers  used  to  pay  much  lower  percentages  than  public  or  Church
employers. The percentages were harmonized for municipalities and the Church
in the late 1990s and for state employers in the reform of the funding of health
insurance in 2006. (Hallituksen esitys (Government bill) 2005a, Hallituksen
esitys (Government bill) 2005b).
In 2006 national health insurance was divided into two parts: medical care
insurance and earned income insurance.  Sickness  and parental  allowances  and
the reimbursement of the costs of OHS are paid from the latter fund. The basis
for collecting the funds was also changed. The state would no longer support the
funds as it had been compelled to do for years. Since 2006 the employees’
payment has varied between 0.67 and 0.93% of their taxable income. The
payment  is  tax  deductible.  The  percentage  paid  by  the  employers  was
18
harmonized – all employers have had the same percentage since 2006, but the
annual percentage has been varying between 1.97 and 2.23 %. One fourth of the
funds for earned income insurance have been collected from the employees. The
employers’ share is close to 70 per cent and the state has been responsible for the
rest. The state’s share has been used for minimum-rate sickness and parental
allowances. (Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland)
2010b)
Employers first pay all costs of OHS and apply for reimbursement within six
months after closing their accounts. The share of the costs reimbursed has varied
during more than 40 years of reimbursement. Until 1995, reimbursement was
based  on  the  total  costs  of  OHS.  In  1995  the  activities  were  divided  into
preventive and medical care, each being reimbursed separately. The objective
was to channel more resources towards preventive care. The reform also aimed
at keeping the costs down and both reimbursement categories got a cap for costs
per  employee.  In  addition,  the  Social  Insurance  Institution  (SII)  evaluates  the
need and appropriateness of the activities in their reimbursement decisions.
Nowadays the reimbursement is 60 per cent for preventive and 50 per cent for
curative medical services. Thus, despite the reimbursement the employers will
always bear a considerable part of the cost themselves.
According  to  the  latest  statistics  on  occupational  health  services,  the
employers claimed reimbursement for 612.5 million Euros and the Social
Insurance Institution reimbursed 272.5 million Euros for the costs in 2009
(Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland) 2011b). The
magnitude of occupational health services as a part of primary health care
becomes visible by comparing the total costs to the costs of primary health care
provided by the municipalities  or  private  health care  providers,  the  other  two
systems in Finland providing primary health care (Vuorenkoski 2008, p. 1-4). In
2009 the costs of primary care provided by municipal health care centres were
2,090.3 million Euros, the costs of OHS in 2009 representing then 29% of the
resources in municipal health centres (Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos,
(National Institute for Health and Welfare) 2011). When people use private
medical services they are entitled to reimbursement from the Social Insurance
Institution.  The  total  costs  of  services  provided  by  private  health  care  in  2009
were 524.6 million Euros (including doctors’ services and tests, e.g. laboratory
and imaging services) showing that OHS costs were 17% higher than the costs of
other privately provided health services (Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social
Insurance Institution of Finland) 2010a, p. 66, 71.). The total costs of occupational
health services have been increasing by 6 per cent annually in the past ten years
(Figure 1) (Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland)
2010c).
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Figure 1: Costs of OHS and reimbursement paid to employers by SII 1965-2007,
million Euro (in 2008 real value) (Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social Insurance
Institution of Finland) 2010c)
The focus of international conventions and recommendations (World Health
Organization 1994, International Labor Organization 1985) has been on the
assessment  of  risks  and  the  prevention  of  occupational  diseases,  injuries  and
accidents (Hämäläinen 2008). The European Union (EU) also aims at improving
the  safety  and  health  of  workers  at  work  with  the  EU  directive  89/391/EEC
(Council Directive 1989). In Finland the Occupational Safety and Health Act lays
down  that  employers  are  obliged  to  look  after  the  safety  and  health  of
employees  in  line  with  the  international  policies.  The  Occupational  Safety  and
Health Act applies to all paid employment. Employers are responsible for
providing and paying for the services of occupational health care and other
professionals to prevent the risks and adverse effects that work and working
conditions may cause employees. (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2010.)
The international conventions deal with employers’ responsibilities regarding
occupational health and safety, not organizing health services for employees.
In  most  EU  Member  States,  employers  are  not  obliged  to  organize
occupational  health  services.  There  are  a  few  exceptions,  like  Finland,  France,
Italy and the Netherlands. In most countries the emphasis is more on work than
in Finland. This is revealed in the qualifications required of the personnel and
the contents of the services. For example, in many countries it is compulsory to
have occupational hygienists or occupational psychologists among occupational
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health professionals (Hämäläinen et al. 2001). In Finland, it is compulsory to
have occupational physicians and nurses only, and they assess the need for
other experts. The Finnish occupational health services have their origin in
providing medical services. The special nature of the Finnish occupational
health services is also revealed in the survey conducted by Hotopp et al. (2008).
They  describe  how  disability  insurance,  health  care  services  for  occupational
injury and disease, and occupational health and safety systems are organized in
six countries (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Germany and Austria). None of the countries had a system where the employers
acquired  the  expertise  to  assess  the  health  risks  and  to  prevent  the  risks  and
provide curative medical services from the same provider.
There are various ways of organizing occupational health services in the EU
although this is not mandatory for employers (Hämäläinen 2008, Westerholm,
Walters  2007).  In  all  EU  Member  States  employers  can  organize  the  services
internally. In most countries it is possible to organize the services jointly with
other  employers  or  to  have  a  company  doctor.  There  are  also  special  national
solutions, like industries (e.g. Belgium, Denmark) or regional employees’
organizations (France) organizing the services. In some countries, the services
are provided by local (Italy, the United Kingdom) or state authorities (France,
Spain). In Austria and Germany the services are provided by statutory industrial
accident  insurance  funds.  In  both  countries  the  resources  are  also  strictly
regulated.  For  example,  in  Austria  there  is  a  time  allocation  of  0.66  hours  per
employee per year and rules about the frequency of inspections of workplaces.
Internationally, OHS is mainly funded by employers (Hämäläinen 2008, p. 196),
the Finnish reimbursement system is a unique exception.
2.2 EMPLOYERS AS PURCHASERS OF OHS
Employers may choose how to organize their OHS. They may provide the
services themselves (employer’s own OHS) or jointly with other employers
(non-profit1), or the employer may buy the services from a municipal health
1 Here non-profit refers to an association or company jointly governed by employers. They differ
from the non-profits in the USA. Since 1913 the non-profit hospitals in the USA have been exempt
from most revenue and property taxes. In exchange for their tax exemption, not-for-profit hospitals
were required to provide free or below-cost medical services, since 1969 provide services that benefit
the community in exchange for their tax exemption (Potter 2001, p. 18). The Finnish non-profit OHS
providers do have to pay taxes. Therefore there is an incentive not to show profit. If a profit is made
they even refund the employers. Theoretically, the US non-profits have been described as altruists,
providing higher quality and more charity care (Newhouse 1970), signalling that they will not abuse
the informational asymmetry (Arrow 1963), and maximizing joint income for physicians cooperative
(Pauly, Redisch 1973). (See Malani et al. (2003) for a summary on non-profit theories.)
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centre (public2) or from a private medical centre (for-profit3). The contract with
the provider specifies practical arrangements (addresses, opening hours,
invoicing practices and termination of the contract). The contract must contain
information  on  the  services  provided  only  in  very  broad  terms:  if  the  contract
concerns  only  preventive  services,  or  if  the  curative  medical  services  are  also
included. According to the Occupational Health Care Act (2001) the employer
must utilize the expertise of occupational health personnel in the planning of
services. Therefore the occupational health personnel conduct a workplace
survey to assess the health risks and need for services. According to the Act,
there must be an action plan for the services provided. The action plan is
intended to improve the target-orientation, follow-up and evaluation of the
activities (Taskinen 2004, p. 62-85). The action plan and annual report must also
be appended to the reimbursement application.
As on national policy level, employers must collaborate with employees in
occupational  health  and  safety  issues  on  the  workplace  level  (Occupational
Health Care Act 1383/2001). For example, the employer’s decisions on essential
matters affecting the organizing of OHS services must be submitted to the
occupational safety committee. The committee is mandatory in all organizations
with more than 20 employees. If there is no occupational safety committee, the
decision must be made together with the occupational safety representative. The
annual report must be processed by the occupational safety committee
(Taskinen 2004, p. 39).
Most Finnish employers have organized occupational health services for
their employees. Only the smallest firms with fewer than ten employees have
low coverage (Kankaanpää, Suhonen & Valtonen 2005). According to the
population surveys conducted by the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health,
about 85 per cent of the employed population had occupational health services
(Perkiö-Mäkelä et al. 2010).
Due to the reimbursement system statistics on occupational health from the
employers’ point of view are available. The statistics provide information on the
costs and content of services according to the number of employees, branch and
provider type.
The  number  of  reimbursement  applications  fell  by  nine  per  cent  from  1992
(almost 23,000) to 1995 due to the economic recession. (Numbers indicated in the
annual  pillars  according  the  number  of  employees  in  Figure  2).  Since  then  the
number has been growing and the annual number of applications has doubled
from 1992 to 2009 (over 46,000 applications). The number has been growing
2 The municipal health centres provide primary care services for the residents of the municipality.
The services are organized into units like maternity care, physicians’ medical care and occupational
health services.
3 The for-profits also provide medical services for individual customers/patients who mainly pay for
the services themselves. At the time of the purchase, the modest reimbursement from the Social
Insurance Institution will be taken into account.
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mostly among the smallest employers with fewer than 20 employees. (Figure 2).
The number of applications seems quite low when compared to the statistics for
the number of firms in Finland, 320,000 in 2010. The difference is much smaller
taken  into  account  that  58  per  cent  of  all  registered  firms  in  Finland  had  no
employees in 2001 (Kankaanpää, Suhonen & Valtonen 2005).
The employer’s choice of provider type depends on the size of the
organization.  Small  firms  with  fewer  than  20  employees  have  usually  chosen
between a public provider and a for-profit provider. The for-profit provider
used to be almost as often the choice among employers with 20-99 employees,
nowadays the majority of these employers choose a for-profit provider. For-
profit providers increased their share considerably among the bigger employers,
especially in the late 2000s. In the early 1990s most of the big organizations with
more  than  500  employees  had  their  own  OHS  unit.  The  share  fell  during  the
recession and later  the services  were outsourced to  for-profit  providers  and to
public  providers.  Employers  in  manufacturing  industries  used  to  have  the
biggest number of employers’ own OHS, 244 providers in 1992. In 2009 only 70
employers in manufacturing had an OHS of their own.
The state reorganized its own OHS units into a state-owned enterprise (SOE)
in 1996 and later sold the firm to investors in 2000. In 2007 a for-profit provider
bought the shares of the company and the ex-SOE was consolidated with the
for-profit provider. The SII has classified the applications of state employers
separately in 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 and not according to provider type.
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The costs of OHS per employee vary according to the size of the employer
(Figure 3). The spread increased during the period 1992-2009. In the smallest
firms or organizations the cost per employee was about 70 per cent of the costs
in organizations with more than 1,500 employees in 1992, and in 2009 it was
about 60 per cent. In general the costs per employee have been rising constantly
- fastest in the size groups 20-99, 100-499 and 500-1,499 employees and least for
employers with fewer than 10 employees. The maximum costs acceptable per
employee has been stable since 1995, about 370 Euros (in 2009 prices)
(Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland) 2011a, p. 408).
Figure 3: OHS costs per employee according to size (number of employees) of
employer in 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2009 (in 2009 prices) (Source:
Annual statistics on occupational health services published by the Social
Insurance Institution of Finland)
The costs of OHS per employee are not only dependent on the number of
employees. The differences in costs are even greater according to provider type
(Figure  4,  all  in  2009  prices).  The  costs  per  employee  more  than  doubled  for
public providers. The costs have also been increasing considerably in for-profits
and non-profits, more than 60%. Costs per employee have been higher in
employers’ own OHS than among other providers, and the costs per employee
have been increasing moderately compared to other provider types, about 20%.
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Figure 4: OHS costs per employee according to provider type in 1992, 1995,
1997, 2000, 2004 and 2009 (in 2009 prices) (Source: Annual statistics on
occupational health services published by the Social Insurance Institution of
Finland)
2.3 PROVIDERS OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES
The Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH) started the surveillance of
the OHS providers in the early 1990s (Räsänen, Peurala & Husman 2002,
Manninen 2009). There are no official statistics on occupational health care
providers compiling information on all providers in one register. The National
Institute for Health and Welfare (NIHW) collects information from all private
health care providers, also from for-profit, employers’ own and non-profit
providers. For other statistics concerning the services provided by the
municipalities the NIHW collects data from the public OHS providers. The
statistics provided by the Social Insurance Institution cover employers.
The FIOH surveys provide information on providers, such as their personnel
resources, services provided and employers and their employees. The numbers
of employers and employees differ from the numbers in the statistics provided
by the Social Insurance Institution. For small employers there may be no activity
within  a  year  and  not  all  employers  apply  for  reimbursement.  On  the  other
hand, an employer with multiple branches may have numerous contracts with
various  providers  across  the  country  but  may  apply  for  reimbursement  with
only one application. The information below is based on two publications by
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FIOH (Räsänen, Peurala & Husman 2002, Manninen 2009) presenting the results
of the surveys for the years 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2007. The first five
years also constitute the data for Studies 3 and 4 in this dissertation.
The number of OHS providers has been about 1,000 in the 1990s (Figure 5).
Since then the number of providers has decreased, mostly because the number
of employers’ own units has decreased more than 60 per cent. This was due to
the closing down of firms during the Finnish economic recession of the early
1990s and later due to outsourcing. The number of for-profit providers increased
until 2000, but thereafter mergers decreased this number. In the late 2000s their
number increased again. The number of public providers increased slightly
during the 1990s. In recent years consolidation of municipalities and the
merging of public providers have decreased their number. The number of non-
profits has remained quite stable. The number of providers in the FIOH survey
also varies because providers have changed their administrative practices. For
some years they could give the data on a city or on regional level, in other years
the data was given per office.
Figure 5: Number of occupational health services providers by provider type in
1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2007 (Räsänen, Peurala & Husman 2002,
Manninen 2009)
The severe economic recession of the early 1990s is also apparent in the number
of clients (employees) (Figure 6). The market shares have changed considerably
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since 1992 in Finland. The for-profit providers’ market share doubled to 48% in
2007. The market share of employers’ own units halved to 14% in 2007. The
employee clients in employers’ own units are not all employed by the employer
owning the OHS unit. Employers’ own OHS units also sell services to other
employers. Since 1992 the employees of these “buying” employers have
accounted for one fourth of the clientele in employers’ own units. The market
share of public providers fell by eleven percentage units to 32% in 2007 and non-
profits had a very stable market share of about 5%.
Figure 6: Number of clients (employees) by provider type in 1992, 1995, 1997,
2000, 2004 and 2007 (Räsänen, Peurala & Husman 2002, Manninen 2009)
The market shares calculated from the number of employers in Figure 7 below
give quite a different picture than does Figure 6 above. According the surveys,
only 1-3% of employers have contracts with an employer’s own OHS or non-
profit provider. The majority of contracts (over 60%) are with the public
provider. The for-profit providers’ share of contracts increased from 27% in 1992
to  36%  in  2007.  Here  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  provider  should  conduct  a
workplace survey with every employer, at least when the contract is made. The
number  of  contracts  yields  an  estimate  of  workplace  visits  needed  and  action
plans to be made and updated.
The number of contracts by provider type in Figure 7 is not comparable with
the number of reimbursement applications by provider type in 1995-2004
(Figure 2) because the SII changed the classification and published state
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employers’ applications as one category and other employers’ applications
according provider type. Although a contract reported in the FIOH survey by a
provider  and  employer’s  applications  for  reimbursement  according  to  the
published statistics do not match completely, it is still useful to compare them.
Firstly,  it  gives  an  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  small  firms  which  may  not  have
annually  any  activities  and  also  an  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  employers  who
have  chosen  a  provider  who  does  not  provide  services  annually.  Both  in  1992
and 2007 the number of reimbursement applications for public providers
accounted for only about 20% of the number of contracts reported in the survey.
The share of for-profit providers has been higher: it was 62% in 1992 and 52% in
2007. Even for the employer’s own OHS, the number of reimbursement
applications was only 63% of the number of contracts both in 1992 and 2007.
Some of  the “buying” employers  are  small  firms without  annual  expenses  and
big employers with multiple branches and their own OHS units may have only
one  application  for  reimbursement.  Non-profits  had  the  highest  share:  80%  in
1992 and 70% in 2007. (Chapter 6.1 addresses the merging of the reimbursement
register and the FIOH survey.)
Figure 7: Number of clients (employers) by provider type in 1992, 1995, 1997,
2000, 2004 and 2007 (Räsänen, Peurala & Husman 2002, Manninen 2009)
The provider types have had different payment systems: for-profits and public
providers have mainly fee-for-service payments, non-profits have a higher share
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of  their  revenues  based  on  capitation  and  employers’  own  OHS  has  a  budget
based on costs of resources. When employers’ own OHS units sell services to
other employers they have both capitation and fee-for-service payments. Non-
profits also have a combination of capitation and fee-for-service.
When  an  employer’s  own  OHS  has  been  selling  OHS  services  to  other
employers, over half of the payments have consisted of capitation payment
(Figure 8, estimated from the statistics). Non-profits used to collect their
revenues mainly through capitation payments. When the reimbursement system
was reformed in 1995, the costs in an employer’s reimbursement application
were supposed to be based on the costs of the services. The SII has
recommended the use of fee-for-service payments, and since then the share of
capitation has decreased from 80% to 50% for non-profit providers. Public and
for-profit providers have a much smaller share of capitation than the non-profits
or employers’ own OHS; in the late 2000s it was about 10%.
The providers may also set the level of the payment per employer, e.g. an
employer may negotiate a reduction of x% from the list price of the provider, or
get reductions in the lump sum fee per employee. Thus, there are no nationally
fixed prices. All providers may charge their own prices and the prices per
employer may also vary. Until 1995 the fees for the public provider were set by
the  Council  of  State.  After  the  reform  of  the  reimbursement  system,  public
providers  were  supposed  to  set  their  prices  themselves,  but  they  were  not
expected to earn profits. Originally, according to the legislation, the employers
were supposed to cover the costs of providing the services in municipal health
centres, too. Before the abolition of the price regulation the statutory set fees did
not cover the production costs (Kankaanpää et al. 1997). Five years after the
reform of the reimbursement system one third of the public providers still
applied the statutory prices set in 1992 (Pulkkinen-Närhi 2000).
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Figure 8: Share of capitation payments from total costs of OHS by provider type
(%) in 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2007 (Source: Annual statistics on
occupational health services published by the Social Insurance Institution of
Finland)
Provider types have differed according to the amount of personnel resources
(Figure 9). Here the resources have been made comparable by calculating the
number of clients (employees) per physician (full-time equivalent). For example,
if the unit had 2,700 employees and 3 physicians who altogether worked 72
hours a week the ratio would be 2700/(72/37) = 1387.
The public providers have had meagre resources compared to other provider
types,  especially  in  the  1990s.  The  physician  resources  have  increased,  but  the
physician of a public provider still has twice the number of clients (employees)
compared to other provider types. The difference in the physician resources has
been smaller between the other provider types, and diminished further during
the period 1992-2007.
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Figure 9: Number of clients (employees) per physician (full-time equivalent),
median in OHS units by provider type in 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2007
(Räsänen, Peurala & Husman 2002, Manninen 2009)
The difference in physician resources naturally also leads to differences in the
number of physician visits per employee (Figure 10). Public providers offered
much less medical care than other provider types in the 1990s. The number of
physician visits has been constantly growing in OHS provided by public units
and has almost reached the level of other providers.
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Figure 10: Number of physician visits per 100 clients (employees) per year,
mean in OHS units by provider type in 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2007
(Räsänen, Peurala & Husman 2002, Manninen 2009)
In general, the OHS providers’ services are oriented to individual employees.
For example, the annual number of workplace surveys per 100 employees
conducted by different occupational health personnel groups is close to zero in
all  provider  types.  Only  occupational  nurses  have  a  ratio  of  1.3-2.4  workplace
visits per 100 employees. Most of the preventive resources are used for health
checkups: annually OHS providers conduct about 1 million health checkups.
The annual number of medical care visits was 5 million in 2007
(Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland) 2009). All these
services provided to about 2.1 million employed people.
The legislation on the provision of OHS is the same for all provider types.
There are a few exceptions: public providers have been governed by the Public
Health  Act,  which  states  that  all  municipal  health  centres  must  provide  or
organize OHS for employers within their region. All other types may freely
enter and exit the market.
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3 Incentive Structures for
Purchasers and Providers
3.1 LEGISLATION TO ACHIEVE THE SOCIETAL GOALS OF
OHS
Society  wants  employers  to  protect  their  employees  against  health  hazards  at
work.  Social  objectives  and  market  failures  justify  the  use  of  rules  and
regulations. Traditionally and historically, social and ethical arguments have
been used to support preventive occupational health services. It has been
regarded as a fundamental right of each worker to enjoy the highest attainable
standard of health, and workers' health at work should be protected (World
Health Organization 1994, International Labor Organization 1985). The
legislation on occupational safety and health issues may also reflect a great deal
of paternalism (Mattila 2006, Gruenspecht, Lave 1989, p. 1512, 1531, Cohen,
Henderson 1988).
The regulation could also be justified by the positive externalities caused by
prevention,  or  by the public  good nature of  prevention (market  failure).  There
are no positive externalities like those attached to vaccination or the prevention
of communicable diseases in OHS. As Gruenspecht and Lane (1989, p. 1522)
note,  health  and  safety  are  not  in  themselves  inherently  public  goods.  In
developed countries, social security and health care are usually publicly or
collectively funded. Then society has an interest in making employers improve
health and safety at work to avoid negative externalities to employees and
taxpayers. The obligation to organize preventive occupational health services is
one of the tools available to policymakers. When such an ethical code is imposed
on  employers  from  the  outside  (society),  an  employer  can  expect  that  all
employers will do the same, and the employer spending in safety and health in
production does not have to fear any excessive costs for good behaviour (Arrow
1973, p. 310).
To achieve its goal society has used legislation as an incentive. The concept of
incentive has been defined as something that “can induce behaviour” (Maynard,
Kanavos 2000, p. 185). This definition incorporates both the fear of punishment
and the expectation of reward. According to Yarrow (1999), incentives are jointly
determined  by  a  whole  range  of  factors,  such  as  market  and  policy
environments, and the regulatory system. The intensity of competition in the
product market, capital markets (e.g. takeover and bankruptcy threats) and
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labour markets (e.g. the value of reputation, the transferability of human capital)
can all be regarded as incentives (Nickell 1996, Nickell, Nicolitsas & Dryden
1997). Together legislation, politics, society, institutions, competition and even
geography set the limits, or give the chances for employers and OHS providers
to achieve their objectives.
The legislation on the Finnish OHS applies various policy tools (Figure 11): 1)
the  funds  for  the  mandatory  public  health  insurance  are  collected  from
employers and employees and, 2) the purchasing task has been delegated to
employers: preventive services are obligatory and medical service voluntary, 3)
the employers may choose how to organize the services: this has created a
market including employers’ own OHS units, non-profits, and for-profits;
municipal health centres have a legal obligation to organize OHS services
(public  provider)  4)  the  number  of  OH  personnel  is  stipulated  by  the
government by regulating the number of licensed physicians; the legislation also
includes requirements for OH personnel regarding training and education in
occupational health, 5) the purchaser – provider relationship is based on a
contract,  the  payment  systems  differ  depending  on  the  type  of  provider;  the
information asymmetry between the provider and the employer is recognised in
the  legislation:  the  employer  has  to  use  the  expertise  of  an  OHS  provider  in
planning the content of the OHS 6) the Social Insurance Institution reimburses
about half of the costs of OHS. The government delegates considerable power to
control the costs and content of the services to the Social Insurance Institution.
The reimbursement system aims at channelling resources to prevention (the
services have been divided into two categories: preventive and medical services)
and to contain the costs (there is a cap for maximum acceptable costs for both
categories of services).
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Figure 11: Incentive structure for employers and OHS providers
Insurance, reimbursement, control and obligation create the incentive structure
for the employer. How well the employer achieves the objective of society
depends on the employer’s objectives and motivation. The employer’s means to
steer the OHS provider are the contract and the payment system, and the threat
to change the provider – if another option exists. The behaviour and
performance of the OHS provider are then dependent on the payment system
and  the  market  structure  of  the  providers,  and  its  own  objectives,  which  in
health economics are often represented by the ownership of the provider.
What  would  explain  the  choices  that  the  government  has  made  on  OHS  to
achieve its objectives? In general, the way health care provision and funding
have been organized nationally is quite varied. According to Newhouse (2002, p.
5-6), the choices in organizing health care reflect “different approaches”,
whereas Zweifel et al. (2009, p. 379) state that “these differences ultimately
reflect basic differences in philosophy.” According to Yarrow (1999, p. 158,
footnote  2)  the  regulation  and  incentives  are  a  result  of  "the  market  for
regulation". According to this metaphor, the various types of state interventions,
like the granting of a subsidy are outputs supplied by some arm of the state, e.g.,
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the legislature, a ministry or a regulatory agency. The intervention is a response
to explicit or implicit demand from one or more sections of the population, e.g.,
producers, labour unions, consumers or taxpayers. Depending on the power and
influence of these subgroups the regulation could promote more the profit of the
industry regulated/subsidised rather than social welfare (Viscusi, Harrington &
Vernon 2005, p. 375). At the societal level, both employers and providers want
society to lay down the rules of the game (legislation, reimbursement etc.) in the
way that is most beneficial for them. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is
only  one  actor  in  the  decision-making,  and  the  unions  and  provider
organizations have a say in all issues concerning the national decisions on OHS.
3.2 EMPLOYERS’ DECISION-MAKING ON OHS
To be able to understand the objectives of an employer with respect to OHS one
has  to  define  what  occupational  health  services  are:  are  they  an  input  in  the
production process, or a fringe benefit? If OHS is an input, the decisions on how
much OHS will be used depend on the price of OHS and its marginal value in
the production process.
Pauly (1999, p. 2) objects to the idea that employers and companies bear the
costs of health services and other benefits at work. He argues that eventually the
health services and insurance based on employment is paid by the employees.
Higher medical costs reduce money wages (compensating differential). Offering
generous curative medical services would then lead to employees' lower wage
demands.  Health  services  are  then  fringe  benefits,  that  is,  the  employer  offers
employees health services in lieu of monetary wages. Actually, the payer of the
fringe benefits depends on the elasticity of labour supply and demand. Usually
fringe benefits include health insurance and pensions (Jolls 2007). While the
theory of compensating differentials is simple and clear it appears to be difficult
to prove empirically. For example, most empirical studies show that health
insurance is associated with higher, not lower wages. The more productive
workers have both higher wages and more extensive health insurance.
The employer’s role as a purchaser of health services for the employees can
also  be  beneficial  for  the  employees  because  of  favourable  tax  treatment  and
lower administrative and search costs, as Morrissey (2001) justified the buying
of a health insurance through an employer. When employers act on behalf of
their  employees  (as  in  the  case  of  health  insurance  in  the  USA)  they  also  take
into  account  the  objectives  of  the  employees.  Then,  as  rational  consumers,  the
employees balance the lost monetary wage and the benefit of OHS and mediate
this demand to their employers. Even though the fringe benefit option of OHS is
recognised,  we  will  stick  to  the  idea  of  legislation  aiming  at  the  promotion  of
health and safety at work.
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Although the legislation on OHS concerns all employers in this dissertation I
will concentrate on companies only in Studies 1 and 2. Their decisions on OHS
can therefore be examined with their profit maximization objective in mind. In
economics,  the  only  reason  for  the  existence  of  a  company  is  to  organize
production to  satisfy  consumer demands in  order  to  gain maximal  profit.  This
profit-maximizing motive is connected to individuals; all shareholders are
assumed  to  prefer  more  income  to  less.  There  is  always  some  good  or  service
which a shareholder would like to have a little more. Therefore, all shareholders
favour profit maximization (Milgrom, Roberts 1992, p. 64).
When companies make decisions on OHS, they weigh the marginal benefits
against the marginal costs. This rule applies, irrespective of the nature of the
OHS  for  a  company:  whether  it  is  regarded  as  an  input  or  a  fringe  benefit.  In
addition, the companies have to solve the ‘make-or-buy’ decision: whether to
provide the OHS internally (vertical integration) or buy the services.
3.2.1 Benefits of OHS to a Company
Organizing preventive occupational health services is a legal obligation of an
employer. If the benefits of good working conditions were paid into tax payers’
or employees’ hands, the company’s objective could be only to obey the law
(and avoid the fine if caught) and the company would aim at minimizing the
costs of OHS.
Society is not the only actor to attach moral and ethical objectives to
occupational  health  and  safety,  employers  also  mention  them  as  important
reasons for attending to occupational safety and health (Miller, Haslam 2009).
Many authors of occupational safety and health publications have claimed that
occupational health and safety is “a profitable investment” for a company
(Mossink 2002, Ahonen 1995, European Agency for Safety and Health at Work
1998). The moral, ethical and financial benefits to employers are closely
connected to the effectiveness of the services provided by the OH personnel and
the interventions that they propose.
Preventive  OHS  are  supposed  to  lead  to  a  reduction  in  number  of
occupational accidents and diseases, less sickness absence and fewer disability
pensions, all of which improve the economic performance of the company
(Ahonen 1995, European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. 2008). The
financial benefits are due to the lower cost of illness for the company. In Finland,
employers pay wages during sick leave according to the collective agreement.
Part of the wages is compensated by the SII. The biggest employers are liable for
disability pension expenditure - the payment category is based on their
disability pensions (Ylinen 2010). In addition, the employers have to insure
themselves against occupational accidents and diseases.
The interventions recommended or initiated by occupational health
personnel can also improve productivity. When employees are motivated and
committed to their work they are keen to improve the services and products.
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Better quality will further lead to higher customer satisfaction and faster
payment of invoices. This reduces receivable accounts and thus provides higher
return on capital employed. Employees' initiatives also concern internal
processes. The result will be less rework and smooth processes that lower
operating expenses.  (Kaplan,  Norton 1996.)  The gains  in  productivity  could be
much greater and be realized faster than the health effects (Miller, Haslam 2009,
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón & Vázquez-Ordás 2009). Fernández-Muñiz et
al. (2009) in their survey found a positive relationship between occupational
safety management and economic performance.
Curative medical services have been promoted with statements like: “healthy
people should be more productive” (Brandt-Rauf, Burton & McCunney 2001, p.
1). The health of employees affects the quality (productivity and performance)
and  the  quantity  (absence  and  exit/turnover)  of  the  labour  they  provide.  This
will eventually have an impact on the efficiency and cost of labour (Miller,
Haslam 2009).
Many authors of occupational safety and health publications have defended
the logic of the positive cycle, e.g. Mossink (2002, p. 12) who has aggregated the
argumentation into Figure 12. Yet, the empirical literature has provided little
empirical evidence for the argumentation (Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón &
Vázquez-Ordás 2009, p. 980). In addition, the published economic evaluations of
interventions and business cases have been of low quality (Tompa et al. 2008,
Verbeek, Pulliainen & Kankaanpää 2009).
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Figure 12: Economic effects of safety and health at company level (Mossink
2002, p. 12)
3.2.2 Costs of OHS to a Company
Mossink in his picture (Figure 12) did not consider other measures affecting
company performance. These other measures compete with investments in
safety and health in the company. OHS is only one input in the production
process. The reimbursement system for OHS changes the relative price of OHS
with respect to other inputs.
Filer  and  Golbe  (2003)  considered  decision-making  in  firms  with  respect  to
safety investments. Although in most cases safety investments in their study
meant investments in safety equipment, their discussion is useful for OHS. The
benefits  of  OHS  and  interventions  can  accrue  over  a  long  time.  Then  the
economic situation of the company (especially the high risk of bankruptcy)
could have an impact on the company’s decisions regarding OHS expenditure.
In general, a company's financial structure substantially affects its real
operating  decisions  and  the  amount  of  risk  the  company  is  willing  to  bear,
which has an impact on the firm's input choices. Investments in safety are such
inputs. The economic situation and financial structure of the company may
affect occupational safety differently from other input decisions (pecking order
for  investments).  Acquiring  outside  funding  for  safety  investments  may  be
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difficult. Filer and Golbe (2003) assess that there is considerable information
asymmetry in safety issues between the firm (manager) and the capital market;
it  is  more  difficult  to  get  outside  funding  for  safety  investments  than,  for
example,  investments  in  productivity.  Therefore  investment  decisions  are
dependent on the liquidity of the company (cash flows). Cash flows indicate if
there is internal funding available in general, also for investments in safety and
health. On the other hand, managers are agents for the owners of the company.
In this task they balance their own non-verifiable effort and investments in
safety equipment to avoid occupational accidents. Thirdly, workplace safety can
also be regarded as one form of rent-sharing with employees. Then, if the capital
structure has an impact on the firm’s bargaining power with employees, it will
also have an impact on safety investments.
Filer and Golbe (2003) observed that, in a wide range of industries, the level
of safety in a workplace was related to the firm's operating margin. Particularly
at low levels of operating margin, firms doing worse also invested less in safety.
Nickell and Nicolitsas (1997) found that declining company finances lead to
lower pay and to lower safety levels as indicated by the abolition of "restrictive
practices" such as restrictions on working hours, manning ratios on machines,
and inflexibility of working practices. The lifting of these restrictions can be
interpreted as a lowering of safety levels.
Although occupational health services differ from investments in safety
equipment the literature summarized in this chapter helps to understand the
connections between expenditure on OHS and a company’s economic
performance.  The  costs  for  occupational  health  services  include  only  the
payments  for  the  OHS  providers,  which  will  be  paid  immediately,  while  the
benefits  of  good  OHS  will  be  derived  only  in  the  future.  Therefore,  we  expect
that high leverage and the risk of bankruptcy will lower the investment in
occupational health services. This is due to shareholders' and bondholders'
conflicting  interests.  Owners  bear  the  costs  of  OHS,  in  case  of  bankruptcy  the
bondholders  become  the  owners  of  the  company  and  will  receive  the  fruits  of
OHS, or the costs of neglect. Therefore, we would expect to see a positive
association between the preceding economic performance of a company and its
expenditure on preventive care, i.e. companies doing worse would cut down the
expenditure on preventive care. On the other hand, companies with good
economic performance would presumably share part of the profit with
employees, i.e. a company would spend more for both preventive and medical
services.
3.2.3 Employer’s OHS ‘make or buy’ Decision
Zweifel et al. (2009, p. 384) proposed that employers can also have a role in
organizing  health  care.  But  they  assumed  that  the  role  can  be  only  that  of  a
purchaser of insurance, not the role of a provider. For reasons of confidentiality,
they  thought  that  it  would  not  be  possible  for  employers  to  provide  health
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services themselves. According to them, exceptions could be remote site, shift-
work or factory towns where transaction costs would make it worthwhile for the
employer to employ physicians and provide the services. The reasons that
Zweifel et al. (2009) listed reasons for the employer to provide the services near
the  plant  or  organization  are  sound,  but  they  are  not  reasons  for  providing
health services ‘in-house’, i.e. to maintain an employer’s own OHS.
The common argument in economics for organizing production in-house are
transaction costs due to information asymmetry and incomplete contracts
(Coase 1937, Williamson 1985). The existence of transaction costs is based largely
on the assumption of humans behaving opportunistically. The opportunism can
take place because contracts are incomplete and therefore high costs would
accompany a ‘buy’ decision: "external service provider [...] requires the firm to
incur substantial costs of negotiation, monitoring, and supervising external
contractual parties." (Ang, Cummings 1997, p. 239.) This argument is usually
accepted without noticing that if a task is so complex that it is difficult to write a
contract  on  it  there  is  room  for  opportunism  and  the  costs  of  controlling  and
monitoring will be high, although the production is organized in-house. Liu and
Yang (2000, p. 149) note that if trading involves endogenous transaction costs
caused  by  moral  hazard  or  other  types  of  information  asymmetry,  trading  in
labour may involve endogenous transaction costs as well. James (1998) also
criticizes transaction cost theory for the reliance on managerial control. If OHS
providers  and  other  health  care  providers  are  difficult  to  steer  with  contracts
due to informational problems, it is likewise difficult to steer them
hierarchically.
Oliver Hart (1995, p. 5) acknowledges that transaction cost theory puts a lot
of emphasis on the costs of drawing up contracts and the consequent contractual
incompleteness. Still, the theory pays less attention to how the relationship
allocates power among purchaser/owner and provider. Milgrom and Roberts
(1992, p. 136-9) describe the hold-up problem connected to asset specificity4. The
risk is that after the contract has been signed and the investments realized, the
other party tries to benefit from the sunk costs by worsening the terms of the
contract. Chalkley and Malcomson (2000, p. 875-6) describe a hold-up problem
between a National Health Service (NHS) hospital and a Health Authority (HA).
When the contract is made and the hospital has invested in equipment the HA is
able to capture the return on investment. This leads to a strong disincentive for
relation  specific  investments,  be  they  equipment,  skills  or  processes.  Property
rights theory formally modelled the hold-up problem, and analysed the costs
and benefits of integration in a unified manner. Grossman and Hart (1986, p.
695, footnote 3) regarded “the right to audit” sometimes as a residual right
rather  than  a  contractible  right.  Then  the  make  or  buy  decision  could  be
4 One party in the relationship has invested in skills, equipment etc. that is most valuable in this
specific relationship and valued less in other use.
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explained by the need for information and how the availability of information is
dependent on ownership patterns. In an employer’s own OHS and in non-
profits the employers have access to information on services, resources and
costs.
The vertical integration of an OHS provider would mitigate the hold-up
problem but the lock-in problem could still exist. The lock-in problem arises
when both parties in the relationship are stuck with each other (Whinston 2001,
Tadelis 2002). The partners are the best possible for each other (otherwise the
contract would not exist) - they create additional value, "quasi-rent" (Whinston
refers to Klein et al. (1978)). Because contracts are incomplete, both parties try to
increase their share of this quasi-rent and this causes inefficiency. "Hold-up" and
"lock-in" could both be described as games, and then bargaining power matters
a  lot.  Big  employers  and  their  providers  may  have  hold-up  and  lock-in
situations.  In  an  employer’s  own  OHS  and  in  non-profits  there  may  be  asset
specificity in the relationship: employers have invested in facilities and
organizational structures; providers have invested in skills and knowledge
needed in a specific workplace, they know how the company “functions”, whom
to contact etc.
The reason for employers to have their own OHS could also be based on
history. When employers started organizing health services in Finland, the
services were neither available from the market nor provided publicly (Jaakkola
et al. 1994). Health insurance organized by the employers has the same historical
background in the USA (Currie, Madrian 1999).
3.3 OWNERSHIP AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE
PROVIDER
The  objectives  of  health  care  provider  organizations  are  thought  to  be
represented by different ownership types. Then the differences in health care
providers’ performance would have their origin in owners’ different objectives.
In Finnish occupational health services there are three different owners:
shareowners of for-profit providers, politicians/bureaucrats as owners of public
providers and employers themselves when they have their own OHS provider
or organize the services jointly (non-profit).
Private for-profit health care providers aim at maximizing profits, as would
any firm according to economics. In theoretical models this objective has been
refined  to  take  into  account  that  health  care  providers  are  multi-tasking  firms
that maximize revenues less treatment costs and the disutility of efforts to lower
costs and improve quality (Ma 1994, Chalkley, Malcomson 1998b, Chalkley,
Malcomson 1998a, Levaggi 2005). Non-profits have been claimed to maximize
net revenues or profits, but instead of distributing these funds to shareholders,
non-profits  allocate  them to uses  selected by firm insiders,  such as  community
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benefit programmes, "contingency funds", or greater employee perks (Eggleston,
Zeckhauser 2002, p. 44). This objective could also apply to the employer’s own
OHS and jointly owned OHS (non-profit) providers. Public health care
providers, like all public organizations in general, differ from firms. They may
have broad social goals, or totally lack precise goals (Shen et al. 2005). Public
providers have also been reported to aim at maximizing the budget (Niskanen
1968).
In health care there are multiple and hierarchical agency relationships.
Health care organizations are led by managers and finally the treatment
decisions  and  decisions  about  the  use  of  resources  are  made  by  health  care
professionals. Although the owners may want to maximize the profit, due to the
non-verifiable effort of a manager even for-profit health care provider may not
be optimally efficient "Hospitals maximize profits plus utility from slack" (Pope
1989, p. 151).
Eggleston and Zeckhauser (2002, p. 36) oppose the idea that different
organizations  take  different  account  of  the  best  of  the  funding  organization  or
that of society by their “nature”. Actually, the medical ethics of physicians
should also be the same irrespective of the ownership of the health care
provider. Arrow (1973, p. 14) regards unnecessary medical expenses or other
abuses as violations of medical ethics. Eggleston and Zeckhauser (2002) state
that the possible differences are due to different incentives and regulations.
Their idea is supported by Barbetta, Turati and Zago (2007, p. 75-6): the
differences in economic performances between competing forms of ownership
are  more the result  of  the institutional  settings  in  which they operate  -  e.g.  the
reimbursement  schemes  -  than  the  objectives  embedded  in  the  various
proprietary forms. A totally different explanation for why ownership does not
matter is proposed by Pauly and Redisch (1973). They described health care
providers  as  physicians’  co-operatives.  Whatever  the  form  of  ownership,  the
organizations would aim at maximizing the physicians’ joint income.
The ownership of the provider is indeed intertwined with many incentives.
Ownership matters, because the financial constraints differ according to the
ownership: public providers are more secure and backed up by their principal's
ability  to  raise  taxes  if  funds  are  needed,  and  the  principal  may  be  unable  to
commit to hard budget constraints (Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003). When
employers  own  an  OHS  unit  or  are  jointly  in  charge  of  an  OHS,  they  have  to
back up the provider. For these providers the softness of the budget constraint is
less soft than for public providers. As Segal (1998) stated, the budget constraints
can be hardened if competition exists, in employer’s own OHS and non-profits
the owner (the employer) has the threat of outsourcing its own OHS or changing
the provider. A hard budget constraint makes the provider fully accountable for
its financial performance. Preker et al. (2007b, p. 96) state that at least
theoretically,  the  chance  of  liquidation  in  case  of  insolvency  should  exist  for  a
health care provider.
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Ownership  is  also  connected  to  incentives  for  innovations.  Innovations  in
quality improvement and cost control cannot be articulated explicitly in a
purchaser-provider contract ex ante. Important opportunities for innovation will
therefore arise after a contract has been negotiated and signed. Incentives for
such  innovations  will  depend  essentially  on  who  has  control  rights  to
implement the innovations, and captures the benefits from those innovations.
(Eggleston, Zeckhauser 2002, p. 40). Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) compared
theoretically public and private for-profit providers and concluded that a
private owner has stronger incentives to invest in innovations, especially to
those that reduce production costs. In their model, the costs are always lower in
the private for-profit firm. Quality may be higher or lower than in public
provision. Eggleston and Zeckhauser (2002) claim that these stunted incentives
for  innovation  can  lead  to  cumulative  low  levels  of  innovation,  so  that  such  a
provider (public) ends up well behind the technical frontier.
In  empirical  studies  contradictory results  have been reported regarding the
effect of ownership on quality and economic performance. Devereaux et al.
(2002) in their meta-analysis compared mortality in private non-profit and for-
profit hospitals. They recognised the problems of combining observational
studies into one figure, treatment effect, but still concluded that the mortality
rate is higher in private for-profit hospitals than in private non-profit hospitals.
The empirical literature on the direct effects of ownership has been reviewed by
Eggleston et al. (2008) and Shen et al. (2007). They conducted meta-analyses of
hospital ownership and performance since 1990. Their aim was to explain
variation  of  the  results  in  different  studies  but  not  to  calculate  the  treatment
effect. Eggleston et al. (2008) studied the effect of ownership on mortality and
other adverse events. Shen et al. (2005, 2007) concentrated on the effect of
ownership on the financial performance of hospitals: cost, revenue, profit
margin,  and  both  cost  and  technical  efficiency.  In  both  meta-analyses  the
conclusion was that better quality studies that take into account market
environment and patient mix as confounding factors and use longitudinal data
reveal smaller differences in performance according to ownership. The results of
Shen  et  al.  indicate  that  ownership  played  a  much  less  important  role  in
influencing hospital financial performance than other hospital characteristics,
even  when  it  was  a  significant  predictor.  They  did  not  regard  the  result  as
surprising, given that there are so many other factors influencing a hospital’s
operations.
Although ownership has been regarded to represent different objectives, we
prefer to regard it as representing differences in incentive structure. Different
ownership types have different payment systems, financial constraints and
incentives for innovations that are connected to their performance.
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4 Purchasing, Payment
Systems and Competition
4.1 ORGANIZATION OF PURCHASING
The  purchasing  of  OHS  in  Finland  is  very  fragmented.  Each  employer  is
responsible for purchasing the services irrespective of the number of employees.
According to the Occupational Health Care Act, the worksite of an employer can
have only one provider. However, an employer with multiple worksites in
different geographical regions may have multiple providers. In non-profits the
employers have combined their efforts and organized the provision together.
According to Preker et al. (2007b, p. 85) fragmented purchasing may cause cost
shifting if the patients can be transferred to another purchaser’s purse. If the
funds per insured person (individual, employee) between purchasers vary it
may have negative equity consequences. The purchasing pool may be too small
to  bear  the  risk  variation.  When  purchasing  is  organized  integrating  the
provider  (employer’s  own  OHS)  and  the  pool  is  small  it  leads  to  a  narrower
clinical  network  (scope  of  services)  for  the  employer  and  too  small  patient
volume for the provider. The optimal scope of purchasing (insuring) often
exceeds the geographical scope of a medical group (Preker et al. 2007b, p. 91).
The way in which purchasing of  OHS is  organized has  some characteristics
of an exclusive provider organization (EPO) in the USA. The employer (instead
of  an  insurance  company  in  the  USA)  contracts  with  one  provider  and  funds
only services provided by the EPO. In the USA the insurer pays an access fee to
the EPO and gets discounts on the prices. One-contract-only policy seems also to
be the lowest cost option when an employer bears all costs. Vistnes, Cooper and
Vistnes (2001) studied two-stage competition in the USA: employers first choose
the health plans and then employees choose one plan from among those chosen
by the employer. The premiums were higher if employers paid the whole
premium and offered more than one plan.
4.2 PAYMENT SYSTEMS
4.2.1 Agency, Contract and Informational Problems
Purchasing has been regarded as important in steering the providers (Figueras,
Robinson & Jakubowski 2005, Preker et al. 2007a). Langenbrunner et al. (2005, p.
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237) describe strategic purchasing as a tool to correct market failures, and
payment mechanisms provide an opportunity to affect providers’ behaviour.
Basically, there are two organizational forms to allocate resources to providers:
ownership and purchasing. Ownership is one form of resource allocation
mechanism  and  the  purchaser  and  the  provider  are  then  vertically  integrated.
Purchasing may be based on long-term contracts or spot-market transactions.
According  to  the  Occupational  Health  Care  Act,  the  employer  must  have  a
contract with the OHS provider, therefore there is no spot-market for OHS.
The  theoretical  analysis  of  payment  systems  is  mainly  based  on  agency
theories and incentives. As Varian (2010, p. 730) wrote, the idea is to find means
to induce behaviour:  “How can I  get  someone to  do something for  me?” In an
agency relationship, it is often thought that the purchaser is the principal who
sets the terms of the contract and the provider (the agent) only has the option to
accept  or  reject:  “the  purchaser  can  make  credible  ‘take  it  or  leave  it’  offers  to
suppliers” (Chalkley, Malcomson 2000, p. 852). In Finnish OHS, it can be also the
provider who has decided upon the structure of the payment system to be
applied.  Then  it  is  up  to  the  purchaser  to  accept  or  reject  the  contract  and  the
payment system, or, depending on the bargaining power, to negotiate the level
of payment (but not the structure of the payment system).
Chalkley (2006) defines a contract as a formal statement of what the
purchaser  will  pay  for  a  task  (tasks)  and  how  to  assess  that  the  provider  has
performed that task. Contracts are supposed to be enforced, if necessary, and
therefore the judgement whether the terms of the contract have been met must
be verifiable by an outsider (the enforcer). It is common in the literature to use
the word contract to refer to arrangements for payment even if there is no
formal legal contract (Chalkley, Malcomson 2000, p. 851). In Finnish OHS, the
contract concerns more the practical arrangements, such as if the services
include only preventive services or also curative medical services. The prices
will be on the “pricelist” and the tasks will be included in the separate action
plan, which usually does not contain a budget. Action plans have been vague
and the employer has not had a role in preparing the plan; the provider makes
the proposal for the action plan (Laine et al. 2009). The legislation recognises
information  asymmetry  in  occupational  safety  and  health  issues:  according  to
the Act (Occupational Health Care Act 1383/2001) the employer must consult the
OHS  provider  to  assess  the  needs  for  OHS  and  decisions  on  the  services
provided.
Informational problems are crucial in agency relationships, as in the
purchaser (employer) - provider relationship. If the purchaser's objective is non-
contractible, the success of the payment system depends on how well the basis
for payment and performance measure relates to the purchaser's objectives
(Baker 1992). The objectives of society mediated through the purchaser are
difficult to translate into contracts and bases for payment, e.g. the prevention of
work-related  illnesses  and  accidents,  or  the  functional  capacity  of  employees
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(Occupational Health Care Act 1383/2001). There is uncertainty in the occurrence
of diseases and also in the effectiveness of preventive actions. Working capacity
is  difficult  to  verify  and  hardly  mainly  dependent  on  the  actions  of  OH
personnel. The issues of observability and verifiability matter as to what may
constitute the basis of the payment (Beitia 2003).
Another  informational  problem  is  created  by  the  fact  that  from  the
purchasers’ point of view the health care providers can be described as
multitasking firms: providers have to expend effort both to keep the costs down
and  to  improve  quality5. The purchaser prefers high effort to low effort (high
quality and low cost). Quality, and the effort to improve it,  cannot be observed
and verified by the purchaser and therefore cannot be the basis of payment. The
effort to lower the production cost would not be observed, either, but the price
can be observed. Then the providers would have a stronger incentive to lower
production costs and prices than improve quality. This is the common multi-
tasking  problem  when  one  of  the  tasks  can  be  observed  and  verified,  and  the
other one not (Holmström, Milgrom 1991).
Without informational problems, the purchaser would merely specify the
quantity and quality of services it desired and pay a price high enough to make
the provider to accept the contract. “It [the purchasing agency] would not need
to induce the  supplier  to  provide  the  appropriate  services  by  choice  of  the
arrangements for payment.” (Chalkley, Malcomson 2000, p. 851, italics original).
Chaix-Couturier et al. (2000, p. 139) stress that financial incentives are used to
implement change in medical practice that does not stem from professionals’
own motivation. This observation raises another issue in agency relationships:
the  objectives  of  the  principals  and  agents  are  not  identical.  If  they  were,  the
imperfect information would not cause problems (Smith, Street 2006).
4.2.2 Payment Systems for OHS Providers
In  Finnish  OHS  the  employers  first  bear  all  costs  and  then  apply  for
reimbursement, and the services are free of charge for employees. Therefore
only supply-side payments are relevant. Ellis and Miller (2008) analyse payment
systems according to four dimensions: breadth of payment, information used for
payment, degree of detail in the payment system (fineness) and the generosity of
the payment. Their dimensions will be made use of in the following description
of payment systems in general, and especially those applied in Finnish
occupational health services. According to Ellis and Miller, the three main ways
to pay health care providers are budgets, fee schedules and episode-based
5 Camerer and Malmendier (2004, p. 8) state that in economics effort stands for "a euphemism for
whatever activity agents dislike which is productive for principals".
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payments. The payment can be based on patient/citizen characteristics, service
characteristics or provider characteristics6.
The Occupational Health Care Act sets the limits for the extent of purchasing.
All employers must purchase their preventive services. Curative medical care is
voluntary for employers but most employers have included this in the contract.
Occupational health services are restricted to GP level services only. There will
therefore not be any services provided by hospitals. Occupational physicians
can refer a patient to a specialist for consultation, but that is rare.
Public  providers  in  Finland  used  to  have  line-item  budgets  based  on  the
previous year’s expenditure. Information that was needed for funding therefore
concerned the resources only, not the services provided or those using the
services. The line-item budget locks the provider into existing resources. In
addition, it does not provide any incentives to save. Liu and Mills (2007b) have
used the name “open-ended budget” when the purchaser provides additional
funds if the budget is exceeded; in Finnish municipal health centre (public) it is
not the purchaser but the owner who has to provide the additional funds, i.e. a
public  provider  may  have  a  soft  budget  constraint.  In  Finnish  OHS,  the
employer’s  own  OHS  has  a  fixed  budget  and  has  the  same  features  as  global
budgets for hospitals: after the amount of the budget has been set it will not be
changed. The budget is neither connected to patients served nor to the services
provided. In general, a fixed budget is supposed to lower the quality of services.
However, payer monitoring could be effective in enhancing quality. Also, if the
providers are able to realize savings from preventive care a fixed budget could
encourage providers into prevention. (Liu, Mills 2007b, p. 269-270.)
The reimbursement  system for  OHS has  a  cap per  employee,  and,  knowing
this,  the  employer  could  allocate  resources  to  the  employer’s  own  OHS  as  a
fixed sum per employee. Then the payment system in employer’s own OHS
could be regarded as a budget based on capitation7. And further, capitation
could be regarded as bundling of services. The capitation payment includes all
services  provided  by  the  employer’s  own  OHS:  physician  and  nurse  visits,
workplace surveillance, lab tests etc. When the capitation payment is too low,
the providers would have an incentive to stint – deliver fewer services than an
informed patient would like (Newhouse 2002, p. 82) or lower the quality –
skimping  on  office  quality,  accepting  too  many  registrants  that  would  lead  to
6 Langenbrunner et al. (2005, p. 237-8) propose a typology that differs from that of Ellis and Miller.
Langenbrunner et al. divide payment systems into time based payments (salary or fixed budget),
service based (fee-for-service, fee for patient episode such as diagnoses related group (DRG)) and
population based (capitation, block contract) which is close to the information base classification of
Ellis and Miller.
7 A method of payment for health services in which a physician or hospital is paid a fixed amount
per enrollee to cover a defined scope of services for a defined population for a defined period of
time, regardless of the actual number or nature of services provided; capitation may be used by
purchasers to pay for health plans or by plans to pay providers; http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/capitation (accessed 4/4/2012).
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long waiting times (Liu, Mills 2007b, p. 265). Capitation makes it profitable for
the provider to seek cheaper ways of providing the services, e.g. to use nurses
instead of physicians, or engage in cost-shifting e.g. increasing the referrals to
hospitals (Liu, Mills 2007b, p. 264-5, Ellis, Miller 2008, p. 399).
Non-profits, for-profits and public providers all have much finer
categorizations of the payment system than employers’ own OHS. They all have
both fee-for-service payments and capitation. They differ in the share of
capitation: for-profits and public providers earn about 10% of their revenues
with capitation payments, non-profits about 50%. Fee-for-service (FFS)
payments are a poor means of controlling quantity, and therefore the total costs.
FFS induces the provider to concentrate on the most profitable service offerings
irrespective  of  the  benefit  to  patients  or  purchaser.  Overprovision  is  another
likely problem. On the other hand, the steering power of the FFS could be used
to encourage the use of cost-effective treatments and discourage the use of
inefficient treatments (Liu, Mills 2007b, p. 262).
The fineness of the payment system is connected to the risk that a variation in
costs would cause to the providers. For example, the prospective payment
system,  DRG prices,  varies  widely in  cost  per  case.  This  gives  an incentive for
providers not to treat high-risk (high-cost) patients. The occupational health
services have to be grouped into two categories because of the reimbursement
system requirements: preventive and curative medical care. Otherwise the
providers are allowed to name their service offerings and decide on the degree
of  detail  in  the  “product  list”.  The  services  are  restricted  by  law  to  GP  level
medical services so the uncertainty connected to the variation of cost per item in
the payment system is negligible. The providers can always refer their clients
(employees)  to  public  primary  and  specialised  care  without  any  costs  to  the
employers.
The fee-for-service in Finnish OHS deviates from the fixed price systems in
the USA and in the UK. In both countries the price is prospectively determined
per patient in a certain category, e.g. diagnoses related group (DRG) in the USA
or  health  resource  group  (HRG)  in  the  UK.  They  give  strong  incentives  for
providers to seek cost savings because the provider will be the residual claimant
of all savings (Chalkley 2006, p. 246). Fixed payment systems per patient rely on
provider altruism that high-quality services are provided (Ellis, Miller 2008, p.
398). The incentive to prefer low-risk (low-cost) patients and avoid high-risk
(high-cost) patients is strong, both for the insurer and the provider (cream
skimming). Because the distribution of health care expenditure on individual
level is extremely skewed, there may be substantial profits for an insurance
company if it can disproportionately enrol good risks and charge premiums
equal approximately to the cost of an average risk (Newhouse 2002, p. 147). In
Finnish OHS the employer chooses the provider and the provider must accept
all the employees of that employer as clients. Because the costly patients can be
referred elsewhere there is no need for risk adjustment, which has been
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proposed to diminish cream skimming by lowering the risk of financial loss for
providers (insurers) (van de Ven, Wynand P.M.M., Ellis 2000).
The level of the payment (generosity) varies with the provider type. The
statutory  fees  of  public  providers  set  by  the  Council  of  State  were  too  low  to
cover  the  production  costs  in  the  early  1990s.  In  an  employer’s  own  units  the
level of capitation payment has been generous, in non-profits likewise (Figure 8,
page 31). Ellis and Miller (2008, p. 398) state that in all payment systems too low
payment levels reduce the incentive to provide quality.
Performance-based payment systems have not been applied in Finnish OHS.
In general, outcomes are often difficult to observe and not totally attributable to
services rendered (e.g. a physician visit). The knowledge base for treatments and
interventions may be weak, and therefore the medical profession may disagree
on the proper treatment. This has led to variation in medical practices (Iversen,
Lurås  2006,  p.  270).  When  the  agreement  on  proper  treatment  is  missing  it  is
difficult to set payments for performance. Therefore providers are often paid for
their inputs (time spent) or outputs (units of production).
Liu and Mills (2007b) assessed different payment systems according their
criteria  for  an  ideal  payment  system  (Table  1).  The  table  includes  only  those
payment  systems that  are  relevant  for  Finnish OHS.  Liu and Mills  regard cost
containment  as  the  most  important  requirement  for  a  good  payment  system.
Fee-for-service and open-ended budgets are the worst systems for cost
containment; capitation and fixed budgets do it well. The systems that are good
for  controlling  costs  do  not  perform  as  well  in  ensuring  quality.  The  payment
systems also differ in their incentives for overprovision and under-provision.
Those systems that are good for controlling costs will induce under-provision
and systems that are not will induce overprovision. The table also makes visible
why  blending  of  payment  systems  is  attractive  (Robinson  et  al.  2004)  and  in
some cases also optimal (Chalkley, Malcomson 2000).
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Table 1: Payment systems compared by cost containment, quality assurance,
overprovision, underprovision, internal efficiency and administrative feasibility
(Liu, Mills 2007b, p. 274)
Type of
payment
Cost
contain-
ment
Quality
assurance
No
incentive
for over-
provision
No
incentive
for under-
provision
Internal
efficiency
Administrative
feasibility
Fee for
service
--- +++ --- +++ +++ --
Capitation +++ - +++ --- + ++
Salary ++ + ++ ++ --- ++
Open-
ended
budget
--- +++ + + --- -
Fixed
global
budget
+++ - +++ -- +++ ++
The  number  of  “+”  signs  refers  to  the  degree  of  goodness;  the  number  of  “-”  signs
refers to the degree of badness
In  health  care,  it  is  ultimately  the  physician  who  makes  the  decisions  on
treatments. Therefore, the objectives of physicians and the way they are paid for
their work are crucial in mediating the purchasers’ objectives into daily practice.
The physician acts as an agent for the patient while deciding on treatments.
Then, again, the multitasking role is noticeable. The physician almost always
supplies her own input to the production of health care for the patient.
Physicians  cannot  be  paid  for  effort  they  spend  in  acquiring  information,  and
providing the information to the patient (Haas-Wilson 2001), nor for their effort
to lower costs and enhance quality (Ma, McGuire 1997) which all may be in the
interests of the purchaser. The physicians may still act in their patients’ best
interests. The social exchange for the professional autonomy which patients and
society grant physicians, pride in their work, and enjoyment in providing health
care,  the  satisfaction that  physicians derive from improving the health of  their
patients, reflecting altruism, professional obligation and desire to enhance
reputation have been evinced as reasons for acting in the interests of the patients
(Arrow 1973, Ma, McGuire 1997, Boadway, Marchand & Sato 2004). The ethical
code  of  the  profession  is  supposed  to  offer  the  patient  protection  against  the
physician’s exploiting his or her superior knowledge (Newhouse 2002, p. 4). The
threat of tort liability also creates an incentive to exercise care (Sloan 2001, p.
907, Gal-Or 1999).
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Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a, p. 17) presented physicians as having a bias
in favour of quality: they would choose higher quality and less cost reducing
effort than the administrators would choose. Chaix-Couturier et al. (2000, p. 139)
raised the possible conflict that financial incentives might create for physicians
between their incomes and quality of care. If the medical staff favours more
quality improvement effort and managers favour cost containment effort it
might help in balancing the cost reduction and quality enhancing efforts
(Chalkley, Malcomson 1998a). Financial incentives might also conflict with
intrinsic motivation and therefore cause undesired side-effects (Prendergast
(2008) gives “teaching for the test” as an example).
Iversen and Lurås (2006) reviewed the basis for payment for primary care
physicians.  There  are  also  two  systematic  reviews  on  physician  remuneration
systems conducted by Chaix-Couturier et al. (2000) and Gosden et al. (2000,
2001). All these publications report similar results: fee-for-service payment
encourages the provision of services, even above optimal provision might be
possible; capitation induces physicians to recruit patients for their lists – rather
the  low-cost  ones.  On  the  other  hand,  it  provides  incentives  to  reduce  own
workload by compromising quality and prescribing referrals. Salaried
physicians have an incentive to minimise their workloads during working
hours, which leads to lower productivity. In Finnish OHS, the physicians of for-
profit providers are mainly paid on a fee-for-service basis, in all other provider
types they are mainly salaried employees.
From  the  purchaser’s  point  of  view  the  payment  systems  for  individual
physicians (professionals) should be aligned with the payment system for the
provider organization, but only if the payment system in the purchaser-provider
relationship is able to fulfil the objectives of the purchaser (see, e.g. for Boadway
et al. (2004)). Robinson et al. (2004) studied how changes in payment systems led
to changes in the remuneration systems for physicians in the USA. Physicians
used to be paid with fee-for-service payments and insurers reimbursed all costs.
Then the HMOs began to reimburse the provider on a prospective, capitated
basis. This changed the incentives for the medical group and also led to changes
in the payment systems for individual physicians. When HMOs had a market
share higher than 20% the medical groups were less inclined to use only fee-for-
service payment for physicians and preferred a blended payment system based
partly on prospective fees and partly on retrospective payment, either capitation
or salary.
Table  2  combines  the  payment  systems  for  providers  and  the  way  the
providers remunerate their physicians. For-profit providers have aligned
payment systems to (over)provide and be productive. All other provider types
have salaried physicians, which would imply lower productivity. The public
provider has fee-for-service payments as do for-profits, but it can rely on the
taxpayers. Non-profits have a combination of capitation and FFS, which
balances the cost containment and quality improvement incentives and should
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also  keep  productivity  high.  Whether  employers’  own  OHS  payment  is
regarded as a capitation system or fixed global budget the consequences are the
same: it will induce cost containment, and underprovision (if not high
capitation) and productivity.
Table 2: Payment systems for providers and physicians in the Finnish OHS
Physician’s remuneration
Fee-for-
service
Capitation Salary
Payment system
for OHS provider
Fee-for-
service
For-profit Public
Capitation and
FFS
Non-profit
(Employer’s own
selling to other
employers)
Fixed budget
Employer’s own
OHS
4.3 COMPETITION AND MARKET ENVIRONMENT
4.3.1 Competition
Stigler (1987) describes competition: “Competition arises whenever two or more
parties  strive  for  something  that  all  cannot  obtain.”  In  OHS,  the  providers
compete for the employers. Employers have to choose one provider according to
the Occupational Health Care Act, and if the employer also purchases curative
medical  care  for  employees,  as  most  of  them  do,  the  provider  chosen  by  the
employer has to attract the employees.
Studies 3 and 4 deal with the intensity, productivity, share of medical care,
unit price and revenue of the provider. I start the discussion on how competition
affects  these  indicators  with  the  review  of  competition  and  productivity  by
Holmes and Schmitz (2010), their review being one those few publications that
deal with competition as behaviour. Because they were looking for causality, the
impact of competition on productivity, they stressed that there first has to be a
change in competition associated with a change in productivity. In addition,
there should be an understanding of the mechanism through which competition
affects productivity. The productivity increase in an industry could accrue
through the closing down of inefficient plants (competition leads to
reallocation). If the scale of the remaining producers grows and there are fixed
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costs  involved  in  the  production,  this  will  also  lead  to  an  overall  increase  in
productivity.
Holmes and Schmitz (2010) regarded as more challenging the question of
what  causes  the  existing  firms  to  increase  their  productivity  when  there  is  no
change in their scale. They wanted to delve into the “black box” and asked, what
would diminish “X-efficiency” within a firm? They review case studies on
changes in the competitive environment, such as how the railways affected
productivity in water transportation (new technology), or how Brazilian iron ore
producers challenged the producers in the USA (high prices increasing the
likelihood of producers from abroad entering the market). According to Holmes
and Schmitz increased competition leads to new management practices: despite
the pressure from the unions the work rules that constrained capital
productivity were abolished. Increase in competition lowers the opportunity
cost of lost production due to strikes or disruptions caused by implementing
new technology or practices.
Holmes  and  Schmitz  (2010)  were  surprised  by  the  result  that  some  firms
were reluctant to attain great market power. They explain the result by the fact
that  employees  and  other  input  suppliers  (including  the  community  with  its
taxation interests) had an incentive to invest in their own bargaining power to
extract  surplus.  Consequently,  the  monopoly  would  have  less  incentive  to
innovate - the suppliers will extract the rent. Nickell (1999, p. 14) also states that
investments  in  cost  reducing improvements  that  also increase productivity  are
more likely in a more competitive environment, leading to greater increase in
profit.  On  the  other  hand,  Nickell  (1999)  also  refers  to  Schumpeter:  more
monopolistic producers have less uncertainty, and larger and more stable cash
flows to fund R & D.
Holmes and Schmitz (2010) regarded competition important to induce firms
to adopt more efficient management structures. Nickell (1999) connected
competition with incentives, together they increase the effectiveness of both
management and employees: competition sharpens incentives and therefore
improves performance. Competition works through four channels: managers,
customers, employees and the financial market (Nickell 1996, Nickell, Nicolitsas
& Dryden 1997). The more firms there are, and therefore the more managers, the
more opportunity the owners have to compare the performance of managers
and therefore competition would decrease slack. Increased competition can also
influence customers' demand; both elasticity and amount. Competition can
make demand more elastic, which in turn makes the owners sharpen the
incentives for managers (which leads to improved performance). Nickell (1999)
examined a theory on the effect of product market competition on employees in
a union bargaining framework, and showed that increased competition in the
product market improved employees' effort. The fourth channel for competition
to improve performance is the financial market. For private providers
dependence on external funding creates financial pressure, especially if debt
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servicing payments are high. Managers are then motivated to try their best to
avoid  the  consequences  of  bankruptcy  and  loss  of  reputation.  Competition
increases the risk of bankruptcy, which is worse for managers than for owners
(Nickell, Nicolitsas & Dryden 1997). As Hart (1983, p. 366) phrased it: " [...]
competition is a source of discipline; that is, that it reduces the amount of slack
in the system due to individuals' not minimizing costs or being on their
production possibility frontiers." Nickell et al. (1997) suggest that strong external
shareholder control could substitute for the lack of competition and financial
pressure which are regarded as important for managerial effort.
Providers compete for employers with prices and quality, and for the
employees with quality (the OHS are free of charge to the employees).
Competition with unregulated prices would induce all providers to exert effort
to lower the production costs (increase productivity). In health care, quality or at
least some of its attributes are non-contractible and providers cannot be paid for
all aspects of quality. The incentives to control costs are strong, at least among
for-profit providers and therefore the impact of competition on their quality is
ambiguous (Shen et al. 2005). The competition for quality in Finnish OHS would
induce providers to improve service quality, especially the quality perceived by
the employees.
Provider’s  revenue  is  dependent  on  the  prices  and  the  amount  of  services
used by the employees. Therefore the impact of competition on revenue is
indeterminate: competition lowers prices, but may increase the use of curative
medical services (through increased quality). Nickell (1997, p. 785) states that
“demand elasticities tend to be higher under competition”. If the competition
increases the use of curative medical care it will also increase the share of
medical care (preventive care is more stable).
4.3.2 Market Structure
Competition is essential in achieving optimal allocation of resources in society.
Nevertheless, competition as behaviour has been studied theoretically and
empirically  much  less  than  markets  as  structures.  In  economic  theory  one
market consists of one homogenous product. Then what a supplier can compete
on  is  the  price  (and  quantity).  In  this  kind  of  analysis  the  markets  are  usually
categorised according to the number of providers (perfect competition,
monopoly, oligopoly), and the market structure is supposed to represent the
level of competition. The only explanation in neoclassical economics for why a
monopoly continues to exist without competitors is that the technology has
increasing  returns  to  scale.  A  single  firm  can  then  produce  at  a  lower  average
cost than any number of competitors would.
Oligopoly theories and monopolistic competition both belong under the
heading  of  imperfect  competition  and  are  therefore  at  the  core  of  industrial
economics.  In  oligopoly  theories  the  number  of  firms  is  small.  An  important
characteristic of oligopoly (or duopoly) markets is the strategic interdependence
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between competitors. (Cabral 2002, p. 101.) The models can explain both fierce
price competition and collusive behaviour (Lipczynski, Wilson & Goddard 2005,
p. 4-5, Waldman, Jensen 2007, p. 230-265). The oligopoly theories concentrate on
one market (partial equilibrium approach) and firms do not create new
products. Competition is almost synonymous with the number of firms, and the
equilibrium market structure is determined in a long-run equilibrium. Since the
number of firms is important, the entry and exit of firms become an important
aspect of market analysis (Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon 2005, p. 165). The
theory concentrated on barriers to entry to be able to explain why concentration
and high profits could sustain (Sutton 2007).
The composition of an industry - number of firms and their size distribution
– has been regarded as crucial in understanding the processes and outcomes of
competition (van Witteloostuijn, Boone 2006, p. 409). In the Structure–Conduct–
Performance  (SCP)  paradigm,  an  industry  is  characterized  by  its  structure,
conduct and performance. The focus of the paradigm is on the market power -
profitability relationship, market power measured by the concentration of the
industry.  The paradigm was developed by Edward Mason and Joe Bain in  the
1940s and 1950s (George, Joll & Lynk 1992). The theory led to a “short cut
analysis”: since structure determined conduct and conduct determined
performance, one could ignore conduct and look directly at industry structure
when trying to explain performance (Douma, Schreuder 2002, p. 187).
Industry does not take into account that markets may be regional or that the
competition may be international. A more serious problem is that SCP does not
take into account that firms’ conduct may have an effect on the structure of the
industry (Cabral 2002, p. 157). Nowadays it is increasingly recognized that the
conduct  of  firms  can  also  affect  industry  structure.  Therefore  an  industry's
market structure can be regarded as both a consequence and outcome of
competition (van Witteloostuijn, Boone 2006, p. 409). Nevertheless, the SCP
studies developed the understanding of market power and created indicators
for measuring it.
In  economics,  it  is  well  known  that  market  structure  affects  the  price  of  a
product. A monopoly has the highest price, a firm in a competitive market has
the lowest price, and prices in oligopolistic markets are somewhere in between
(Cabral 2002). There is extensive empirical evidence, mainly from the USA that
higher market concentration of hospitals is connected to higher prices (Gaynor,
Haas-Wilson 1999, Keeler, Melnick & Zwanziger 1999, Gaynor, Town 2011).
Holmes and Schmitz (2010) and Nickell (1999) concluded that competition
will also lead to increased productivity, especially if the scale of the remaining
producers grows and there are fixed costs involved in the production. The scope
of services may also be associated with the output of the provider and therefore
with the productivity of a firm. In health care, scope inefficiencies have been
found in multi-speciality groups compared to single-speciality groups by
Rosenman and Friesner (2004) and in HMOs providing both insurance and
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health services (Wholey et al. 1996). On the other hand, for small-scale providers
such as nursing homes, scope can help in achieving economies of scale
(Christensen 2004). Rosenman and Friesner (2004) found economies of scale in
both primary care and speciality care practices.
The quality of a product is not an issue in the standard models based on the
market structure because the product is assumed to be homogenous.
Theoretically different qualities can be defined as different goods (Newhouse
2002, p. 82), but in practice consumers may have problems in assessing the
quality of health care. Dranove et al. (2003, p. 434) claim that the theoretical basis
for the use of the Herfindahl index is a Cournot equilibrium with homogeneous
firms competing with quantities and therefore would not suit well for assessing
the extent of competition among differentiated sellers. Still, inconsistent with
this  argument,  the  structure  of  the market  has  also represented competition in
studies  where  the  providers  have  been  competing  for  patients  on  quality
(Gaynor,  Town 2011,  p.  60).  There  is  evidence both from the USA and the UK
that competition (measured as market structure) improves quality when patients
choose  the  hospital  and  prices  are  fixed  (hospitals  have  to  compete  on  quality
for patients) (Kessler, McClellan 2000, Gaynor, Moreno-Serra & Propper 2010).
Gaynor et al. (2011, p. 63) conclude that it is clear that concentration affects
hospital quality, but that the mechanism by which this occurs is not. As Jack
(2005) pointed out, fixed prices are good for controlling the costs. Only, when
consumers themselves are good judges of quality and can threaten to switch to a
higher quality provider will the providers be induced to compete on quality.
Thus,  if  there  is  a  chance,  information  and  motivation  to  choose,  there  will  be
competition that spurs on quality.
When prices are market determined, the results have reflected theoretical
indeterminancy. In the UK, Propper et al. (2004, 2008) found that quality was
lower in a more competitive environment: the death rates from emergency
admissions  for  acute  myocardial  infarction  were  higher  in  areas  subject  to
hospital competition than in those which were not. The hospitals were
competing for the purchasers. Sari (2002) found that higher hospital market
share and concentration were associated with lower quality of care in the USA.
Both Propper et al. and Sari used a vast variety of quality indicators but all
related to clinical quality, like obstetric complications, mortality, or
inappropriate surgery.
Economists have defined quality in health care in quite a variety of ways. For
example, Pope (1989, p. 159) has defined quality as "whatever increases demand
for admissions to a hospital" and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b, p. 1093) as
"any aspect of service that benefits patient". Sometimes quality has been defined
as  strictly  related  to  health  only,  like  Allen  and  Gertler  (1991,  p.  363):  "The
quality  of  medical  care  is  its  expected  efficacy  (marginal  product)  in  terms  of
health." Levaggi (2005, p. 329) classifies the definitions in the literature as either
related to the appropriateness of care, or to those who regard quality as a "cost
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driver". She writes of quality "[…] as multidimensional vector that includes
medical and non-medical variables which affect outcome of health care and
have a positive relationship with costs" (ibid. p. 330). In occupational health
services the competition for employees through quality probably leads to
competition  with  quality  as  perceived  by  employees,  not  through  clinical
effectiveness. Thus our quality indicator – intensity of services – is appropriate
to  study  the  impact  of  competition  on  quality.  Those  providers  that  are  most
productive in producing quality would win the employees. Again, one might
assume that competition increases quality productivity.
4.3.3 Market Mix
Most  of  the  theories  and  empirical  studies  deal  with  market  structure.  The
providers are assumed to be firms with a profit maximizing objective. Various
not-for-profit providers operate in health care. If their behaviour deviates from
that of for-profits, then the ownership structure of the market, the market mix,
could affect the performance of a health care provider (competitive spillovers).
In the USA, the presence of non-profits has been deemed important in keeping
service quality high and the presence of for-profits in keeping service costs low.
Kessler  and  McClellan  (2002)  in  their  longitudinal  study  found  that  even  a
10% for-profit share of first heart attack admissions was enough to lower the
expenditure on all heart attack patients by 2.4% with the same patient outcomes.
Quality spillovers from non-profits can be expected only if at least some of the
consumers  are  ill-informed.  Grabowski  and  Hirth  (2003)  examined  the  role  of
non-profits in the USA nursing home market. They claim that only well-
informed customers can push the for-profit nursing homes to provide the
promised quality. The ill-informed customers would prefer to choose a non-
profit nursing home which is motivated by its non-distribution constraint to
provide the promised quality. The bigger the market share of the non-profit
nursing homes, the poorer the chances of for-profits to abuse the ill-informed
customers. Then an increase in the non-profit market share will improve both
for-profit and overall market quality, as found in USA nursing homes by
Grabowski and Hirth (2003). Santerre and Vernon (2006) studied the welfare
implications of ownership mix in the USA and concluded that it would improve
welfare to increase the share of for-profits in inpatient care and the share of non-
profits in outpatient care. In the USA, market mix has also had an impact on the
service offerings of providers. Horwitz and Nichols studied hospitals in
metropolitan statistical (2009) and rural areas (2011). Non-profits with low
market share of for-profit providers were more likely to offer unprofitable
services such as psychiatric, hospice, substance abuse, and social work services
than non-profits in markets with high market share of for-profit providers.
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4.3.4 Purchasers’ and Consumers’ Behaviour in Health Care
In the oligopolistic models the consumers/purchasers are assumed to be
numerous and small enough, so that their decision-making would not change
the quantity or the price in the market. An important aspect of the SCP,
oligopolistic and monopolistic competition, is that decisions on the use of
resources are left to the individual consumers and firms (Milgrom, Roberts 1992,
p. 72). The only role of government is to facilitate the functioning of the private
markets.  The  state  legislates  on  contracts,  supports  the  judicial  system  for
reinforcing the contractual base of markets and protects private property rights
(Dasgupta 1993, p. 138).
Health care differs greatly from the assumptions of competitive markets
(Dranove, Satterthwaite 2000). The consumers are neither well informed nor
allowed to make the decisions regarding their use of health care. Likewise, they
do  not  pay  the  price  of  the  services.  Finnish  OHS  includes  only  primary  care
services, therefore employees can influence the use of the services themselves.
As consumers they would use the services as long as the marginal cost of doing
so would equal the marginal benefits of OHS. The services being free of charge
for employees probably leads to excessive usage from society’s point of view.
Due to the uncertainty connected to health and to the costs of health care, in
most countries people have pooled the risks and organized insurance either
through private or public insurance, or taxation. This has led to “third party
purchasing”. Another difference is that health care providers are not all firms;
depending on the country and service, the market may consist of a mixture of
providers with various owners, not only of for-profit providers (see Chapter
3.3).
Political and legal decisions create the market for purchasing in health care.
The purchaser needs skills (information) and incentives to do the purchasing
well. If purchasing is left to individuals and insurance reimburses the costs, the
purchasing will not be price-sensitive. When managed care, health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) in particular, was introduced in the USA in the 1990s, the
purchasing  decisions  were  shifted  away  from  relatively  price-insensitive
consumers towards more cost-conscious health plans (Dranove et al. 2008). The
HMO  experiences  support  the  idea  that  the  purchaser's  role  matters:  hospitals
had lower total margins in markets with higher levels of HMO penetration.
Managed care has been shown also to improve efficiency in production (Brown
2003, Sari 2003). The UK experiences from the general practitioner fund holding
(GPFH) practices 1991-1999 show that they were willing and able to challenge
hospitals (Glennerster 1998). They ‘shopped around’ in search of lower costs
because they were allowed to retain the savings. Moreover, the waiting times
were shorter for the patients referred to hospitals by the GPFHs. When the
GPHFs were replaced by primary care groups, later primary care trusts, they
were clearly less eager to shop around and commissioning concentrated
(Dusheiko et al. 2008).
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The structure of the purchasing of OHS in Finland is very fragmented, so the
purchasers are numerous. The size of the employer may affect negotiation
power. A high concentration of the labour market based on the employer’s
market shares of all employees in the region could then signal that there are
some employers with market power. There are no statistics on regional
concentration of all employers in Finland, but Statistics Finland has published
regional concentration figures on firms. In ten regions out of 68, the biggest firm
employed more than 30% of all employees recruited by firms in 2004. In more
than  20  regions  the  share  was  above  20%.  The  regions  with  very  high
concentration are regions with moderate numbers employed in firms in general,
and  one  paper,  pulp  or  steel  factory  is  located  in  the  region  (Rajaniemi  2006).
Nevertheless, employer’s size (number of employees) may not be a sign of
bargaining power. Barros and Martinez-Giralf (2006) collected empirical
evidence on negotiations between third party purchasers and providers.
Evidence shows that the availability of alternatives for the purchaser is more
significant for bargaining power than the size of the purchaser. Then, depending
on the market for OHS, large size of an employer (purchaser) may lead to hold-
up or lock-in problems and not to bargaining power.
4.4 PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND COMPETITION
Liu and Mills (2007a) compared different economic models of hospital
behaviour  to  be  able  to  analyse  how  hospitals  react  to  different  payment
systems. Most of the models rest on agency relationship and present providers
“as if they existed in isolation” (Hirth 1999, p. 220). Therefore, they concluded
that it is difficult to draw conclusions on how competition affects providers’
behaviour. Contrary to Liu and Mills, Eggleston and Zeckhauser (2002)
concluded in their theoretical study that if the environment is competitive,
public and non-profit providers resemble private for-profit providers although
their objectives differ when they have a similar prospective fixed fee. Eggleston
and Zeckhauser referred to Vining’s 'primacy of competition versus ownership'
argument (see Vining, Boardman 1992).
Kessler  and  McClellan  (2000)  summarised  studies  on  the  effects  of
competition in the USA that revealed the importance of the payment system for
the impact of competition. Until the mid-1980s the “cost-plus” reimbursement
system, when hospitals were competing on quality, competition among
hospitals led to excess capacity, higher production costs and prices. After the
implementation of prospective payment in 1983 competition had the opposite
effect.
The type of the payment system also defines if there is space for differences
according to the ownership of a hospital. Potter (2001) studied the relationship
between hospital type and expenses per admission in a panel setting (years 1980,
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1985, 1990 and 1994) in the USA. Her findings show that the differences in
efficiency measured as expenses per adjusted admission between non-profit, for-
profit and public hospitals diminished after the introduction of a prospective
payment system in 1983. Yet, non-profit hospitals continued to provide a higher
level of community services than for-profits. Neo-institutionalists have given a
name, institutional isomorphism, to this phenomenon when regulatory change
forces  different  type of  organizations to  pursue similar  strategies  regardless  of
their objectives (Horwitz, Nichols 2009, Potter 2001).
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5 Hypotheses and Research
Questions
The theoretical framework for all the studies of this dissertation is the incentive
structure and the objectives of employers and providers of OHS (Chapter 3). In
Studies  1  and  2  all  employers  are  companies  and  will  make  the  decisions  on
OHS  with  their  profit  maximization  objective  in  mind  taking  into  account  the
incentive structure created by the legislation. They must organize the OHS, use
the expertise of the providers in planning the contents of the services, and pay
the costs of OHS. The use of OHS is subsidized, and the employers can apply for
reimbursement for the cost of the services.
The history of Finnish OHS and the legislation have created OHS markets
that regionally vary widely, from public monopolies to highly competitive areas
with  numerous  for-profit  providers.  In  addition,  employers  have  a  role  as
providers of OHS services, some employers have an OHS of their own, or
employers together govern the OHS provider (non-profit). This creates an
opportunity to study how market structure and ownership are connected to the
performance of the OHS provider (Studies 3 and 4).
Study 1
We assume that the OHS and the interventions OH professionals propose or
initiate  at  workplaces  are  effective.  Then  the  interventions  lower  sickness  and
the  ensuing  costs,  and  improve  productivity.  Eventually,  this  will  lead  to
improvement in the economic performance of the company. We examine the
hypothesis that when a company invests in preventive occupational health
services  there  will  be  an  impact  on  the  profitability  of  the  company.  The
empirical research question is: Does a company’s expenditure on preventive
OHS either in 1997 or 1999 predict its economic performance in 2001.
Study 2
The costs of occupational health services include only the payments to the OHS
providers and will be paid immediately, whereas the benefits of good OHS will
be  realized  in  the  future.  Owners  bear  the  costs  of  OHS,  in  the  case  of
bankruptcy the bondholders become the owners of the company and will reap
the benefits of OHS, or suffer the costs of neglect. Studies on firms’ investments
in safety equipment have shown that investments in occupational safety and
health do not succeed in competing for funding from financial markets
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(information asymmetry in safety issues); the expenditure on OHS must be
financed from the cash flows of the company. Therefore, we assume that a
company’s expenditure on preventive care is positively associated with its
economic  performance.  Companies  doing  worse  cut  their  expenditure  and
companies  with  good  economic  performance  share  part  of  the  profit  with
employees, i.e. a company incurs higher expenses for both preventive and
medical services. We studied if the company’s economic performance in 1999
predicts its OHS expenditure in 2001, separately for preventive and curative
medical care.
Studies 3 and 4
The ownership of a health care provider has often been interpreted to represent
different objectives. In Studies 3 and 4 we rather regard ownership to represent
differences in the incentive structure, in the payment systems and financial
constraints (soft/hard budget constraints and the risk of insolvency). Therefore,
when  we  study  differences  in  the  performance  of  providers  according  to
ownership  in  different  market  environments,  we  study  how  competition  is
connected to performance through payment systems and financial constraints. If
the providers have similar payment systems, financial constraints and market
environment there should not be differences in performance according the
ownership.
For-profit providers have aligned provider and physician payment systems
to (over)provide and be productive. All other provider types have salaried
physicians, which would imply lower productivity. The public provider has fee-
for-service payments like the for-profit provider but may rely on the taxpayers’
purse and charge lower prices from employers and have lower productivity
than for-profits (soft budget constraint). Non-profits have a blend of capitation
and FFS, which balances the cost containment and quality improvement
incentives and should also keep productivity high. Whether employers’ own
OHS  payment  is  regarded  as  a  capitation  system  or  fixed  global  budget  the
consequences are the same: it will induce cost containment, and under-provision
(if not high capitation) and productivity.
We expect the for-profit providers to provide more services, exhibit greater
intensity, higher share of medical care and better productivity than public
providers  (although  public  providers  also  have  an  FFS  payment  system,  the
physicians are mainly salaried); Employers’ own OHS and non-profits may be as
productive, the unit price should be lower, but the quality depends on the level
of capitation and budget. If the level is “high” the intensity may be as high as in
for-profits, if it is “low” it may be lower.
The prices in OHS are market determined. Therefore competition is
supposed  to  lead  to  lower  prices.  The  effect  on  quality  may  be  ambiguous.  In
our study, intensity represents quality assessed by clients (employees). For them
access to care is an important quality characteristic, and the easier the access, the
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more services are used. Preventive care is more stable, and intensity can be
raised by increasing curative medical services. Therefore we expected
competition to increase intensity and the share of curative medical services.
Increasing intensity increases provider's revenues. Because competition
increases productivity, it may lead to lower unit prices. On the other hand,
increasing intensity may lead to higher unit prices. Hence we had no
expectations regarding the possible effect of competition on unit price.
Competition increases demand (both magnitude and elasticity) therefore it
increases the revenue of providers.
We studied the effect of different market environments on the performance
of OHS providers in a panel setting that covers the years 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000
and 2004. The performance of a provider was measured as intensity of services,
productivity, share of medical care, unit price and revenues. The research
questions  in  Studies  3  and  4  were  the  following:  Are  changes  in  the  market
environment of the OHS providers associated with change in providers’
performance?  Do  provider  types  differ  in  their  reactions  according  to
ownership?
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6 Data and Methods
6.1 REGISTERS AND SURVEYS
Companies and OHS
The data for studying the companies and their OHS is based on data from two
registers. Statistics Finland collects the financial statements of all Finnish firms
from the tax authorities. This register also contains data such as the number of
persons employed by the firm, number of blue- and white-collar workers, year
of establishment, registered office and industry.
The  Social  Insurance  Institution  of  Finland  (SII)  registers  employers'
reimbursement applications for OHS. This register contains data on services and
costs. We chose to use registers from the years 1997, 1999 and 2001. In 1999, the
reformed reimbursement system had been in operation for four years. As this
project was launched in 2004, the year 2001 was the last year for which all
reimbursement applications had been processed. Four years should be a long
time enough to reveal the benefits. In studies on occupational health and safety,
a  follow-up time of  one to  two years  is  common (Ozminkowski  et  al.  2002);  in
case studies reporting company level results the follow-up times have also been
quite short (Verbeek, Pulliainen & Kankaanpää 2009).
At Statistics Finland the Social Insurance Institution register was merged
with the Statistics Finland data using firm-specific identification codes (Figure
13). The data was at our disposal at the research laboratory of Statistics Finland
so that we could neither identify the firms, nor their OHS providers.
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Financial
statements
Employers’
reimbursement
applications
Year N N
1997 205,802 merging 25,739
1999 220,746 by firm 29,993
2001 226,255 ID 34,960
Companies operational
1997-2001 64,597
Other exclusion criteria 6,271
Figure 13: Composition of data for the study on company’s economic
performance and OHS (Studies 1 and 2)
In 2001, 40% of a total of 226,000 firms were actually self-employed private
persons and 15% had limited or unlimited liabilities. These and all other legal
forms except companies were excluded. Companies are defined as clearly for-
profit organizations, and the legislation on bookkeeping and financial
statements guarantees a high quality of economic performance data. To assess
whether the preceding investment in preventive OHS had affected company’s
economic performance, the companies had to have been continually in business
19972001 (financial statements were available for this period). The same rule of
staying in business is needed when the opposite question is studied: does the
company’s previous economic performance affect if it is able and willing to
organize  OHS  or  how  high  its  expenses  in  preventive  and  curative  medical
services will be.
Because  of  the  special  features  of  the  Finnish  reimbursement  system,  we
measured the company's investments in OHS per employee both in monetary
and temporal terms. The time variable was calculated from the SII register data.
Workplace  and  group  activities  had  originally  been  registered  in  hours.  We
converted the number of health checkups into minutes based on information
from earlier studies or an expert assessment of the contents of OH personnel’s
work in different provider models. All activities were summed up into the
variable occupational health (OH) personnel's time per employee. In the
companies' own OHS units, the costs of preventive and curative medical
services in reimbursement applications were often divided according to the
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shares of maximum reimbursement (40% for preventive and 60% for curative
medical  services)  and  not  according  to  the  resources  used.  This  was  revealed
when we checked the correlations between the time resource (minutes per
employee) and costs (Euros per employee). These two variables correlated
strongly in all other provider models (0.6-0.8), but not in the companies' own
units. The investment in OHS measured in Euros did not represent the resources
for OHS in municipal health centres, either. The price level in municipal OHS
units  was  about  40%  lower  than  in  other  provider  models  (Euros  per  OH
personnel  minute).  Thus  time  resource  is  a  better  measure  for  investment  in
preventive OHS for both the companies' own units and municipal OHS units.
Therefore  we did not  use  the costs  per  employee in  the analysis.  To be able  to
compare investment in preventive OHS between companies, we used two
different variables: resources measured as OH personnel minutes per employee
and the share of total costs of preventive services per turnover.
In  Study  2  we  assessed  the  influence  of  a  company's  lagged  economic
performance on the amount of spending, separately for prevention and curative
medical services. Then Euros per employee were used as independent variables
and not the time resource. The expenditure measured in Euros represents
exactly what the employer had to pay for the services before reimbursement.
OHS providers
In the data for studying whether competitiveness of the market among
providers affected the performance of OHS providers we combined survey and
register  data.  The  Finnish  Institute  of  Occupational  Health  (FIOH)  sent  a
questionnaire  to  all  OHS  providers  and  collected  data  on  employers  and  their
employees,  services  and  occupational  health  (OH)  professionals  from  the
providers for the years 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004. The questionnaire was
sent in the spring of the following year. The response rate was high (over 90%
per survey) but not all providers supplied information on all items in the
questionnaire.
Due to the reimbursement system, records on services provided by the OHS
units are well standardized. The FIOH questionnaire collected the number of
hours of workplace activities (workplace surveillance, meetings, lectures, groups
and counselling) and the number of health checkups and medical visits
separately for physicians, nurses, physiotherapists and psychologists over a
whole year.
An  employer-based  register  of  the  provider,  content  and  costs  of  OHS  is
available as a result of the reimbursement system. This employer-based data
was combined per provider code at the SII, and merged with FIOH's data using
the provider's name and address. Thus the state employers’ reimbursement
applications  were  also  placed  on  the  provider  reported  in  the  reimbursement
application. Yet, the problem remains of employers who applied for
reimbursement of the costs of OHS and had used multiple providers (this
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implies having multiple workplaces around Finland). The application only
allows  space  for  one  provider.  The  advice  is  to  report  the  provider  whose
services constitute the greatest share of the costs. Because we used only the cost
information from the SII register, the outlier check of unit price would have
revealed the most serious problems (see also Chapter 6.2.2)
We had at our disposal unidentified data. The first FIOH survey in 1992 was
based  on  the  provider  register  of  the  SII.  Later  FIOH  updated  the  provider
register itself and the fit of the survey and the SII provider register declined. In
1992 almost all providers in the FIOH survey could be linked to the SII register,
Later the percentage fell: in 1997 it was 90%, descending to 75% in 2000 and 67%
in 2004. Almost 90% of all providers in the FIOH survey could be matched with
the SII register.
The merged data contains about 230 public providers, 350 employers’ own
and 40 non-profits, and 180 for-profit medical centres, altogether 4,094
observations during the period 1992 to 2004. Because of entry and exit of
providers,  the  data  forms  an  unbalanced  panel  data  set.  A  subset  of  this  data
was used to  study how the performance of  public  providers  was connected to
the competitiveness of the market (Study 3). (Figure 14)
Social Insurance Institution
Employers reimbursement FIOH
applications questionnaire
Year N N
1992 22,848 964
1995 20,801 855
1997 25,739 merging by 1,041
2000 32,262 provider’s 1,016
2004 40,646 name and address 719
4,094 observations, unbalanced panel
only public providers, 1,164
observations, unbalanced panel
Figure 14: Composition of data for the studies on OHS providers’ performance
and competitiveness of the market (Studies 3 and 4)
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6.2 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
6.2.1 Economic Performance of a Company
Key ratios  are  widely used in  assessing the performance of  a  company,  e.g.  by
banks and investors. Definitions for key ratios can be found in Table 3 grouped
into profitability, solidity and liquidity, as usual. Key ratios for profitability are
calculated from the profit and loss account by deducting costs from turnover
and dividing this margin by turnover. The difference between the ratios results
from the variation in costs deducted. The three first key ratios for solidity relate
the annual profit to different capital titles. The two other key ratios for solidity,
relative indebtedness and equity ratio, give an idea of the accumulated wealth of
the company. Key ratios for liquidity indicate how large a share of its debts the
company  could  pay  with  its  liquid  assets.  Statistics  Finland  calculated  the  key
ratios for all companies in the study.
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Table 3: Definitions of key ratios of economic performance
Profitability
Operating margin % Company’s earnings that is left over after paying for
variable costs of production (wages, raw material, etc)
divided by net sales.
Operating profit % Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by net
sales.
Net result % (Total revenues – total expenses) divided by net sales, tells
if a company has earned or lost money in an accounting
period with its business.
Total result % Net result + extraordinary incomes – extraordinary
expenses divided by net sales
Profit/loss for the accounting period %
The profit / loss result after the company has paid the taxes
divided by net sales.
Solidity
Return on Capital Assets %
Tells how profitable the company is relative to its total
assets. = Net income / total assets
Return on investment % Evaluates the efficiency of an investment = (gain from
investment – cost of investment) / cost of investment.
Return on equity % Tells how much profit is generated relative to the owners’
investment in the company = Net income / shareholders
equity
Relative indebtedness % Company’s liabilities divided by its turnover.
Less than 40%: Good
40–80%: Satisfactory
More than 80%: Poor
Equity ratio % The percentage of equities from the balance sheet
Over 40%: Good
20-40%: Satisfactory
Less than 20%: Poor
Liquidity
Quick ratio Company’s ability to meet its short term liabilities (debt and
payables) with its most liquid assets (excludes inventory).
(Current assets – Inventories)/Current liabilities
Over 1: Good
0.51: Satisfactory
Less than 0.5: Poor
Current ratio Company’s ability to meet short term liabilities. Current
assets/Current liabilities
Over 2: Good
2: Satisfactory
Less than 1: poor
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In  Study 1  we studied if  the  extent  of  preventive OHS influences  a  company’s
economic performance, which is dependent on many other things than
investment in preventive OHS alone. We included various other explanatory
variables in the model. We assumed that “the past predicts the future”: that
firms  that  did  well  in  the  past  would  continue  to  do  better.  We  included  the
equity  ratio  in  1999  in  the  model  to  represent  a  company's  past  economic
performance; higher equity ratio indicated greater opportunity to make
investments. The other variables taken into account were company size, age,
industry  and  location.  Industry  was  included  in  the  model  because  key  ratios
differ according to industry. Geographical regions were included to represent
booming or declining regional economies (6 provinces in Finland, reference
region Uusimaa, the province around the capital city Helsinki). The type of
municipality  is  an  indicator  of  the  size  of  the  local  market,  for  both  the
company's  products  and  for  OHS.  Municipalities  were  classified  into  three
groups: city, semi-urban and rural. There was hardly any correlation of variables
in the models except the self-evident positive correlation between number of
employees  and  turnover.  In  addition,  investment  in  OHS  measured  as  OH
personnel minutes per employee correlated positively with company size
measured either by turnover or number of employees. Correlations for the
variables in Study 1 can be found in Appendix 1.
Companies' own units are generally believed to be able to integrate their
activities more efficiently into the company than other providers. We assumed
that the provider model could affect company performance. However, in this
study,  the  OHS  provider  model  had  no  effect  on  the  key  ratios  and  was  thus
excluded from the models.
In  Study  2  we  studied  if  the  economic  performance  of  a  company  affected
expenditure on preventive and curative medical services. From the
reimbursement statistics published by the SII it is known that expenditure varies
by employer size and provider type. In addition, the industry could indicate the
health  risks  at  work  and  would  affect  expenditure,  at  least  on  preventive
services. The proportion of blue-collar workers could also be related to
expenditure on OHS due to socio-economic differences in health. The markets
for OHS differ greatly and the options available to companies to buy or organize
services are dependent on their location (city, semi-urban or rural). Therefore all
these variables were included in the models for studying companies’
expenditure on OHS. There were no correlations among the variables. Naturally
there were correlations between the key indicators, but these were always
included in the models  one at  a  time.  Correlations for  the variables  in  Study 2
can be found in Appendix 2.
6.2.2 Performance of an OHS Provider
The  performance  of  a  provider  was  measured  as  intensity  of  services,
productivity, share of medical care, unit price and revenues. OHS providers are
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multi-professional multi-product providers and therefore we calculated a cost-
weighted activity (CWA) output (Oliver 2005). The first four indicators are
computational indicators based on this CWA output. Performance indicators are
presented in Table 4.
We calculated all services in minutes and summarized them by occupational
health (OH) professional group (physicians, nurses, physiotherapists,
psychologists). In order to make the output of different professional groups
comparable, the minutes of each OH professional group were weighted by
group  wage,  in  relation  to  physicians’  wages  in  2004.  The  wages  are  national
averages  provided  by  the  Commission  for  Local  Authority  Employers.  We
checked the salary ratios in the private sector and they were similar to the public
ones.  CWA  output  is  the  sum  of  the  wage-adjusted  output  of  all  OH
professional groups. In occupational health the division of resources into
preventive and medical services is important. For example, the reimbursement
system aims at steering more resources into preventive work. The service mix
could also reveal the differences in the objectives of provider types. Therefore
we wanted to study the service mix and calculated the share of curative medical
services of CWA output.
The indicator for productivity was calculated from CWA output. The weekly
working  hours  of  OH  professionals  were  weighted  by  wage  of  each  group  in
relation to physicians' wages in 2004. Then these weighted hours were summed
into one figure that measured personnel resources. The productivity measure is
the ratio of CWA output to personnel resources.
We used intensity of OHS as an indicator of quality. Intensity was measured
as CWA output per client (employee). Intensity represents process quality
perceived by the client (employee). Quality is assumed to be higher if there are
more services per employee, or if a more highly qualified professional provides
the service, e.g. a physician instead of a nurse.
At the Social Insurance Institution, employers' reimbursement applications
were summed up per provider. The sum of the employers' expenditure equals
the total of the provider's revenue. Nominal values were converted to 2004 real
values applying the health care cost index. Unit price was calculated by dividing
the revenue of  a  provider  by its  CWA output.  Due to  the obligation for  public
providers and the small size of Finnish municipalities running a health centre
the correlation between market concentration and revenues was negative (-0.35),
likewise the correlation with the share of medical care (-0.35) and intensity
(-0.32). The highly concentrated markets represented public monopolies. The
scope of the provider correlated with the number of OH professionals (0.64)
which  correlated  with  the  revenue  of  the  provider  (0.38).  There  were
correlations between the number of providers and share of medical care (0.37),
unit price (0.36) and intensity (0.32), and the for-profit market share and unit
price  (0.32).  Correlations  for  the  variables  in  Studies  3  and  4  can  be  found  in
Appendix 3.
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Table 4: Indicators of OHS performance
Indicator Formula Keys
CWA output Outputpt = wiqijptminij
                          i      j
j = workplace visits, meetings,
lectures, health checkups, medical
visits
i = physician, nurse,
physiotherapist, psychologist
minij = time that a professional
group i uses to produce service j
qijpt = number of services j,
provided by professional group i, in
provider p, in year t
wi = weight for each professional
group i, average salary of a
professional group i in relation to
physicians’ salary in the municipal
sector in 2004
p = provider id
t = 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004
Intensity Intensitypt = Outputpt/number of
employeespt (clients)
p, t as above
Productivity Prodpt = Outputptwihoursipt
i
hoursipt = weekly working hours of
a professional group i, in year t,
i, t, p and wi as above
Share of medical
care
Medpt =
wiqmediptmedmini/Outputpt
i
qmedi = number of curative
medical visits provided by
professional group i
medmini = time that professional
group i uses to produce one
curative medical visit
i, t, p and wi as above
Revenue Revenuept = TCpet
e
TCpet = total expenditure on OHS
for employer e, provided by
provider p, in year t
p, t as above
Revenue in 2004 real value
Unit price Pricept = Revenuept/Outputpt p, t as above
Most of our indicators are ratios and often based on summing data. The survey
had different time frames for different data, for example the number of services
concerned a whole year and the number and working hours of personnel one
month the following spring. If there were changes in the number of personnel
during  the  first  months  of  the  year  of  the  survey  the  output-personnel  ratios
were flawed. In addition, if one professional group had missing data on some of
its  services  it  could  create  problems  in  calculating  the  output.  Therefore  we
examined  the  studentized  residuals  exceeding  +2  or  -2  for  identifying  outliers,
and recoded the indicator values missing for the providers whose outlier values
were due to the mismatch of timing or missing data. The share of missing data
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was highest  in  the calculation of  unit  price  (26%) and the lowest  in  provider’s
revenue (15%).
6.3 MARKET ENVIRONMENT OF AN OHS PROVIDER
The geographical market areas where the providers are expected to compete
with  each  other  is  a  classification  provided  by  Statistics  Finland  and  based  on
commuting and close collaboration of municipalities in regional development.
The  regions  also  have  the  advantage  of  reflecting  topographical  features  and
travel  time  (Horwitz,  Nichols  2009).  Every  provider  was  located  to  a
municipality based on its post-code. There were 428 municipalities in 2004,
which formed 76 geographical regions8. We excluded the Åland Islands with 16
municipalities and only one provider.
Competition was measured by 1) the number of providers in the region and
either  2)  market  concentration  (Herfindahl  index  -  the  sum  of  squares  of  the
market shares, 0=minimum concentration, 1=maximum concentration (Cabral
2002)) or 3) market share of for-profit providers calculated from the number of
clients (employees) representing the market mix (Table 5).
Table 5: Indicators of market structure and mix
Indicator Formula Keys
Number of
providers within
a region
Providersrt = Count(prt) p = provider id
r = geographically defined local
market
t = 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004
prt = provider id in region r, year t
Herfindahl index HIrt = sprt
2
              p
sprt = provider p's market share from
the number of employees (clients) in
region r, year t, range for HIrt 0-1
r, t as above
For-profit
providers’ market
share within a
region
FPsharert =
clientsFPprtclientsprt
FPp                     p
clientsprt = provider p's number of
clients (employees)
clientsFPprt = For-profit provider p’s
number of clients (employees) in
region r, year t
r, t as above
In Study 3 we applied the number of providers and Herfindahl index (HI) and
in Study 4 the number of providers and the market share of for-profit providers.
The correlations between the variables representing the provider structure and
also the number of purchasers in the region were high (Table 6).
8 The number of regions has diminished since 2004 and was 68 (without Åland) in 2010.
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Table 6: Correlations of variables representing market structure and mix
Number of
providers
Number
of
providers
(log)
HI Market share
of for-profit
providers
Number of
employers
Number of providers 1.00
Number of providers
(log) 0.92 1.00
Herfindahl index
(HI) -0.63 -0.81 1.00
Market share of for-
profit providers 0.54 0.62 -0.59 1.00
Number of
employers 0.96 0.95 -0.67 0.66 1.00
Wong et al. (2005) compared empirically the results with different definitions for
the market and the intensity of competition. They used geopolitical boundaries
(administratively defined geographical areas), fixed radius methods, variable
radius, and market areas based on patient flows. The intensity of competition in
the market area was measured either by the number of providers or Herfindahl
index. They conclude that the effects of competition remain qualitatively the
same irrespective of the measure for competition. In their study the magnitude
of  the  impact  of  competition  based  on  number  of  providers  and  HI  was  also
similar on county level, the definition of market closest to our geographical
market definition.
6.4 STATISTICAL METHODS
The following table summarizes the study design and statistical methods used.
We were able to use longitudinal study design in all research tasks for this
dissertation.  Studies  1  and 2  are  prospective studies  and Studies  3  and 4  panel
studies (Table 7).
This chapter presents a description of the way we applied the statistical
methods and what tests we used to assess the suitability and robustness of the
models.  In  addition,  we  did  some  analysis  to  compare  the  magnitude  of  the
effect  of  competition  and  ownership  on  the  performance  of  OHS  providers
(Study 4).
Regression  analysis  is  about  statistical  dependence,  not  functional  or
deterministic dependence. A statistical relation cannot per se logically imply
causation. Causality should come from the theory (Gujarati 1995, p. 19-20). The
theories we applied in constructing the models have been described earlier in
this  dissertation:  theories  that  explain  how  a  company’s  investment  in
preventive care would be profitable for a company (Chapter 3.2.1 in this
76
dissertation),  theories  that  assess  how financial  structure  of  the firm impact  its
investments in safety (Chapter 3.2.2 in this dissertation, especially the study by
Filer  and  Golbe  (2003)).  In  the  studies  on  OHS  providers  performance  we
applied economic theory on the market  structure  and performance and how it
has been used in health economics to explain how ownership and payment
systems are connected/interact with market structure and mix (Chapter 4 in this
dissertation).
We did not know which way the causality would run in Studies 1 and 2. The
economic  performance  of  a  company  and  its  spending  on  OHS  could  be
determined simultaneously. Actually, the way we modeled the problem, using
lagged variables mitigates the possible simultaneity problem. The models in
Study 1 can produce a reliable forecast of the impact of a company’s investment
in  preventive  OHS  on  the  economic  performance  of  a  company  two  or  four
years later. And the same applies to the opposite question in Study 2.
In  Studies  3  and  4  we  had  to  assess  if  the  market  environment  was  truly
endogenous.  In  Study  3  we  had  only  the  public  providers.  Public  providers
entered the market in the 1970s when public provision was made compulsory
for municipal health centres. Municipalities do not buy or sell OHS units.
Therefore, in Study 3 we could regard the market as an exogenous variable. In
Study 4 we examined the potential endogeneity of the market structure and
compared fixed effects panel model and instrumental variables (IV) panel
model.  We  used  number  of  employees,  number  of  employers  (both  from  our
data) and median household income (provided by the Statistics Finland) to
predict the number of providers and the share of for-profit providers in a region.
Unfortunately,  we  did  not  have  access  to  household  income  data  for  1992.
Therefore, we only used the years 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 in this analysis. We
applied STATA’s xtivreg2 (available from Statistical Software Components
(SSC)  archive)  and  Hausman  test  to  examine  if  the  fixed  effect  panel  model  is
preferred to IV (see e.g. (Dougherty 2007) and (Baltagi 2008)).
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Table 7: Study design and statistical models applied to research questions
Research
question
Study Stydy
design
Model Dependent
variable
Independent
variable
Does company’s
expenditure on
preventive OHS
either in 1997 or
1999 predict its
economic
performance?
1 Prospective Ordinary
least
squares
(OLS)
regression
Key indicators
for profitability
in 2001
OH personnel
minutes per
employee or
Share of
expenditure on
preventive OHS
per company
turnover
Does company’s
economic
performance have
an impact on its
probability to
apply for
reimbursement
for OHS
expenditure
(“organize
OHS”)?
2 Prospective Logistic
OLS
Dichotomous
yes/no applying
for
reimbursement
All key
indicators for
company in
1999
Is company’s
expenditure on
preventive and
curative medical
services in 2001
dependent on its
economic
performance in
1999?
2 Prospective OLS Euros per
employee
separately for
preventive
services and
curative medical
care in 2001
All key
indicators for
company in
1999
Are the changes
in the market
structure and mix
connected to
changes in the
performance of
OHS providers?
3 and
4
Panel
study
OLS,
pooled
OLS, fixed
effects,
random
effects
Performance
indicators on
intensity,
productivity,
share of medical
care, unit price
and revenue
Number of
providers
Market
concentration
(HI)
Market mix –
market share
of for-profit
providers
Do provider types
react differently
to market
structure and
market mix?
4 Panel
study
OLS,
pooled
OLS, fixed
effects,
random
effects
Performance
indicators as
above
Provider type
interactions
with variables
representing
market
structure and
mix
78
We checked whether the coefficients in OLS models can be regarded as unbiased
and consistent. The models were tested using the regression specification error
test (RESET test). This can be used for testing the functional form of a model,
especially to detect nonlinearities and omitted variables (Kennedy 1998).
Nonlinearities make OLS estimator biased (Stock, Watson 2007, p. 319). If the
RESET test and data plots revealed that the relationship between dependent and
independent variable was logarithmic rather than linear, these variables were
log transformed. Earlier studies have shown that the relation between
competition and e.g. productivity may not be linear (Studies 3 and 4). Therefore
we also ran models with a squared number of providers, but their performance
was poorer.
In  addition  to  checking  for  the  consistency  of  the  OLS  estimator  there  is  a
need to check the conditions that ensure consistent standard errors (Stock,
Watson 2007, p. 325-6). Heteroscedasticity of the models was tested with the
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. In a pooled data model the standard errors
obtained are better, more efficient, than in models for separate years, but only if
the separate years have the same variance. If the variances are different, then the
standard errors obtained from the pooled regressions are wrong. In Study 3 for
pooled  OLS  models  we  applied  robust  standard  errors  and  in  Study  4  panel
corrected standard errors for those pooled OLS models with heteroscedasticity.
The panel models also had heteroscedasticity problems. In the panel models
concerning only public  providers  (Study 3)  we applied robust  standard errors;
in Study 4 we applied cluster robust correction for standard errors.
Another problem could be the correlation of the error term across
observations, especially when the sampling process is not random. It is common
to have correlation of error terms when 1) the observations are repeated
measures  of  the same entity  over  time,  2)  sampling is  based on a  geographical
unit. Correlation of the error term violates one of the OLS assumptions: that Xis
are  independently  and  identically  distributed  (i.i.d.)  draws  from  their  joint
distribution. The data used in Studies 1 and 2 of this dissertation had only three
time points and the data in Studies 3 and 4 had only five time points. Therefore
we did not  correct  for  autocorrelation.  In  addition,  in  Study 4  we used cluster
robust option for correcting heteroscedasticity. Then the standard errors are
robust to both heteroscedasticity and intra-group correlation.
We examined the variance inflation factors (VIF) for signs of
multicollinearity. When the models have multicollinearity problems there is a
linear relationship between the explanatory variables (Gujarati 1995, pp. 59-68).
In  Study  4,  the  models  that  included  provider  type  interactions  with  the
variables representing market competition and time, there was naturally
multicollinearity. We did not add interaction terms to increase the R square but
to study if the provider types reacted differently to the competitiveness of the
market. Therefore we did not use “rules of thumb” for variance inflation factors
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either (O'Brien 2007). Otherwise there were no problems with multicollinearity
in the models.
In Studies 3 and 4 we applied various methods in our analysis: ordinary least
square  regression  analysis  for  pooled  data,  and  both  fixed  and  random  panel
models. We compared the models in the following way. To compare the pooled
OLS  and  the  fixed  models  we  applied  the  F  test,  which  is  based  on  loss  of
goodness-of-fit (Stata .xtreg command by default conducts the F test). In all
cases the fixed model was better than the pooled OLS. To compare the pooled
OLS models and random effects models we applied the Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange multiplier test, which follows chi-squared distribution with one
degree of freedom. Again, for all models the random model was better than the
pooled OLS. Then we compared fixed and random panel models. Statistically,
using  fixed  effects  models  is  always  a  reasonable  thing  to  do  with  panel  data
(they  always  give  consistent  results)  but  they  may  not  be  the  most  efficient
models to run. This may be especially true in our data covering almost all OHS
providers  in  Finland.  The  Hausman  test  showed  that  for  almost  all  indicators
the fixed effects  model  turned out  to  be  better  than the random effects  model.
(Park 2009.) Fixed effects models are viewed as appropriate tools for eliminating
bias  arising  from  time-invariant  unobserved  factors  (Shen  et  al.  2007,  Greene
2003).
In  Study 4  we also studied if  different  provider  types  reacted differently  to
market competition and if they differed in their trajectories. Therefore we
included  interactions  of  the  variables  “type  of  provider”  and  number  of
providers, market share of non-profits and time (continuous) in all models. We
computed the F-statistic to test a) if the coefficients for the variables representing
competition (number of providers, market share of for-profit providers) or time
and  the  interaction  terms  jointly  differed  from  zero  and  b)  if  the  interaction
terms  of  the  public,  employers’  own  and  non-profit  providers  differed  from
those of for-profit providers (Stock, Watson 2007).
We used two different software packages in the analysis. The SAS software
package  was  used  for  excluding  and  recoding  the  data  in  Studies  1  and  2;  all
analyses were conducted with STATA software packages.
For this dissertation the magnitude of the association between the company’s
investment in preventive care in 1997 and the operating profit in 2001 was
illustrated with an example -  what  would be the impact  on operating profit  in
2001 if the company had doubled the share of preventive care costs per turnover
(other things being equal). In Study 4 we compared changes in our performance
indicators associated with a huge change in competition in the panel model and
ownership type. Change in market structure was assessed as a change from the
25% percentile to the 75% percentile in 2004 both in the number of providers
(logarithm)  or  the  market  share  of  for-profit  providers.  The  dummies  in  the
pooled OLS models represent the differences between ownership types.
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In  Study 4  we checked the robustness  of  our  results  to  the weights  used in
constructing  the  cost-weighted  output,  the  base  for  most  of  our  performance
indicators. We also estimated the models with proportional wages for private
providers obtained from trade union statistics and the municipal wages for
public providers. In our models the structure of the market was measured as the
number of  all  providers  in  the region.  We constructed two other  measures  for
market  structure:  1)  a  variable  based  on  the  number  of  providers  without
employers’  own  units  and  2)  a  dummy  variable  based  on  the  number  of
providers:  a  market  with  less  than  six  providers,  a  market  with  six  to  19
providers,  and  a  market  with  20  or  more  providers.  The  reason  for  excluding
employers’ own units from the number of providers in the region was that they
may not compete for employers in the same way as the other provider types. On
average, three fourths of the clients (employees) in employer owned units were
employed by the organization that also owned the OHS provider. A cut-off
point of 6 was also used by Santerre and Vernon (2006). They justify this cut-off
of  6  by the fact  that  equally  sized hospitals  would lead to  a  HI  of  1,800 which
would be regarded as highly concentrated by the Federal Trade Commission
and Department for Justice. Cabral (2002) also calculated that seven providers in
a Cournot model would be enough to achieve the price level of a competitive
market. The correlation between the number of providers in the region and the
number  of  providers  without  the  employers’  own  units  was  0.92  and  the
correlation with the dummy was 0.86.
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7 Results
7.1 COMPANY’S INVESTMENT IN PREVENTION DOES NOT
IMPROVE ITS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AFTER TWO OR
FOUR YEARS
In the first study we started from the assumption that if a company invests more
in preventive occupational health services this would mean more interventions
and, consequently, more favourable outcomes in the future. Finally, there would
be an impact on the profitability of the company. The objective was to determine
whether preventive occupational health services influence on a company’s
economic performance.
The company’s investment in prevention per employee was not high. On
average, the 6,721 companies invested in preventive OHS 39.50 Euros per
employee in 1997 and 46.00 Euros in 1999. This sum bought the companies some
22 minutes  of  OH personnel  time per  employee for  each of  the two years.  The
costs  per  employee  varied  according  to  the  provider  (Table  8).  Among  the
companies which had applied for reimbursement, the costs were the highest in
the companies' own OHS units and lowest in municipal health centres.
Table 8: Companies' costs of occupational health services in 2001 by provider
type in Euros per employee per year, mean (standard deviation)
Provider Preventive services Curative medical services
Employer’s own OHS unit
(N=454)
91.60
(44.90)
138.10
(67.15)
Employers’ joint OHS unit
(N=470)
72.95
(37.80)
107.30
(60.70)
Municipal health centre (N=1603) 43.35
(35.25)
27.10
(43.20)
Private medical centre (N=2422) 62.90
(41.55)
120.40
(78.25)
Other (N=35) 69.60
(46.10)
125.50
(74.90)
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The  average  annual  turnover  of  the  companies  in  the  study  was  around  24
million Euros, and the average age of a company was 18 years. The average
share of total costs for preventive OHS per turnover was 0.0334%.
Prevention as investment
The  five  key  indicators  of  the  profitability  of  the  company  in  2001  were  the
dependent variables, each in turn. The independent variables in the model were
investment in preventive OHS either in minutes per employee (log) or as the
total cost of prevention per turnover, all in 1997 or in 1999. Therefore we
conducted twenty regression analyses to study the connection between
investment in preventive OHS and company profitability two or four years after
the investment in preventive care.
Table 9 presents the results for operating profit. The preceding investment in
preventive OHS measured as OH personnel time per employee in 1997 had a
negative coefficient which was statistically non-significant. When the share of
total preventive OHS costs per turnover represented investment, the coefficient
was negative and statistically significant. The results of the models for other key
indicators were very similar. All coefficients for time per employee variables
were non-significant, and negative in 9 out of 10 models. For the costs per
turnover variable, the coefficient was negative in all ten models, and statistically
significant in nine out of ten models.
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Table 9: Regression models for operating profit in 2001, investment in
preventive OHS measured by two variables (N=6,271)
Dependent: operating profit in 2001
Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t|
Constant 7.44 *** 8.04 ***
Preventive OHS in 1997
Minutes per employee (log) -0.05
Total costs/turnover -349.55 *
Equity ratio in 1999 0.06 *** 0.06 ***
Equity ratio in 1999*2 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Log number of employees in 2001 -0.08 -0.02
Log turnover in 1999 -0.35 ** -0.40 **
Age of company -0.02 * -0.02 *
Industry, ref. wholesale and retail trade
Agriculture, hunting and forestry,
fishing
3.88 *** 3.89 ***
Mining and quarrying,
manufacturing
2.22 *** 2.25 ***
Electricity, gas, and water supply 0.79 0.78
Construction 2.08 *** 2.11 ***
Hotels and restaurants 1.48 ** 1.51 **
Transport, storage, and
communication
1.11 ** 1.11 **
Real estate, renting, and business
activities
2.45 *** 2.49 ***
Education -3.74 * -3.71 *
Health and social work 2.91 *** 2.98 ***
Other community, social and
personal service activities
-0.44 -0.41
Region, ref. Uusimaa (province around
Helsinki)
South 0.12 0.11
East 0.18 0.18
Central -0.11 -0.12
North 0.59 0.58
Åland 0.88 0.88
Municipality, ref. city
Semi-urban 0.20 0.18
Rural 0.20 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12
Reset F(3, 6244) 5.10 p=0.0016 5.25 p=0.0013
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
The average operating profit of the companies was 6.5% (median 5.67%). The
magnitude of the association between the company’s investment in preventive
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care 1997 and the operating profit in 2001 can be described by calculating the
impact  on  operating  profit  in  2001  if  the  company  had  doubled  the  share  of
preventive care costs per turnover (other things being equal). On average, the
companies used 0.0334% of their turnover for preventive occupational health
services (ratio 0.000334). According to the model, doubling this ratio would
lower the operating profit by 0.1 percentage units ((0.000668-0.000334)*(-349.55)
= 0.11675).
7.2 COMPANYS’S EXPENSES IN PREVENTIVE AND
MEDICAL OHS DO NOT FLUCTUATE ACCORDING TO THE
PROFITABILITY OF THE COMPANY
According  to  the  registers,  almost  one  in  five  companies  had  not  applied  for
reimbursement. Therefore we first used logistic regression analysis to examine if
this was due to the company’s economic situation. The analysis revealed that the
probability of applying for reimbursement (having OHS expenses) in 2001 was
not related to company’s economic performance two years before in 1999. (Table
10). The results were similar to those presented in table 10 for other key
indicators in 1999.
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Table 10: Logistic regression on a company's economic performance in 1999 for
a company's probability to apply for reimbursement in 2001 adjusted for age of
the company, turnover in 2001, industry, region and urbanisation (N = 6,155)1)
Variables in the model Coefficient P>|z|
Constant -12.67 ***
Economic
performance Operating margin in 1999 -0.00
Other variables Log turnover in 2001 0.85 ***
Age of company 0.03 ***
Blue-collar workers % in 2001 -0.35
Industry Reference: Wholesale and retail trade
Agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing 0.29
Mining and quarrying, manufacturing 0.84 ***
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.24 *
Construction 0.39 **
Hotels and restaurants 0.50 **
Transport, storage and communication 0.36 *
Real estate, renting and business 1.06 ***
Education 0.38
Health and social work 1.14 **
Community, social and personal service activities 0.99 **
Region Reference: Uusimaa (province around Helsinki)
South 0.29 **
East 0.28 *
Central 0.11
North 0.07
Åland -1.03 *
Municipality Reference: Rural
Urban 0.81 ***
Semi-urban 0.29 *
Pseudo R2 0.15
1) The results here are presented in the same form as in the preceding table, with regression
coefficients and asterisks for statistical significance, not with odds ratios (OR) and 95%
confidence intervals as in the published article.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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We  applied  ordinary  linear  regression  analysis  to  assess  the  influence  of  a
company's economic performance on the amount of spending, separately for
preventive care and curative medical services. Economic performance was
measured  by  all  key  ratios:  the  annual  profitability  of  a  firm,  the  accumulated
wealth representing the performance of a company throughout its history and
liquidity.  We  varied  the  models  and  all  key  indicators  were  included  in  the
model  as  independent  variables,  each  in  turn.  None  of  the  key  ratios  for
profitability, solidity and liquidity in 1999 was related to the costs for curative
medical  services  neither  to  costs  for  preventive  OHS  per  employee  in  2001
(Table 11). Here only the results for the operating profit in 1999 are presented.
There were differences between industries, regions and OHS providers. In
this study companies with a higher percentage of white-collar workers spent
more on curative medical services than in blue-collar dominated companies.
Table 11: Regression models of a company’s economic performance for costs of
curative medical services and preventive care (log Euros per employee) in 2001
adjusted for age of the company, turnover in 2001, share of blue-collar workers,
OHS provider, industry, region and urbanisation (N = 4,958) 1).
Curative medical
services,
Euros per employee
(log)
Preventive care,
Euros per
employee (log)
Variables in the model Coeffi-
cient
P>|t| Coeffi-
cient
P>|t|
Constant 0.66 2.57 ***
Operating profit in 1999 -0.001 -0.001
Age of company 0.00 0.00
Log turnover in 2001 0.20 *** 0.10 ***
Blue-collar workers % in 2001 -0.31 ** 0.05
Provider model
Ref. company's own OHS
Joint OHS unit 0.02 -0.06
Municipal OHS -2.32 *** -0.75 ***
Private medical centre 0.02 -0.23 ***
Other provider 0.18 -0.23
Industry
Reference: Wholesale and retail trade
Agriculture, hunting and forestry,
fishing
-0.87 ** 0.16
Mining and quarrying, manufacturing 0.09 0.38 ***
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.32 0.38 ***
Construction -0.33 *** 0.32 ***
Hotels and restaurants 0.07 0.02
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Transport, storage and communication -0.18 0.02
Real estate, renting and business
activities
0.36 *** 0.24 ***
Education 0.44 0.29
Health and social work 0.20 0.25 *
Other community, social and personal
service activities
0.49 ** 0.25 **
Region
Reference: Uusimaa (region around
Helsinki)
South 0.18 ** -0.11 ***
East -0.14 -0.11 **
Central -0.09 -0.18 ***
North -0.05 0.20 ***
Åland -0.27 0.22
Municipality
Reference: Rural
Urban 0.82 *** -0.09 *
Semi-urban 0.51 *** -0.10 *
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.19
Reset F(3, 4955) 27.28 0.0000 0.47 0.7062
1) The results here are presented in the same form as in the preceding table, the statistical
significance is presented with asterisks not with 95% confidence intervals as in the published
article.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
7.3 COMPETITIVENESS OF REGIONAL OHS MARKETS
VARIES A LOT
During the study period 1992-2004 the total number of providers diminished. At
the same time the market share of for-profit providers increased.
The number of all OHS providers decreased during the study period from
1,006 to 621, mostly because the number of employers’ own units decreased by
almost 60%. This was due to the closing down of the companies during the
Finnish economic recession of the early 1990s and later due to outsourcing. The
number of for-profit providers increased until 2000, but since then mergers have
decreased this number. The number of public providers and non-profit
providers  increased  slightly  during  the  study  period.  (Table  12.)  The  market
shares in Finland changed during the study period. For-profit providers’ market
share more than doubled to 37% in 2004. The market share of employers’ own
units halved to 18% in 2004. The market share of public providers fell by five
percentage units to 39% in 2004 and non-profits had a very stable market share
of about 6%.
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Table 12: Number of providers by provider type 1992-2004
For-profit Public Employers’ own Non-profit
1992 224 226 552 42
1995 164 234 410 41
1997 179 237 325 42
2000 190 237 291 39
2004 155 230 192 49
Due to these changes the average number of providers diminished in the regions
used  to  define  the  geographical  market  (Table  13).  This  development  did  not
lead to more concentrated markets on average. On average, the market share of
for-profit providers doubled in the regions.
Most regions can be considered competitive, but the local markets for OHS
varied widely. The for-profit providers and employers’ own units are located in
more  competitive  regions.  For  them,  the  average  number  of  providers  in  the
region was almost 50 and the for-profit market share 35% in 2004. The non-
profits and public providers faced less competition. On average, the non-profit
providers had 30 competitors and the market share of for-profit providers was
29% in 2004; public providers had 14 competitors and the market share of for-
profit providers was 19% on average in 2004.
Table 13: Competitiveness of the market measured by number of providers,
market share of for-profit providers (%), concentration of market (Herfindahl
index) and number of employers in a region (N=76), mean and (standard
deviation)
Number of
providers
For-profit
market share
Herfindahl
index
Number of
employers
1992 13.8
(29.7)
7.2
(8.9)
0.36
(0.24)
897
(1632)
1995 11.2
(21.9)
8.2
(9.6)
0.35
(0.26)
977
(1634)
1997 10.3
(18.9)
12.4
(13.1)
0.34
(0.24)
947
(1461)
2000 9.9
(18.9)
14.0
(14.3)
0.34
(0.24)
1062
(1746)
2004 8.6
(14.7)
15.1
(15.5)
0.35
(0.23)
855
(1445)
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7.4 PERFORMANCE OF OHS PROVIDERS IN 1992-2004
Four of  the indicators  measuring the performance of  a  provider  are  ratios  and
comparable between provider types. Figure 15-Figure 18 present the averages of
these  indicators  by  provider  type  during  the  study  period.  Public  providers
were catching up with the other provider types in intensity and share of medical
care (Figure 15 and Figure 17). However, they provided fewer services per
employee  (lower  intensity)  and  used  a  greater  share  of  the  resources  for
preventive care. The variation in productivity between provider types
disappeared almost completely (Figure 16). The unit price in employers’ own
units  and  non-profits  was  higher  than  in  for-profits  and  in  public  units.  Their
price also rose throughout the study period, but in for-profits the unit price was
quite stable. The unit price of public providers reached the level of for-profits in
2004 (Figure 18).
Figure 15: Intensity of the services (CWA output/employee) according to type of
provider 1992-2004, mean
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Figure 16: Productivity (CWA output/salary weighted weekly working hours) by
type of provider 1992-2004, mean
Figure 17: Share of medical care (%) by type of provider 1992-2004, mean
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Figure 18: Unit price (provider’s revenue/CWA output) by type of provider 1992-
2004, mean, 2004 real value
7.5 OWNERSHIP, INCENTIVES AND COMPETITION ALL
MATTER FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF AN OHS PROVIDER
First we studied how competitiveness of the market affected the performance of
public providers (Study 3). The results were surprising and contrary to
expectations based on economic theory. In Finland public OHS providers raised
their prices, which led to increased revenues when the competitiveness of the
market increased. But the market competition did not affect the production
decisions, i.e. intensity, productivity and share of medical care. When we
studied competitiveness and public providers, the number of providers and
Herfindahl index represented the structure and competitiveness of the market.
In this dissertation only the results from the models including all provider types
are reported (Study 4). Table 14 below presents the results of the panel models
from Study 4. The results of Study 3 are in line with those presented here when
we used market share of for-profit providers instead of the HI.
A change in the total number of all providers in the region was statistically
significantly associated with a change in three indicators: share of medical care,
unit price and revenue. The association was positive for the share of medical
care and similar for all provider types, i.e. if the number of providers increased
the  share  of  medical  care  also  increased.  For  unit  price  and  revenue,  the
association  differed  by  ownership.  For  for-profit  providers  the  increase  in  the
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number  of  providers  was  associated  with  a  decrease  in  the  unit  price.  The
interaction terms reveal that for public providers the association of change in the
number  of  providers  with  unit  price  was  altogether  positive  (-0.159  +  0.397  =
0.238). For employer’s own units and non-profits the association was negative as
for for-profits, but the magnitude was much smaller (about -0.04 for both, only
one fourth of  the coefficient  for  for-profits).  The association of  a  change in  the
number  of  providers  with  a  change  in  the  revenue  was  negative  for  for-profit
providers (-0.161). For non-profits the association was also negative but much
weaker than for for-profits (-0.161 + 0.157 = -0.004). Change in revenue in
employer’s own and public units was positively associated with a change in the
number of providers (-0.161 + 0.419 = 0.258 for public providers and -0.161 +
0.119 = 0.042 for employer’s own).
A change in market mix (the market share of for-profit providers) was
associated only with productivity. The spillover effect was negative. The
provider types did not differ in their reaction to change in the market mix
(interactions were not statistically significant).
Number of OH professionals indicates the scale of the provider. A change in
the scale was negatively associated with a change in productivity and positively
associated with a change in the share of medical care and revenue. A change in
the  scope  of  the  services  was  not  associated  with  a  change  in  any  of  our
indicators.
The  models  took  into  account  market  structure  and  mix,  scope  and  scale
economies. Usually in a fixed effect panel model a time trend is included in the
model to capture the impact of omitted variables that change during the study
period but whose impact is the same for all providers. In our study the provider
type  interactions  with  time  show  that  the  provider  types  had  different  paths
over time.
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We compared the direct effects of ownership (statistically significant provider type
dummies  in  pooled  OLS  models,  available  in  Appendices  3-6  of  Study  4)  on  the
indicators with the changes in those indicators statistically significantly associated
with changes in the market structure (number of providers) and in the market mix
(market share of for-profit providers). We varied the number of providers
(logarithm) or the market share of for-profit providers from the 25% percentile
values (Q1) to the 75% percentile values (Q3) in 2004. The quartiles for the number
of providers were Q1=7 and Q3=27 and for the market share of for-profit providers
Q1=0.14 and Q3=0.42 in 2004.
When the magnitude of change in market structure and mix is compared with
provider type differences the possible provider type interactions must be taken into
account. For example, in the pooled OLS model for unit price the public providers
had a dummy coefficient of -0.346. This coefficient means that public providers had
a 0.346 lower unit price than for-profit providers when all other variables in the
model are similar. A change in the number of providers from Q1 to Q3 would lead
to  a  change  of  1.350  (in  the  logarithm).  Taking  into  account  the  coefficient  for  the
number of providers (-0.159) and the public provider’s interaction coefficient (0.397)
this would lead to a change of 0.3212 units ((-0.159+0.397)*1.350 = 0.3212). This
change is slightly smaller than the difference due to ownership.
Changes in productivity were negatively associated with changes in the market
share of for-profits. Only employers’ own OHS differed statistically significantly
from for-profit providers in productivity (employers’ own OHS were more
productive). The difference was greater than the change in productivity associated
with a huge change in the for-profits’ market share (negative association). Changes
in share of medical care were positively associated with changes in number of
providers. Public providers differed statistically significantly from for-profit
providers in the pooled OLS model (they had a lower share of medical care than for-
profits). For public providers, the magnitude of the change in the share of medical
care positively associated with the change in the number of providers was smaller
than the difference due to ownership.
All not-for-profits differed statistically significantly from for-profits in the pooled
OLS models for unit price and revenue (there is a difference in “level” due to
ownership).  Public  providers  had  lower  unit  price  and  employer’s  own  OHS  and
non-profits had higher unit price than for-profits. All not-for-profits had higher
revenue than for-profits. For employer’s own OHS and non-profits the change in
unit price and revenue associated with a huge change in the number of providers in
the region was much smaller than the difference due to ownership. The magnitude
of change in unit price and revenue for public providers associated with change in
number  of  providers  was  much  greater  than  for  employer’s  own  OHS  and  non-
profits and almost of the same magnitude than the differences due to ownership.
To check the consistency of the results in Study 4 we applied private sector wage
ratios for private providers in constructing the cost-weighted activity output, but the
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results did not change. We also applied two different measures for the structure of
the market. The results of the panel models with the number of providers excluding
employers’ own units or dummies (less than six, six to 19, and 20 or more providers)
were similar to those presented here for productivity and unit price. The results
differed slightly for other performance indicators. Higher intensity was positively
associated with higher number of providers excluding employer’s own units for for-
profit providers and negatively associated for public and non-profit providers. In
the model with all providers there was no association between a change in the
structure  of  the  market  and  intensity.  We  also  measured  market  structure  with  a
dummy: a market with less than six providers (during the study period 12% of all
OHS units), a market with six to 19 providers (47% of all OHS units), and a market
with 20 or more providers (41% of OHS units). There was no association between a
change in the dummy and a change in intensity, share of medical care and revenues
of the provider.
We compared fixed effects panel models with IV panel models to examine the
possible  endogeneity  of  market  structure  and  mix.  In  this  comparison  the  models
differed from the ones presented here: variable scope and interactions were not
included in the model and we did not have data on household income for 1992. We
used  number  of  employees,  number  of  employers  (both  from  our  data)  and  the
median household income to predict number of providers and share of for-profit
providers in the region. For the dependent variables share of medical care, unit price
and revenue the Hausman test revealed that the fixed effects panel model is
preferred to IV. For intensity and productivity the test recommended IV modeling.
For intensity the market variables were not statistically significant in the fixed
effects panel model, in the IV model intensity was negatively associated with the FP
market share. Also for productivity the results of the two models differed. In the IV
model the number of providers was positively and statistically significantly
associated with productivity, the coefficient for the FP market share was also
positive but not statistically significant. In the fixed effects panel model the
coefficient for the number of providers was not statistically significant and the
coefficient for the FP market share was negative and statistically significant.
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8 Discussion
8.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We found no support for the hypothesis that a company's investment in preventive
OHS has a positive effect on the company's profitability after two or four years
(Study  1).  We  used  two  different  measures  to  represent  preceding  investment  in
preventive OHS: occupational health personnel time per employee or the ratio total
costs  of  preventive  services  per  turnover.  The  coefficients  for  the  variables  in  the
regression models were negative in almost all models. Those for OH personnel time
per employee variable were always non-significant. When the investment was
measured as the total costs of preventive OHS as a share of turnover, the coefficients
were all negative, and statistically significant in nine out of ten models.
From  a  company's  point  of  view,  and  compared  to  other  investments  in
intangibles (16% of turnover), such as R&D, marketing and investments in tangibles
(13% of turnover), such as equipment, investment in OHS is minimal, less than 0.5%
of turnover on average (Maliranta, Rouvinen 2007). The economic performance of a
company  is  much  more  dependent  on  other  factors  than  preventive  occupational
health care services.
Company’s economic performance is too distant from preventive OHS to
measure the effectiveness of prevention. Ahonen et al. (2001) addressed the problem
of ascertaining the impact of occupational health and safety interventions on
economic performance. First there should be an intervention that has a health effect.
This health effect should lead to decreased disability and improved productivity.
Furthermore, these should improve the economic performance of the firm. Outcome
measures applied in research should be specific (Verhoeven 1997), also in
occupational health and safety. Evaluation studies have shown that economic
evaluation and argumentation can be adequately combined with intervention
studies, see e.g. Tompa et al. (2008) and Taimela et al. (2008) for examples of
effective and profitable interventions for the company.
The importance of preventive care could be validated with other arguments than
company profitability. Sometimes preventive care can be valuable from the
viewpoint  of  society,  even  though  it  may  not  be  profitable  for  the  company.
Legislation (Torén, Sterner 2003) is one way to impose obligations for employers to
avoid negative externalities to society and employees, i.e. the costs of ill health due
to  work.  To  promote  the  consumption  of  preventive  services,  the  society  can  also
subsidize employers: the reimbursement system in Finland is one example of this.
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The  results  of  Study  2  show  that  the  Finnish  OHS  system  is  very  stable.
Companies’ expenditure on preventive and curative medical care do not fluctuate
according the economic performance of the company. The economic performance
over the preceding two years was not statistically related to expenditure on
preventive or curative medical OH services in 2001. Economic performance was
measured by firm’s annual profitability, the accumulated wealth that represents the
performance of a company throughout its history and liquidity.
The  result  differs  from  those  in  safety  studies  (Filer,  Golbe  2003,  Nickell,
Nicolitsas 1997, Dionne et al. 1997), where a firms' investment in safety is affected by
economic success, especially the financial structure and liquidity. Safety investments
are often equipment and non-current spending, whereas OHS are services and
consumption  of  a  more  stable  nature.  In  Finland,  employees  continue  to  use  the
services and providers continue to provide the services apparently irrespective of a
company's  economic  performance.  The  employer  has  to  use  the  expertise  of  the
provider in deciding upon the services and the action plans for the content of
services are devised by the provider. This leaves less room for the company to
decide on the content and cost of OHS. From a purchaser’s point of view OHS has a
minor role in a company. Organizing health care services is not a core business for
employers.
Although the economic performance of a company did not affect the amount of
money spent per employee on curative medical services and preventive care in a
particular company, there were differences between industries, regions and OHS
providers.  The  OHS  system  is  not  entirely  successful  in  the  optimal  allocation  of
resources according to needs. Expenditure on preventive care is not highest in the
riskiest industries (Grönqvist, Räsänen 2004, Riihimäki, Kurppa & Karjalainen 2004).
In companies with a higher percentage of white-collar workers, the costs of medical
services were higher than in blue-collar dominated companies. The white-collar
workers benefitted more in terms of free use of curative medical services, so there is
inequality  within  OHS  in  Finland.  Previously  it  has  been  reported  that  OHS
increases  inequity  in  the  use  of  physician  services  at  population  level  (van
Doorslaer, Masseria & OECD Health Equity Research Group, 2004, Häkkinen,
Nguyen 2010). In addition, the differences in expenditure were connected to
provider type and region, which also is connected to the supply of OHS services.
Studies 1 and 2 used data from 1997, 1999 and 2001. Given such a stable system,
we believe that  the results  would be the same if  more recent  data  were used.  The
content of the services has been the same according the statistics on OHS.
According to Studies 3 and 4, the market competition measured as the number of
providers showed no strong or clear association with the performance indicators.
The share of medical care was positively associated with the number of providers
and similarly for all provider types. Competition measured by number of providers
was associated with unit price and revenues but the provider types differed. For for-
profit  providers,  the  association was as  economic theory posits:  the  unit  price  and
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provider’s revenue both decreased when the number of providers increased in the
region. Contrary to the result for for-profits, the public providers had higher unit
prices and revenues when the number of providers increased. For the two other
provider  types,  employers’  own units  and non-profits,  the  association between the
monetary indicators was weaker than for for-profits. Their provider type
interactions with competition almost offset the coefficient of for-profit providers.
The extraordinary results for the public providers are understandable because of
the changes in their regulatory environment. Firstly, in 1995 the regulation of their
prices was abolished. In a more competitive environment, the public providers were
more  sensitive  to  react  to  the  abolition  of  price  regulation  and  raise  their  prices.
Secondly, during the study period, the public providers got more power to decide
upon their resources and were more dependent on the payments by employers and
less  on  politicians  (Maarse  et  al.  2005).  These  two  changes  may  explain  why  the
public providers started to increasingly resemble for-profit providers (institutional
isomorphism (Horwitz, Nichols 2009, Potter 2001)).
Market mix was not associated with the indicators. The only statistically
significant and negative association in the panel models was between market mix
and productivity. Our result contradicts the conventional wisdom that the presence
of for-profit providers increases productivity and lowers costs and prices. Shen et al.
(2007) reported a similar result in their meta-analysis: there was no consistent
support for for-profit hospitals operating more efficiently.
Grabowski and Hirth (2003) regarded the existence of spillover effects as proof of
information asymmetry in the nursing home markets. In our study, the share of for-
profit  providers  had  no  impact  on  the  performance  indicators  (except  for  the
negative association with productivity). The absence of spillovers could then be a
sign that the differences that existed and persisted between provider types were due
to heterogeneity of employers and employees and monopolistic competition. On the
other hand, market shares changed considerably in the past ten years (Manninen
2009, Kansaneläkelaitos (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland) 2007). This
implies that the segments are not totally separate and there must be some
competition.
All  performance  indicators  also  showed  a  time  trend  that  differed  by  provider
type.  We interpret  this  result  as  a  path dependency:  providers  have a  tendency to
continue  the  same  behaviour.  Path  dependency  has  previously  been  found  on
system level (Oliver, Mossialos 2005).
Ownership was a more important determinant of the differences in performance
than what could be achieved through more competition (considerable increase in
the number of providers). Only in unit prices and revenues of public providers was
the change associated with competition close to the differences due to ownership.
The relative importance of ownership and competition can be interpreted
through the incentives and/or objectives of providers represented in the ownership
types. Public ownership is a means both to steer resources in occupational health
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care, and municipalities have the legal obligation to provide or organize the services
for the employers in their region. On the other hand, public ownership is a means to
take  wider  societal  objectives  into  account  and  restrict  the  resources  for  OHS.
Although the lifting of price regulation and control in general has led to an increase
in the resources in public OHS, the resources are still meagre compared to those of
other providers. The change in public OHS is also connected to the special Finnish
characteristic of multiple channels for funding primary care. After the reform of the
state  allowance  system  in  1992  it  has  also  been  in  the  municipality’s  interest  to
increase the funding for health care by increasing the resources for OHS funded by
employers and the SII. Soft budget constraint was reality for public OHS providers
in the early 1990s, when public providers had regulated prices that did not cover the
production costs and tax revenue was used to cover the costs of OHS. When the
politicians relaxed their control of resources and public units started setting their
prices  on  a  level  that  would  cover  the  production  costs  (Kankaanpää,  Pulkkinen-
Närhi 2009) the performance started to resemble that of for-profit providers.
In general, the health care providers and professionals have a great deal of
power, being on “the short side of a non-clearing market” (Bowles, Gintis 2008). In
other words, the demand for health care exceeds what the regulated number of
providers can or will offer. Then one could question the existence of competition
measured  by  the  number  and  mix  of  providers.  The  substituting  pressure  would
come from strong external ownership and from financial markets (Nickell,
Nicolitsas & Dryden 1997). Indeed, the for-profit providers have aligned their
incentives best: employers are charged fee-for-service payments, and most of their
physicians are also paid on a fee-for-service basis. A fee-for-service payment system
is  known  to  induce  (over)provision  and  increase  the  total  costs  of  health  care.  In
Studies 3 and 4 intensity indicated quality and easy access is connected to intensity.
For-profit  providers  had  the  best  incentives  to  be  productive  in  quality  measured
with intensity and access. The data available in the studies does not enable to assess
how  performance  is  connected  to  welfare.  From  the  RAND  health  insurance
experiment it is known that there were no negative health effects when the co-
payments reduced the number of physician visits (Manning et al. 1987). The present
OHS  have  created  good  earning  opportunities  for  health  care  providers  and
professionals. This had led to an increase in the number of physicians working in
OHS, and there is shortage of physicians in many municipal health centres. The
parallel and differently funded systems may lead to a socially undesirable
distribution of resources.
For most employers the structure of the payment system in Finnish OHS is not
set by the purchaser but by the provider. It seems that the payment systems act
more for the benefit of the provider than the purchaser. Even in employer governed
provider  types,  employer’s  own OHS and non-profits,  the  unit  prices  were higher
than in other provider types. High unit price in employer’s own OHS and non-
profits could be a signal of rent earned by the provider. There could be a hold-up
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problem in employers’  own OHS which would lead to  higher  prices:  the  provider
has relation specific information on collaborating with the right people, knows the
management and processes. Employer’s own OHS and non-profits were also most
productive and had higher intensity than for-profits and public providers. They
were serving bigger employers in which employees’ organizations have established
participation structures. They could better present employees’ demands with
respect to occupational health care. According to Temin and Maxwell (Temin,
Maxwell  2003),  the  unions  in  the  USA  have  a  great  deal  of  power  in  employers’
decisions about organizing health services, especially in outsourcing decision.
In  general,  market  competition  is  not  only  about  providers.  The  purchasing  of
OHS  is  very  fragmented  in  Finland.  Most  employers  are  small  (in  number  of
employees) and cannot be regarded as powerful in bargaining for the prices or
content of occupational health services. Although the legislation obliges employers
it simultaneously guarantees the flow of clients (both employers and employees) to
providers. OHS providers have succeeded well in "the market for regulation".
8.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The data  used in  Studies  1  and 2  was unique.  In  Finland we had a  opportunity  to
combine key indicators calculated from the financial accounts of companies with
data on OHS. The power of the study and the follow-up time were sufficient to yield
significant relevant results. Exclusion criteria for continuous business and having
more  than  10  employees  may  bias  the  results  in  the  direction  of  apparently
diminishing the impact of economic performance on a company's OHS expenditure.
Entering  and  exiting  companies  and  companies  of  small  size  may  be  in  a  more
unfavourable financial situation.
A strength of Studies 3 and 4 is that the panel data included a large number of
observations  and  covered  almost  all  OHS  providers  in  Finland.  Defining  the
boundaries of a market is always difficult. We used the geographical regions
defined by Statistics Finland based on regional collaboration and commuting. The
number of providers in the region represented the market structure. We checked the
robustness of the results by constructing alternative measures for competition and
obtained mainly similar results.
There  are  limitations  in  our  study,  too.  We  did  not  have  data  on  clients
(employees),  which  has  proven  important  in  comparing  providers.  The  data  was
obtained  from  surveys  to  providers  and  a  register  which  did  not  include
information on the quality of the services as perceived by employers and employees
or on the impact on health. The simultaneous determination of the market structure
and the performance of providers causes a potential endogeneity problem,
especially  in  studies  with  cross  sectional  data  (Evans,  Froeb  &  Werden  1993).  We
applied Hausman test  in  the comparison of  fixed effects  and IV panel  models.  For
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the variables share of medical care, unit price and revenue the Hausman test
revealed  that  fixed  effects  panel  model  is  preferred  to  IV.  For  intensity  and
productivity  the  test  recommended  IV  modeling,  so  the  results  for  these  two
indicators  should be interpreted with caution.  Nor could we take into account  the
structure of the employers. According to the statics on regional concentration of
firms,  most  regions  are  not  concentrated.  On  the  other  hand,  the  availability  of
alternative providers matters more for the bargaining power than the size of the
purchaser (Barros, Martinez-Giralf 2006).
8.3 FUTURE RESEARCH
The health care market deviates from the assumptions of well functioning markets:
there are informational problems in contracting, purchasers may not have power to
apply incentives  to  counterbalance the power of  providers,  and consumers  do not
use market-determined prices as guides in their decision-making. Therefore it
would  be  interesting  to  model  and  empirically  study  the  consequences  of
competition in the labour market for the performance of health care providers.
Purchasing  and  payment  systems  as  incentives  are  regarded  as  important
instruments in steering health care providers. Economists’ analyses of payment
systems are overwhelmingly principal agent models that do not take competition
into  account.  The  conclusions  of  the  models  are  based  on  the  assumption  of
providers’ objectives and effort. Both these concepts would deserve more effort from
economists being so crucial for the recommendations of economists.
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9 Conclusions
The conclusion of our study is that there is no evidence to support the positive effect
of investment in preventive OHS on the economic performance of a company.
However, it cannot be concluded that preventive OHS has no positive effects. We
would rather recommend that all prevention be judged on its success in achieving
its specific objectives that are related to its core activities. The discussion as to
whether  OHS  is  beneficial  should  move  towards  more  specific  outcomes,  such  as
sickness absence, disability pension and productivity, when applicable, both in
occupational  health  service  research  and  in  practice  at  workplaces.  What  is  not
effective cannot be profitable for the company, either.
Expenditure  on  OHS  seems  to  be  independent  of  a  company's  economic
performance  in  Finland.  Legislation  obligating  the  employers  and  the
reimbursement system both contribute to this.
Market  competition  did  not  greatly  influence  the  performance  of  providers.  In
OHS, as is common elsewhere in health care, many crucial elements of market
competition are missing from the demand side of the market.
In our study only the for-profit providers’ unit prices and revenues behaved as
expected according to economic theory: unit prices in for-profits and revenue were
lower in more competitive market. The differences due to ownership were greater in
most performance indicators. Ownership as representing different objectives did not
as such matter much, either; the differences were more due to the differences in
incentive  structures  and  the  ability  to  allocate  or  restrict  the  resources  of  the
provider. The public providers and for-profit providers had a similar contractual
relationship with the purchasers and similar structure in their payment system. The
public providers’ performance was converging with the for-profits’ performance
after  their  price  regulation  was  abolished  in  1995.  When  employers  themselves
organized the provision of the services, either integrating the provider hierarchically
or jointly with other employers governing a non-profit provider the employers and
employees got more services, productivity was higher, but so was the unit price,
and indeed the costs per employee. The employers seemed to purchase capacity,
and the performance of the provider was almost immune to competition.
Steering health care providers is difficult. In the Finnish OHS the legislation has
made a purchaser of every employer. This has created a very fragmented
purchasing  structure.  In  addition,  the  employers  are  not  motivated  purchasers  in
terms  of  the  share  of  OHS  of  company  turnover.  Providers  compete  with  access,
probably leading to overprovision. The providers do not face any financial risks,
they are fully reimbursed. The cap for costs per employee concerns only the
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employer. The legislation has created incentive structures for employers and
providers  that  are  not  powerful  to  steer  the  providers  to  perform  according  the
wishes of society. Strong external interest, the power of shareholders in for-profits,
seems to compensate the low power of market environment and purchaser’s
steering ability.
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Abstract
Background: Both social and ethical arguments have been used to support preventive
occupational health services (OHS). During the 1990s it became more common to support political
argumentation for occupational health and safety by converting the consequences of ill health at
work into monetary units. In addition, OHS has been promoted as a profitable investment for
companies, and this aspect has been used by OHS providers in their marketing.
Our intention was to study whether preventive occupational health services positively influence a
company's economic performance.
Methods: We combined the financial statements provided by Statistics Finland and employers'
reimbursement applications for occupational health services (OHS) costs to the Social Insurance
Institution. The data covered the years 1997, 1999 and 2001 and over 6000 companies. We applied
linear regression analysis to assess whether preventive OHS had had a positive influence on the
companies' economic performance after two or four years.
Results: Resources invested in preventive OHS were not positively related to a company's
economic performance. In fact, the total cost of preventive OHS per turnover was negatively
correlated to economic performance.
Conclusion: Even if OHS has no effect on the economic performance of companies, it may have
other effects more specific to OHS. Therefore, we recommend that the evaluation of prevention
in OHS should move towards outcome measures, such as sickness absence, disability pension and
productivity, when applicable, both in occupational health service research and in practice at
workplaces.
Background
Both social and ethical arguments have been used to sup-
port preventive occupational health services (OHS). It has
been regarded as a fundamental right of each worker to
reach the highest attainable standard of health, and work-
ers' health at work should be protected [1,2]. Prevention
was perceived as valuable, at any rate better and cheaper
than a cure [3], and therefore economic analyses were not
required.
During the 1990s it became more common to reinforce
political argumentation for occupational health and
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safety by converting the consequences of ill health at work
into monetary units [4-6]. Moreover, OHS has been pro-
moted as a profitable investment for companies [7,8], a
viewpoint that has been used by OHS providers in their
marketing.
Occupational health personnel have a role in assessing
the health risks at the workplace – both environmental
risks and problems in the functioning of the working
community. They offer guidance on how to carry out
interventions to improve working conditions and well-
being at work and assist employees in maintaining their
health. They also carry out interventions themselves,
organize groups e.g. for persons with neck problems or
obesity, participate in the planning and implementation
of return-to-work policies, and act as facilitators in organ-
izational development projects [9,10].
The interventions also have an economic dimension.
Through improvement of working conditions, the costs of
occupational accidents and diseases can be lowered. More
importantly, these improvements can also lead to
increased productivity [8,11]. If employees are motivated
and committed to their work, they are willing to improve
the services and products, which leads to higher customer
satisfaction and faster payment of invoices. This reduces
receivable accounts and thus provides higher return on
capital employed. Employees' initiatives also concern
internal processes. The result will be less rework and
smooth processes that lower operating expenses [12]. The
costs of sickness absence and disability pensions can be
lowered with health related interventions [13], which has
immediate positive financial effects for a company. In the
long run, this will mean reductions in the company's
health and insurance pension premiums due to lowered
social security costs [8].
We study the assumption that if a company invests more
in preventive occupational health services this would
mean more interventions and, consequently, more
favourable outcomes. Finally, there would be an impact
on the profitability of the company.
We wanted to study the above described previously unex-
plored relationship between a company's economic per-
formance and its investment in preventive occupational
health services. The small amount of research in this area
may be due to insufficient data. The circumstances in Fin-
land, however, enable examination of this relationship, as
it has been obligatory for employers to arrange preventive
occupational health services for their employees since
1979. Preventive services include both individual and
workplace activities. Employers can voluntarily organize
GP level medical services, and they are entitled to reim-
bursement for the costs of preventive and medical serv-
ices. Because of the reimbursement system, there is an
employer-based register of the contents and costs of OHS.
In this study, we combined this register with the firms'
financial statements gained from Statistics Finland. Firm-
specific identification codes were used in the processing of
the financial statement data.
Our objective was to determine whether preventive occu-
pational health services positively influence a company's
economic performance.
Methods
We examined the relationship between companies' invest-
ment in preventive OHS in 1997 and 1999 and the com-
panies' economic performance four or two years later in
2001. We had the opportunity to use micro-level data
from the companies.
Statistics Finland collects the financial statements of all
Finnish firms from tax authorities. The register also con-
tains data such as number of persons employed by the
company, year of establishment, registered office, and
industry.
The Social Insurance Institution (SII) registers employers'
reimbursement applications for OHS. This register con-
tains data on the service mix and the costs incurred. We
chose to use registers from the years 1997, 1999 and 2001.
In 1997, the reformed reimbursement system for the pro-
motion of activities supporting work ability had been in
force for two years. As this project was launched, 2001 was
the last year for which all reimbursement applications had
been processed. Companies apply for reimbursement
within six months of closing their accounts, after which it
takes over a year to process all the applications at the SII.
We then merged this register with the Statistics Finland
data, using firm-specific identification codes.
Finnish firms are a heterogeneous group. Table 1 presents
the exclusion criteria. In 2001, 40% of a total of 226,000
firms were actually self-employed private persons and
15% had limited or unlimited liabilities. These and all
other juridical forms except companies were excluded.
Companies are defined as clearly for-profit organizations,
and the legislation on bookkeeping and financial state-
ments guarantees high quality of economic performance
data. To enable assessment of whether the preceding
investment in preventive OHS has had an impact on the
company's economic performance, the companies had to
have been in business continually through 1997–2001
(financial statements were available for this period).
Statistics Finland has graded the quality of the financial
statements into three categories. It only uses financial
statements from firms when the quality of the data is
BMC Public Health 2008, 8:130 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/130
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graded excellent or good in its own publications and anal-
ysis. We used the same criteria, as in the third category
many of the rows in the income statements have to be esti-
mated.
The Act on Occupational Health Services applies only to
firms that have employees. We assumed that a company's
turnover had to exceed a certain level in order for it to be
able to employ someone. With this in mind, we excluded
companies with a turnover of less than €50,000 p.a. The
number of employees in the Statistics Finland register also
includes all short-term contracts, which might have been
valid for a couple of hours only. Thus we left out compa-
nies with less than ten employees in 2001. By trimming
both tails of all key ratios we were left with 6271 compa-
nies for the analysis.
After the exclusions, the number of companies fell from
almost 100,000 to 6271. However, with view to average
Finnish companies in 2001, the companies included in
the study were rather typical in their location in terms of
region and type of municipality. Regionally, the compa-
nies were mainly located in the south: 37% in Uusimaa,
the region around the capital city of Helsinki, 36% in
Southern Finland, 8% in Eastern Finland, 12% in Central
Finland, 7% in Northern Finland, and less than 1% in
Åland. Most of the companies were situated in urban
municipalities (74%), and the rest were split between
semi-urban (14%) and rural municipalities (12%).
The size distribution of the companies in the study natu-
rally differed from that of all Finnish companies as those
with less than ten employees were excluded.
The industry distribution of the included companies dif-
fered from that of total Finnish companies in three indus-
tries: the share of companies in real estate, renting, and
business activities was smaller in the study population
than in all Finnish companies (28%). These companies
were small: 92% employed less than ten persons and were
therefore excluded from the study. The financial interme-
diation industry disappeared completely, as this industry
has special regulations concerning financial statements
and cannot be compared with companies from other
industries. The share of companies from the combined
industry group of mining and quarrying plus manufactur-
ing was higher than in all Finnish companies (14%). The
size and industry distribution of the companies included
in the study is presented in Additional file 1.
The average turnover of the companies in the study was
about €24 million, and the average age of a company was
18 years.
Statistics Finland calculated the key ratios for all compa-
nies (Table 2). They are all derived from financial state-
ments and commonly used in assessing companies'
economic performance. We used the five key indicators
for profitability as an outcome measure for company eco-
nomic performance. Key indicators for industries differ
[14], and there are also geographical and regional differ-
ences, mainly due to differences in competitiveness [15].
The size of the company is also a factor in economic per-
formance [16].
In Finland preventive occupational health services cover
almost all employed persons; only in micro firms with
less than 10 employees the employers has not always
organized OHS services for the workplace. According to a
population survey conducted in 2006, two out of three
employees had attended an occupational health examina-
tion in the past three years, and around half of them had
had occupational health personnel assessing their work-
place in the past three years. Although organizing medical
services is voluntary for employers, over 90% of employ-
ees can obtain GP level services from their OHS unit.
Around half of the primary care level GP visits of these
employees take place within OHS [17].
To be able to compare investment in preventive OHS
between companies, we chose two different points of
view: resources per employee and OHS's share of total
costs per turnover (importance compared to other uses of
resources in the company, comparable e.g. to costs of pre-
vention per gross national product, GNP).
Because of the specific features of the Finnish reimburse-
ment system, we measured the company's investment in
OHS per employee both in monetary and temporal terms.
Until 1995, the prices in municipal health centres were set
by the State Council and did not cover the costs of provid-
ing these services [18]. Many municipal units have been
slow in changing their pricing policy: in 2000 one in three
were still using the regulated prices from 1994. In the
companies' own OHS units, the costs of preventive and
medical services in reimbursement applications are often
divided according to the shares of maximum reimburse-
ment (40% for prevention and 60% for medical services)
and not according to the resources used.
Table 1: Exclusion criteria and number of companies in study
Number of firms in 2001 226 000
Number of companies in 2001 99 428
Financial statements for 1997, 1999 and 2001 64 597
Quality of the data rated good or excellent in 2001 32 522
Turnover > €50 000 for each of the three years 24 380
Personnel > 10 in 2001 7 013
Trimming of the key ratios for 2001 (1% both tails) 6 271
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The time variable was calculated from the SII register data.
Workplace and group activities had originally been regis-
tered in hours. We converted the number of health exam-
inations into minutes based on information from
previous studies or an expert assessment of the contents of
OH personnel's work in different provider models. All
activities were summed up into the variable Occupational
Health (OH) Personnel's Time per Employee. The time
resource and costs correlated strongly in all other provider
models (0.6–0.8), but not in the companies' own units.
The price level in municipal OHS units was about 40%
lower than in other provider models (euros per OH per-
sonnel minute). Thus time resource is a better measure for
investment in preventive OHS for both the companies'
own units and municipal OHS units. Therefore, the deci-
sion was made to leave the costs per employee out of the
analysis.
Table 2: Key ratios of companies in 2001 (N = 6 271)
Key ratio Mean Median Standard Deviation
Profitability
Operating margin, %
What is left over from the company's earnings after paying for variable costs of production divided by net 
sales.
10.03 8.73 8.29
Operating profit, %
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by net sales.
6.5 5.67 7.15
Net result, %
(Total revenues - total expenses) divided by net sales = Shows whether a company has earned or lost 
money with its business in the accounting period.
4.25 3.65 6.15
Total result, %
Net result + extraordinary revenues - extraordinary expenses divided by net sales
4.05 3.27 5.76
Profit/loss for the accounting period, %
The profit/loss result after tax payments divided by net sales.
4.11 3.25 5.57
Solidity
Return on capital assets, %
Shows how profitable the company is relative to its total assets. = Net income/total assets
14.05 12.43 13.59
Return on investment, %
Evaluates the efficiency of an investment = (gain from investment - cost of investment)/cost of investment.
26.83 21.5 32.28
Return on equity, %
Shows how much profit is made relative to the owners' investment in the company = Net income/
shareholders equity
24.71 21.01 59.87
Relative indebtedness, %
Company's liabilities divided by its turnover.
32.18 23.92 28.39
Less than 40%: Good
40–80%: Satisfactory
More than 80%: Poor
Equity ratio, %
The percentage of equities from the balance sheet
43.43 43.13 23.37
Over 40%: Good
20–40%: Satisfactory
Less than 20%: Poor
Liquidity
Quick Ratio
Company's ability to meet its obligations.
0.51 0.23 0.73
Over 1: Good
0.5–1: Satisfactory
less than 0.5: Poor
Current Ratio
Company's ability to meet short term debt obligations.
0.54 0.38 0.61
Over 2: Good
1–2: Satisfactory
less than 1: Poor
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On average, the 6721 companies invested in preventive
OHS €39.50 per employee in 1997 and €46.00 in 1999.
This sum bought the companies some 22 minutes of OH
personnel time per employee for each of the two years.
Among the companies who had applied for reimburse-
ment, the costs were the highest in the companies' own
OHS units (€91 for prevention and €138 for medical
services per employee) and lowest in municipal health
centres (prevention €62 and medical services €42 per
employee).
The average share of total costs for preventive OHS per
turnover was 0.04%.
We assumed that the provider model could have an
impact on company performance. The companies' own
units are generally believed to be able to integrate their
activities more efficiently into the company than other
providers. However, in this study, the OHS provider
model had no effect on the key ratios and was thus
excluded from the models.
The connection between investment in OHS and the com-
panies' economic performance was analyzed using linear
regression analysis. The investment in preventive occupa-
tional health services was not dependent on the com-
pany's previous economic success. The correlations
between the investment in 2001 and the key ratios in
1997 or 1997 were all small (absolute values were less
than 0.1).
We tested the models using the regression specification
error test (RESET test). It can be used for testing the func-
tional form of a model, especially to detect non-linearities
and omitted variables [19]. RESET test revealed that the
relationship between dependent and some independent
variables was logarithmic rather than linear. The models
were also tested for multicollinearity.
We used two different software packages in the analysis.
The SAS software package was used in excluding and
recoding and the STATA for the analysis.
Results
Model
The five key indicators of the profitability of the company
were the dependent variables, each in its turn. The inde-
pendent variables in the model were investment in pre-
ventive OHS either in minutes per employee (log) or as
the total cost of prevention per turnover (%), all in 1997
or in 1999. Therefore, we conducted twenty regression
analyses to study the connection between investment in
preventive OHS and company profitability.
The other independent variables were the company's past
economic performance (equity ratio in 1999, with higher
equity ratio indicating greater opportunity to make profit-
able investments), size of the company (log number of
employees in 2001, log turnover in 1999), and age of the
company.
Some of the confounding variables were dummies, and
the coefficients are meaningful only when compared to
the reference group. Industry was included in the model
because key ratios differ according to industry; in this
study the reference group was wholesale and retail trade.
Geographical regions were included to represent booming
or declining regional economies (6 counties in Finland,
reference region Uusimaa). The type of municipality is an
indicator of the size of the local market, for both the com-
pany's products and for OHS. Municipalities were classi-
fied into three groups: city, semi-urban, and rural.
We checked the correlations between independent varia-
bles (see Additional file 2), and found no multicollinear-
ity.
Company's economic performance
Operating profit represents here the economic perform-
ance of the company in 2001. Table 3 includes two differ-
ent models for operating profit, one for each indicator of
the company's investment in preventive occupational
health services in 1997.
The preceding investment in preventive OHS measured as
OH personnel time per employee in 1997 had a negative
coefficient which was statistically non-significant.
When the share of total preventive OHS costs per turnover
represented investment, the coefficient was negative and
statistically significant.
The results of the models for other key indicators were
very similar to those presented in Table 3. All coefficients
for time per employee variables were non-significant, and
negative in 9 out of 10 models. For the costs per turnover
variable, the coefficient was negative in all ten models,
and statistically significant in nine out of ten models.
Success seems to follow success: a higher equity ratio in
1999 was connected with better key indicators for profita-
bility in 2001. The age of the company and turnover were
negatively related to profitability but no correlation was
found between profitability and the geographical or
regional location of the company.
The adjusted R2s were low in general, highest in the mod-
els for operating margin (18%), and about 12% for other
key indicators of profitability.
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Discussion
In this study, we could not find support for the hypothesis
that a company's investment in preventive OHS would
have a positive effect on the company's profitability after
two or four years. The coefficients for the variables repre-
senting preceding investment in preventive OHS in the
regression models were negative in almost all models.
Those for OH personnel time per employee variable were
always non-significant. When the investment was meas-
ured as the total costs of preventive OHS as a share of
turnover, the coefficients were all negative, and statisti-
cally significant in nine out of ten models.
The power of the study and the follow-up time were suffi-
cient to yield significant relevant results. In Finland, we
had the unique opportunity of combining economic indi-
cators from companies with data on OHS.
Economic performance of a company is a complex phe-
nomenon, and difficult to decipher exhaustively with this
kind of data. The explanatory power of the regression
model for the economic performance of the company was
low, but not deviant from other studies with similar
design explaining a firm's economic performance [20,21].
Some independent variables that might affect economic
performance were lacking, which was also shown in the
RESET tests. Had we had information on matters such as
management, marketing and research and development,
the explanatory power of the models would have been
higher. However, if these omitted variables are uncorre-
lated with our key variables (as tested by RESET test, in
fact), the results relevant for our study questions are unaf-
fected by these omitted variables.
Table 3: Regression models for operating profit in 2001, investment in preventive OHS measured with two variables
Dependent: operating profit in 2001
Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 7.439 *** 8.040 ***
Preventive OHS in 1997
Minutes per employee (log) -0.050
Total costs/turnover -349.552 *
Equity ratio in 1999 0.060 *** 0.060 ***
Equity ratio in 1999*2 0.000380 *** 0.000381 ***
Log number of employees in 2001 -0.080 -0.020
Log turnover in 1999 -0.348 ** -0.401 **
Age of company -0.018 * -0.018 *
Industry
Agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing 3.875 *** 3.888 ***
Mining and quarrying, manufacturing 2.216 *** 2.249 ***
Electricity, gas, and water supply 0.788 0.781
Construction 2.081 *** 2.107 ***
Hotels and restaurants 1.482 ** 1.507 **
Transport, storage, and communication 1.109 ** 1.109 **
Real estate, renting, and business activities 2.448 *** 2.494 ***
Education -3.739 * -3.710 *
Health and social work 2.910 *** 2.984 ***
Other community, social and personal service activities -0.436 -0.406
Reference: Wholesale and retail trade
Region
South 0.119 0.114
East 0.181 0.178
Central -0.109 -0.118
North 0.590 0.582
Åland 0.884 0.882
Ref. Uusimaa
Municipality
Semi-urban 0.198 0.182
Rural 0.199 0.180
Ref. city
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12
Reset F(3, 6244) 5.10 p = 0.0016 5.25 p = 0.0013
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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From a company's point of view and compared to other
investments in intangibles (16% of the turnover), such as
R&D and marketing, and investments in tangibles (13%
of the turnover), such as equipment, the investment in
OHS is minimal, less than 0.5% of turnover on average
[22]. The economic performance of a company is much
more dependent on other factors than preventive occupa-
tional services, and as an outcome measure economic per-
formance is too distant to actually correlate with
preventive OHS. If one wants to show that occupational
health services are profitable for the company cost-benefit
and cost-effectiveness analysis should be used. Good
examples of such studies are Tompa et al. and Taimela et
al. [13,23]. In addition, occupational health services units
can be an economical way to provide medical curative
care [24].
A line of argumentation based on a viewpoint quite sepa-
rate from profitability for the company could also be used
to advocate the importance of prevention. Sometimes pre-
vention can be valuable from the viewpoint of society
even though it would not be profitable for the company.
Legislation [25] is one way to impose obligations for
employers to avoid negative externalities to the society
and the employees, i.e. the costs of ill health due to work.
To promote the consumption of preventive services, the
society can subsidize employers: the reimbursement sys-
tem in Finland is one example of this.
Conclusion
The conclusion of our study is that there is no evidence to
support the positive effect of investment in preventive
OHS on the economic performance of a company.
However, it cannot be concluded that preventive OHS has
no positive effects. We would rather recommend that all
prevention would be judged on it success in achieving its
specific objectives that are related to its core activities. The
discussion as to whether OHS is beneficial should move
towards more specific outcomes, such as sickness absence,
disability pension and productivity, when applicable,
both in occupational health service research and in prac-
tice at workplaces. What is not effective cannot be profita-
ble for the company either.
In general, it might be quite difficult to prove that preven-
tion has some impact on the economy (see [3], p. 13–23).
This means the discussion about the relationship between
health and productivity, or the wealth of a nation, will
continue [26] within occupational health. However the
first step, the link between prevention and health should
be given priority when planning new research on the area.
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Abstract
Background: In Finland like in many other countries, employers are legally obliged to organize
occupational health services (OHS) for their employees. Because employers bear the costs of OHS
it could be that in spite of the legal requirement OHS expenditure is more determined by economic
performance of the company than by law. Therefore, we explored whether economic performance
was associated with the companies' expenditure on occupational health services.
Methods: We used a prospective design to predict expenditure on OHS in 2001 by a company's
economic performance in 1999. Data were provided by Statistics Finland and expressed by key
indicators for profitability, solidity and liquidity and by the Social Insurance Institution as employers'
reimbursement applications for OHS costs. The data could be linked at the company level.
Regression analysis was used to study associations adjusted for various confounders.
Results: Nineteen percent of the companies (N = 6 155) did not apply for reimbursement of OHS
costs in 2001. The profitability of the company represented by operating margin in 1999 and
adjusted for type of industry was not significantly related to the company's probability to apply for
reimbursement of the costs in 2001 (OR = 1.00, 95%CI: 0.99 to 1.01). Profitability measured as
operating profit in 1999 and adjusted for type of industry was not significantly related to costs for
curative medical services (Beta -0.001, 95%CI: -0.00 to 0.11) nor to OHS cost of prevention in 2001
(Beta -0.001, 95%CI: -0.00 to 0.00).
Conclusion: We did not find a relation between the company's economic performance and
expenditure on OHS in Finland. We suppose that this is due to legislation obliging employers to
provide OHS and the reimbursement system both being strong incentives for employers.
Background
Occupational health services (OHS) are regarded as a fun-
damental right of every worker. In order to reach the high-
est attainable standard of health, workers' health at work
should be protected [1,2]. Therefore, employers in Fin-
land and in many other countries are obliged by legisla-
tion to organize OHS [3]. Because employers cover the
costs of OHS it could be that in spite of this requirement
OHS expenditure is more determined by economic per-
formance of the company than by law.
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Filer and Golbe [4] have described how company's invest-
ment in workplace safety is connected to company's eco-
nomic performance. In general, a company's financial
structure substantially affects its real operating decisions
and the amount of risk the company is willing to bear,
which have an impact on firm's input choices. Both safety
and occupational health services are such inputs for a
company.
In making decisions on OHS investments the company is
balancing the costs and benefits of OHS. Preventive serv-
ices are supposed to lead to lower occupational accidents
and diseases, lower sickness absence and disability pen-
sions which all improve the economic performance of the
company [5-7]. Curative medical services within OHS
have similar objectives. In addition, curative medical serv-
ices can be regarded as fringe benefits, that is, the
employer offers employees health services (or health
insurance) in place of or as an additional monetary wage
[8]. Offering generous curative medical services would
then lead to employees' lower wage demands.
Investments in safety and health compete with other
investments in the company. While companies make
decisions on resource allocation the economic situation
of the company might affect OHS differently than other
input decisions. Acquiring outside funding for OHS
investments will be difficult and therefore investment
decisions on OHS are dependent on the liquidity of the
company (cash flows). Cash flows indicate if there is
internal funding available in general, also for investments
in OHS.
Filer and Golbe [4] studied investments in safety which
also includes investments in capital goods, like equip-
ment. They summarize various models and conclude that
the impact indebtedness has on safety investments is
ambiguous, mainly due to the capital nature of safety
investments. In our study, the costs for occupational
health services include only the payments for the OHS
providers that will be paid immediately, and the benefits
of good OHS will be received in the future. Therefore, we
expect that high leverage and the risk of bankruptcy will
lower the investment in occupational health services. This
is due to share owners' and bondholders' conflicting inter-
ests. Owners bear the costs of OHS, in case of bankruptcy
the bondholders become the owners of the company and
will receive the fruits of OHS, or the costs of neglect.
There is some evidence to support these assumptions but
there are only few studies. Nickell and Nicolitsas found in
their study that declining company finances lead to lower
pay and to lower safety levels as indicated by abolishment
of "restrictive practices" such as restrictions to hours of
work, manning ratios on machines, and inflexibility of
working practices [9]. Abolishment of these restrictions
can be interpreted as lowering of safety levels. Filer and
Golbe also observed that, in a broad range of industries,
the level of safety in a workplace was related to the firm's
operating margin and indebtedness [4]. Particularly at
low levels of operating margin, firms doing worse also
invested less in safety.
The small amount of research in this field may be due to a
lack of data. In Finland, however, it is possible to study the
relationship between economic performance and OHS
expenditure because employers are entitled to reimburse-
ment for about half of the costs of preventive and curative
medical occupational health services. Based on the reim-
bursement claims, the National Social Insurance Institution
keeps an employer-based register of the contents and costs of
OHS. In addition, Statistics Finland keeps a register with the
firms' annual financial statements. These financial state-
ments allow the calculation of key ratios that measure a com-
pany's economic performance. Firm specific identification
codes made it possible to combine the information in both
registers at the firm level.
Based on these administrative sources, we studied if key
ratios for a company's economic performance were asso-
ciated with the OHS expenditure two years later.
Methods
Occupational health services
It has been obligatory for employers to organize preven-
tive occupational health services for their employees since
1979. According to a population survey conducted in
2006, two out of three employees had attended an occu-
pational health examination in the past three years, and
around half of them had had occupational health person-
nel assessing their workplace in the past three years.
Although organizing curative medical services is voluntary
for employers, over 90% of employees can obtain GP level
services from their OHS unit. Around half of the primary
care level GP visits of these employees take place within
OHS [10]. A more detailed description of the Finnish
OHS can be found in [3,11]. At the moment, OHS is the
only health care system in Finland that provides curative
medical services for users without out-of-pocket pay-
ments. Therefore, the curative medical services can be
regarded as fringe benefits.
Finland introduced public health insurance to reimburse
the costs of curative medical care in the private sector in
1964. Since then employers have got reimbursement for
the costs of OHS. Employers first pay all costs of OHS and
apply for reimbursement within six months after closing
their accounts. The share of the costs reimbursed has var-
ied during the over 40 years of reimbursement. In 2001
and still nowadays, the reimbursement is 60% for preven-
tive and 50% for curative medical services. So, despite of
BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:156 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/156
Page 3 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
the reimbursement the firms will always bear a considera-
ble part of the cost themselves.
Study design
In a prospective design, data for economic performance of
companies from 1999 were used to predict their expendi-
ture on OHS in 2001.
Statistics Finland collects the financial statements of all
Finnish firms from the tax authorities. The register also
contains data such as the number of persons employed by
the company, number of blue- and white-collar workers,
year of establishment, registered office, and industry.
The Social Insurance Institution (SII) registers employers'
reimbursement applications for OHS. This register con-
tains data on service mix and costs. We chose to use regis-
ters from the years 1999 and 2001. In 1999, the renewed
reimbursement system where the costs for prevention and
curative medical services are reported separately had been
in force for four years. As this project was launched, 2001
was the last year for which all reimbursement applications
had been processed. Companies apply for reimbursement
within six months of closing their accounts. After this, it
takes over a year to process all the applications at the SII.
The Social Insurance Institution register was merged with
the Statistics Finland data at the Statistics Finland by using
firm-specific identification codes. To protect the privacy of
the companies we had at our disposal only the merged
unidentifiable data.
The companies
Firms are a heterogeneous group, e.g. differences in the
legal construction affect the regulations about bookkeep-
ing. To be sure that the firms in the study would employ
personnel and would therefore be obliged to provide
OHS we had to restrict our sample (Figure 1). For this rea-
son we excluded firms that
- were not companies
- had not been in business continually through 1999-
2001
- had financial statements of insufficient quality as
assessed by Statistics Finland (quality is rated low when
the firm had not reported many rows in the profit and loss
account and this missing information has to be estimated
by Statistics Finland)
- had a turnover of less than €50,000 per annum
- had less than ten employees in 2001
- had values in either 1% tail of any key ratio. (Trimming
is commonly used with key ratios to help to comply with
the normality assumption [12].)
- had very high values of prevention costs (> 240 euro per
employee, 61 cases) and curative medical service costs (>
360 euro, 55 cases) in 2001. This indicates that expendi-
ture has been beyond the normal limits because of excep-
tional circumstances.
This resulted in 6,155 firms that had valid data for both
economic performance and OHS expenditure and that
could be included in the analysis.
Economic Performance
Key ratios for profitability are calculated from the profit
and loss account by deducting costs from turnover and
dividing this margin by turnover. The difference between
the ratios results from the variation in costs deducted. The
three first key ratios for solidity proportionate the annual
profit to different capital titles. The two other key ratios
for solidity, relative indebtedness and equity ratio, give an
idea about the accumulated wealth of the company. Key
ratios for liquidity indicate how large a share of its debts
the company could pay with its liquid assets. Definitions
for key ratios can be found in the appendix 1 (Table5.
Statistical analysis
The association between a company's economic perform-
ance and investment in OHS was analyzed using regres-
sion analysis. The independent variable was economic
Construction of the study sampleFigure 1
Construction of the study sample.
Restriction criteria Number 
after
restriction
Total number of firms in 2001 226,000
Not a company in 2001 
 99,428
No financial statements for both 1999 and 2001 
 64,597
Quality of the data not rated good or excellent in 2001 
 32,522
Turnover < €50,000 
 24,380
Personnel < 10 in 2001 
 7,013
1% of either tail of the key ratios in 2001 
 6,271
Exceptionally high OHS costs 
 6,155
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performance of the company as represented by key indica-
tors for profitability, solidity and liquidity. All indicators
were each in its turn modelled and analysed.
Because almost one in five companies had not applied for
reimbursement, we first used logistic regression analysis
with a dichotomous dependent variable of yes or no
spending on OHS. The dependent variable of spending on
OHS was constructed from yes or no applying for reim-
bursement. In a separate analysis we applied linear regres-
sion analysis to assess the influence of a company's
economic performance on the amount of spending, sepa-
rately for prevention and curative medical services.
We tested the models using the regression specification
error test (RESET test). It can be used for testing the func-
tional form of a model, especially to detect nonlinearities
and omitted variables [13]. The test revealed that the rela-
tionship between dependent and some independent vari-
ables was logarithmic rather than linear. Therefore, these
variables were log transformed. The models were also
tested for multicollinearity, and there was no multicol-
linearity.
We assumed that industry, the proportion of blue collar
workers, age of the company, geographical region and
grade of urbanisation of the area could all be related to the
economic performance and to the expenditure of OHS.
These variables were therefore introduced as confounders
in all models.
We used the STATA software packages for the analysis.
Results
Study Sample
The companies included in the study were a representative
sample in terms of region and the type of the municipal-
ity. The size distribution of the companies in the study
naturally differed from that of all Finnish companies as
those with less than ten employees were excluded. For the
same reason of exclusion of small firms, the industry dis-
tribution of the included companies differed from that of
all Finnish companies. 'Real estate, renting, and business
activities' and 'financial intermediation' were underrepre-
sented and 'mining and quarrying plus manufacturing'
slightly overrepresented. (See additional file 1 for the size
and the industry distribution of the companies.)
The key ratios for economic performance were about the
same as for all Finnish firms (including also other firms,
not only companies) except for relative indebtedness and
quick ratio which were lower in the companies included
in the study (table 1). The correlations between key ratios
for profitability and solidity were big within a year (abso-
lute values 0.4-0.9) and small for the key ratios for liquid-
ity (0.2). Between the time periods the correlations got
smaller.
The average turnover of the companies in the study was
about €24 million, and the average age of a company was
18 years.
Of the companies included in the study, 19% had not
applied for reimbursement in 2001. Among the compa-
nies who had applied for reimbursement, the costs were
the highest for the companies' own OHS units and lowest
for municipal health centres (table 2). The magnitude of
OHS expenditure was relatively small: the total OHS costs
represented about 0.1% of turnover on average.
Economic performance and applying for reimbursement 
for the OHS costs
In table 3 the odds ratio for operating margin in 1999
indicates that the relation with OHS is negligible and non-
Table 1: Key ratios for economic performance of companies in 2001 (N = 6,271)
Key ratio Mean Median Standard Deviation
Profitability
Operating margin, % 10.0 8.7 8.3
Operating profit, % 6.5 5.7 7.2
Net result, % 4.2 3.6 6.2
Total result, % 4.0 3.3 5.7
Profit/loss for the accounting period, % 4.1 3.2 5.6
Solidity
Return on capital assets, % 14.0 12.4 13.6
Return on investment, % 26.8 21.5 32.3
Return on equity, % 24.7 21.0 59.9
Relative indebtedness, % 32.2 23.9 28.4
Equity ratio, % 43.4 43.1 23.4
Liquidity
Quick Ratio 0.51 0.23 0.73
Current Ratio 0.54 0.38 0.61
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significant after adjustment for the various confounders.
The results of the models with other key ratios for eco-
nomic performance were similar to operating margin and
also not significant (data not shown).
Costs of curative medical and preventive services
Operating profit in 1999 was not related to the costs for
curative medical services nor to costs for preventive OHS
per employee in 2001 (table 4). The results were similarly
non-significant for the other key rations for profitability,
solidity and liquidity (data not shown). There were differ-
ences between industries, regions and OHS providers.
The costs of preventive OHS were higher in companies
with higher turnover and for companies in the industries
'manufacturing and mining', 'electricity, gas and water
supply', 'construction', 'real estate, renting and business
activities', 'health and social work' and 'other community,
social and personal service activities' compared to 'whole-
sale and retail trade'.
Discussion
The preceding economic performance two years earlier
was not statistically related to expenditure on preventive
or curative medical OH services in 2001. Economic per-
formance was measured by the annual profitability of a
firm, the accumulated wealth that represents the perform-
ance of a company through its whole history and liquid-
ity.
The strength of our study was that the data we used was of
good quality and covered a vast subgroup representative
Table 2: Companies' costs for occupational health services in 2001 by provider in euro per employee per year
Preventive services Curative medical services
Provider Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Employer's own OHS unit (N = 454) 91.60 44.90 138.10 67.15
Employers' joint OHS unit (N = 470) 72.95 37.80 107.30 60.70
Municipal health care centre (N = 1,603) 43.35 35.25 27.10 43.20
Private medical centre (N = 2,422) 62.90 41.55 120.40 78.25
Other (N = 35) 69.60 46.10 125.50 74.90
Table 3: Logistic regression on a company's economic performance in 1999 for a company's probability to apply for reimbursement in 
2001 (N = 6,155).
Variables in the model OR 95% Confidence interval
Economic
Performance
Confounders
Operating margin in 1999 (%) 1.00 0.99 to 1.01
Log turnover in 2001 (€) 2.34 2.16 to 2.53
Age of company (years) 1.03 1.02 to 1.03
Share of blue-collar workers in 2001 (%) 0.71 0.50 to 1.01
Industry
(categorical)
Reference: Wholesale and retail trade
Agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing 1.33 0.63 to 2.84
Mining and quarrying, manufacturing 2.32 1.84 to 2.92
Electricity, gas, and water supply 3.45 1.13 to 10.54
Construction 1.48 1.16 to 1.89
Hotels and restaurants 1.65 1.16 to 2.34
Transport, storage and communication 1.43 1.03 to 1.99
Real estate, renting, and business 2.89 2.19 to 3.80
Education 1.47 0.29 to 7.39
Health and social work 3.14 1.58 to 6.24
Community, social and personal service activities 2.70 1.50 to 4.84
Region
(categorical)
Reference: Uusimaa (region around the capital city)
South 1.33 1.12 to 1.58
East 1.32 1.00 to 1.74
Central 1.12 0.88 to 1.42
North 1.07 0.81 to 1.41
Åland 0.36 0.15 to 0.85
Municipality
(categorical)
Reference: Rural
Urban 2.26 1.82 to 2.80
Semi-urban 1.33 1.05 to 1.70
Pseudo R2 = 0.15
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of Finnish companies. We were the first ones to be able to
combine financial statements and OHS data for a com-
pany. In addition, we were able to take into account vari-
ous confounders that affect both the economic
performance and the OHS expenditure of a company.
Exclusion criteria for continuous business and having
more than 10 employees might bias the results into the
direction of apparently diminishing the impact of eco-
nomic performance on a company's OHS expenditure.
Entering and exiting companies and companies of small
size might be in a more unfavourable financial situation.
Almost one fifth of the companies did not apply for reim-
bursement although preventive OHS is compulsory for all
of them. This could be due to the following reasons. First,
the company might not have obeyed the law, and did not
organize OHS. This, however, is quite rare as Finnish
employers do. The coverage among employees is one of
the highest in the world, about 90% [14]. Only small
enterprises with less than 20 employees do not always
have a contract with a provider. Secondly, in small com-
panies, it is possible to have years with no need for OHS
activities, and therefore without costs. And sometimes
Table 4: Regression models on company's economic performance for costs of curative medical services and prevention (log euros per 
employee) in 2001 (N = 4,958).
Curative medical services, euros per employee (log) Prevention, euros per employee (log)
Variables in the model Coefficient 95% Confidence interval Coefficient 95% Confidence interval
Constant 0.66 -0.00 to 1.33 2.57 2.22 to 2.93
Operating profit in 1999 -0.001 -0.01 to 0.00 -0.001 -0.00 to 0.00
Age of company 0.00 -0.00 to 0.00 0.00 -0.00 to 0.00
Log turnover in 2001 0.20 0.17 to 0.21 0.10 0.08 to 0.11
Blue-collar workers % in 2001 -0.31 -0.50 to -0.12 0.05 -0.05 to 0.15
Provider model
Ref. company's own OHS 0 0
Joint OHS unit 0.02 -0.17 to 0.21 -0.06 -0.16 to 0.04
Municipal OHS -2.32 -2.49 to -2.15 -0.75 -0.84 to -0.66
Private medical centre 0.02 -0.14 to 0.17 -0.23 -0.31 to -0.14
Other provider 0.18 -0.33 to 0.68 -0.23 -0.50 to 0.04
Industry
Ref.: Wholesale and retail trade 0 0
Agriculture, hunting and forestry, 
fishing
-0.87 -1.44 to -0.31 0.16 -0.14 to 0.46
Mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing
0.09 -0.04 to 0.22 0.38 0.31 to 0.45
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.32 -0.05 to 0.69 0.38 0.18 to 0.58
Construction -0.33 -0.48 to -0.18 0.32 0.24 to 0.40
Hotels and restaurants 0.07 -0.17 to 0.31 0.02 -0.11 to 0.15
Transport, storage and 
communication
-0.18 -0.38 to 0.02 0.02 -0.08 to 0.13
Real estate, renting and business 
activities
0.36 0.21 to 0.52 0.24 0.16 to 0.32
Education 0.44 -0.55 to 1.44 0.29 -0.24 to 0.83
Health and social work 0.20 -0.18 to 0.59 0.25 0.05 to 0.46
Other community, social and 
personal service activities
0.49 0.16 to 0.82 0.25 0.08 to 0.43
Ref.: Wholesale and retail trade
Region
Reference Uusimaa 0 0
South 0.18 0.08 to 0.28 -0.11 -0.16 to -0.05
East -0.14 -0.31 to 0.02 -0.11 -0.20 to -0.03
Central -0.09 -0.24 to 0.06 -0.18 -0.26 to -0.10
North -0.05 -0.22 to 0.12 0.20 0.10 to 0.29
Åland -0.27 -0.89 to 0.35 0.22 -0.11 to 0.55
Municipality
Reference rural 0 0
Urban 0.82 0.68 to 0.97 -0.09 -0.16 to -0.01
Semi-urban 0.51 0.35 to 0.68 -0.10 -0.19 to -0.01
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.19
Reset F(3, 4955) 27.28 0.0000 0.47 0.7062
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companies just do not apply for reimbursement, as the
costs of OHS might be low and filling in the application
might constitute a more significant expenditure.
Our results differ from those in safety studies [4,9,15]
where a firms' investment in safety is affected by eco-
nomic success, at least in firms performing most poorly. A
difference with safety measures is that OHS are of a more
stable nature. Employees continue to use the services and
providers continue to provide the services apparently irre-
spective of a company's economic performance. In addi-
tion, in occupational health services, like in general in
health care, information asymmetry exists between the
provider and both the payer (employer) and the user
(employee). Therefore, the employer has to use the exper-
tise of the provider in deciding upon the services. This
leaves less space for the company to decide on the con-
tents and the costs of OHS. Moreover, the total costs are
about 0.1% of a company's turnover. This means that the
expenditure on OHS has only a minor impact on a com-
pany's finances. This was also confirmed in our article
based on the same data [16]. Company's investment in
preventive OHS did not have a positive impact on com-
pany's economic performance.
Although the economic performance of a company did
not affect the amount of money spent per employee in
curative medical services and prevention in a particular
company, there were differences between regions, indus-
tries and OHS providers. The OHS system is not entirely
successful in optimal allocation of resources according to
needs. Expenditure on prevention is not the highest in the
riskiest industries [17,18] and white-collar workers bene-
fit more in terms of free use of curative medical services
[19]. In addition, regional differences are connected to the
supply of the OHS services.
Conclusion
Expenditure on OHS seems to be independent of a com-
pany's economic performance in Finland. Legislation
obligating the employers and the reimbursement system
both contribute to this.
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Table 5: Definitions for key ratios of economic performance
Profitability
Operating margin % Company's earnings that is left over after paying for variable costs of production divided by net sales.
Operating profit % Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by net sales.
Net result % (Total revenues -- total expenses) divided by net sales = tells if a company has earned or lost money in an accounting 
period with its business.
Total result % Net result + extraordinary incomes -- extraordinary expenses divided by net sales
Profit/loss for the accounting period %
The profit/loss result after the company has paid the taxes divided by net sales.
Solidity
Return on Capital Assets % Tells how profitable the company is relative to its total assets. = Net income/total assets
Return on investment % Evaluates the efficiency of an investment = (gain from investment -- cost of investment)/cost of investment.
Return on equity % Tells how much profit is made relative to the owners investment in the company = Net income/shareholders equity
Relative indebtedness % Company's liabilities divided by its turnover.
Less than 40%: Good
40--80%: Satisfactory
More than 80%: Poor
Equity ratio % The percentage of equities from the balance sheet
Over 40%: Good
20-40%: Satisfactory
Less than 20%: Poor
Liquidity
Quick ratio Company's ability to meet its obligations.
Over 1: Good
0.5-1: Satisfactory
Less than 0.5: Poor
Current ratio Company's ability to meet short term debt obligations.
Over 2: Good
1-2: Satisfactory
less than 1 poor
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Abstract
Background As reforms in publicly funded health sys-
tems rely heavily on competition, it is important to know if
and how public providers react to competition. In many
European countries, it is empirically difficult to study
public providers in different markets, but in Finnish
occupational health services, both public and private for-
profit and non-profit providers co-exist. We studied possi-
ble differences in public providers’ performance (price,
intensity of services, service mix—curative medical ser-
vices/prevention, productivity and revenues) according to
the competitiveness of the market.
Materials and methods The Finnish Institute of Occu-
pational Health (FIOH) collected data on clients, services
and personnel for 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 from
occupational health services (OHS) providers. Employers
defray the costs of OHS and apply for reimbursement
from the Social Insurance Institution (SII). The SII data
was merged with FIOH’s questionnaire. The unbalanced
panel consisted of about 230 public providers, totalling
1,164 observations. Local markets were constructed from
several municipalities based on commuting practices and
regional collaboration. Competitiveness of the market was
measured by the number of providers and by the
Herfindahl index. The effect of competition was studied
by ordinary least square regression analysis and panel
models.
Results The more competitive the environment was for a
public provider the higher were intensity, productivity and
the share of medical care. Fixed panel models showed that
these differences were not due to differences and changes
in the competitiveness of the market. Instead, in more
competitive markets public providers had higher unit prices
and higher revenues.
Keywords Market competition  Public provider 
Performance  Productivity  Intensity  Price
JEL Classification I11  L11  L25
Introduction
Product market competition plays a significant role in the
policy recommendations of economists. The competitive
market is thought to be superior to other market arrange-
ments because it allocates scarce resources efficiently.
Moreover, it is often believed that product market com-
petition also improves quality and lowers unit costs [1].
Public production, on the other hand, is considered more of
a policy instrument, introduced only if the private market
fails to allocate scarce resources optimally.
Competitive market arrangements have also been intro-
duced to health care in countries where health services
have traditionally been produced by the public sector.
The purchaser–provider split and the greater involvement
of the private sector are examples of these changes in the
UK’s National Health Service [2]. Competition has
also been introduced as a stimulus to efficiency in other
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publicly funded health care systems, such as those of
Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and New
Zealand [3].
As public providers differ from private profit-maxi-
mizing firms, the fundamental question is whether public
producers react to competition and, if so, is the response
similar to that observed in private markets. Results from
the US health care system show that public providers
react to market competition, and that their performance is
more dependent on other hospital and market character-
istics than ownership [4, 5]. However, less is known
about the impact of competition on public health care
providers in countries where health care is produced
mainly in the public sector. Therefore, it is interesting to
study public providers in different market settings. In this
study, the behaviour of the public provider is modelled as
responsive to the market. In addition, if ownership is
interpreted as differences in incentives for the providers,
it could be that public providers in non-US contexts react
differently to competition.
In most countries it is difficult to study how market
circumstances affect the performance of the public pro-
vider. It is common to have one dominant way of orga-
nizing the production of health care services, either
public or private, or they may each serve different pop-
ulations (client segments). Finnish occupational health
services provide the opportunity to study how public
providers in different market conditions differ (or not)
with respect to quality, and the mixture of services, pri-
ces, revenues and productivity. In Finland, occupational
health services (OHS) are provided mainly by private
non-profit or for-profit providers. Municipalities are in
charge of organizing primary health care, and this obli-
gation also includes the provision of OHS within its
region. This was set to guarantee that OHS would be
available for employers in the whole country. The public
provider produces the same services as the private pro-
vider. Geographically, market structure for OHS varies
from public monopolies to regions with many private
as well as public providers. Until 1995, the prices in
municipal health centers were set by the State Council,
whereas private providers were allowed to set their prices
freely. Abolishment of price regulation gave public pro-
viders the ability to influence their revenue, and therefore
also their resources, which had been scant compared to
those of private providers.
We studied possible differences in public providers’
performance (price, intensity of services, productivity and
revenues) according to the market environment, in a panel
setting that covered the years 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 and
2004. In addition, we studied whether the market envi-
ronment affected the service mix (curative medical and
preventive services).
Markets, incentives and public providers
It is well known in economics that market structure affects
the price of a product. A monopoly firm has the highest
price, a firm in a competitive market has the lowest price,
and oligopolistic firms are somewhere in between [6].
Quality is not an issue, because the product is assumed to
be homogenous.
The impact that market competition has on a provider
can be described by the principal agent relationship.
Competition sharpens incentives and therefore improves
the performance of the provider. It works through four
channels: managers, customers, employees and the
financial market [1, 7]. The more firms there are, and
therefore managers, the more opportunity the owners
have to compare the performance of managers. Increased
competition can also influence customers’ demand; both
its elasticity and amount. Competition can make demand
more elastic, which in turn makes the owners sharpen
incentives for managers (which leads to improved per-
formance). Nickell [8] examined a theory for the effect
of product market competition on employees in a union
bargaining framework, and showed that increased com-
petition in the product market improved employees’
effort. The fourth channel for competition to improve
performance is the financial market. For private provid-
ers, the dependency on external funding creates financial
pressure, especially if debt service payments are high.
Managers are then motivated to try their best to avoid
the consequences of bankruptcy and ruining their per-
sonal career. Competition increases the risk of bank-
ruptcy, which is worse for managers than for owners
(limited liability) [7]. As Hart phrased it: ‘‘…competition
is a source of discipline: that is, that it reduces the
amount of slack in the system due to individuals’ not
minimizing costs or being on their production possibility
frontiers’’ [9].
Based on this, competition in the market is thought to
increase productivity and lower unit cost, which in turn
leads to lower prices. The results concern homogenous
products. Property rights theorists [10] state that for-
profit firms have strong incentives to invest in innova-
tions, which would imply that competition increases
quality. In health care, quality is (or at least some
attributes of it) non-contractible. Once the incentives for
cost-controlling are strong for for-profit providers, the
impact competition might have on quality is ambiguous
[11].
The predictions of market competition are based on
well-informed, utility-maximizing consumers and profit-
maximizing providers. Health care providers have also
been described as minding patient benefits. In their theo-
retical comparison between public, for-profit and non-profit
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health care organizations, Eggleston and Zeckhauser [12]
concluded that public providers resemble private for-profit
providers if the environment is competitive (the ‘primacy
of competition versus ownership’ argument [13]) although
their objectives differ.
In addition, it is stated that public organizations in
general differ from firms. They have different objectives to
for-profit firms, such as broad social goals, or the lack of
precise goals [11]. Their financial constraints are different:
public providers are more secured and backed up by their
principal’s ability to raise taxes if funds are needed, and the
principal may be unable to commit to hard budget con-
straints [14]. Segal [15] stated that budget constraints can
be hardened if competition exists. We believe that market
competition will have an impact on public providers via the
markets for managers, purchasers, clients, and health care
personnel.
The empirical literature on both competition and
ownership is mainly from the US. There is extensive
evidence that higher market concentration is connected to
higher prices [16–18]. Empirical studies have offered
conflicting results regarding the effect of ownership on
quality and on the provider’s economic performance. This
mixed evidence has been studied recently by Eggleston
et al. [5] and Shen et al. [4], who both applied meta-
analytic methods to literature existing since 1990 on
hospital ownership and performance. Eggleston et al. [5]
studied quality (mortality and other adverse events) and
found that the majority of the studies did not find a sta-
tistically significant difference between non-profit and
for-profit hospitals.
Shen et al. [4] studied the effect of ownership on the
financial performance of hospitals (cost, revenue, profit
margin, and both cost and technical efficiency). Owner-
ship appeared to play a much less important role in
influencing hospital performance than other hospital
characteristics. Studies that compared revenues all found
that either for-profit providers earn greater revenue and
higher profits or that there is no difference between
for-profit and non-profit providers. However, the con-
ventional wisdom that for-profit hospitals operate more
efficiently (i.e., at lower cost) was not consistently sup-
ported in this review [4].
In the UK, market circumstances have been described
as ‘‘competition created by policy’’ by Propper et al.
[19]. The outcome of competition has been an improved
responsiveness on the part of the NHS, measured by
waiting lists and waiting times [2]. Propper et al. [19,
20] found that quality is lower in a more competitive
environment: the death rates from emergency admis-
sions for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) were higher
in areas subject to competition than in those which were
not.
Materials and methods
Finnish occupational health services
In Finland, employers are obliged to organize preventive
OHS for their employees. Employers may choose whether
they produce the services themselves (employers’ own
units and jointly owned units; ‘non-profit’) or buy the
services from either municipal health care centers (‘pub-
lic’) or private medical centers (‘for-profit’). Employers
defray the costs of occupational services and can apply for
reimbursement from the Social Insurance Institution (SII).
Although they receive reimbursement—60% for preventive
and 50% for curative medical services—the employer is
nonetheless left with a considerable part of the costs. Thus
the competition among providers is ‘‘buyer driven’’. The
total costs of organizing OHS were € 425 million in 2005,
and the SII reimbursed € 188 million to employers. The
average cost was € 262 per employee in 2005 [21].
According to a population survey conducted in 2006,
two out of three employees had undergone an occupational
health examination in the last 3 years, and occupational
health personnel had assessed around half of their work-
places in the last 3 years. Although organizing curative
medical services is voluntary for employers, over 90% of
employees can obtain GP level services from their OHS
unit. About half of the primary care level GP visits of these
employees take place within OHS [22].
Figure 1 shows the shares of employers, employees and
OHS units by different provider type in 2004.
There are several features that differentiate municipal
OHS units from its private competitors. First, the munici-
pality has to provide the services according to the Act on
public health services. Although the public OHS provider
charges employers for the services, and has revenues, the
soft budget syndrome might still affect a budget unit of the
municipal health care center. On the other hand, public
OHS providers are not allowed to keep the profit. Until
1995, the prices for public providers were set by the State
Council; private providers were allowed to set prices
themselves. Although the public provider had regulated
prices, the justification was not to avoid excess prices but
to set prices for public providers who had no experience in
price-setting. They also had no budgeting or accounting
practices to support cost calculations. The reason for
abolishing the regulation was that municipalities com-
plained that prices did not cover costs, and it was thought
that all providers should be treated the same way. Public
providers were supposed to set the prices according to the
production costs without subsidizing them [24].
Finland suffered a serious recession during the early
1990s, which lead to the tightening of municipal budgets.
New governance structures were introduced; for instance,
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instead of separately controlling costs and revenues,
steering concerned net profit/loss. This change in munici-
palities, followed by the abolishment of price regulation,
enabled OHS units to make strategic decisions more easily.
Data construction
The Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH) sent
a questionnaire to all OHS providers and collected data
on clients, services and occupational health (OH) pro-
fessionals from the providers for the years 1992, 1995,
1997, 2000 and 2004. The questionnaire was sent in the
spring of each following year. The response rate was high
(over 90% per survey) but not all providers provided
information on all items in the questionnaire. An
employer-based register of the provider, contents and
costs of OHS exists as a result of the reimbursement
system. This employer-based data was combined per
provider code at the SII, and merged with FIOH’s data
using the provider’s name and address.
The merged data contains about 230 public providers,
and 1,164 observations (unbalanced panel).
Due to the reimbursement system, records on services
provided by the OHS units are well standardized. The
FIOH questionnaire collected the number of hours of
workplace activities (workplace surveillance, meetings,
lectures, groups and counselling) and the number of health
examinations and medical visits separately for physicians,
nurses, physiotherapists and psychologists over a whole
year.
The service mix varies between OHS units. Therefore,
we constructed an indicator—cost-weighted activity
Municipal health
care centre
Self-employed
Farmers
Municipality
Enterprise
Enterprise
Company
OHS
unit
Employers   64%
Employees  37%  
OHS units   34%  
Employers      1%
Employees   18%
OHS units    31% Enterprise
Joint model OHS unit
Employers     3%
Employees    6%
OHS units      7%
Enterprise
Company
Company
Private medical 
clinic
Enterprise
Company
Enterprise
Employers     32%
Employees    39%
OHS units     28%
Fig. 1 Shares of enterprises
(employers, purchasers),
employees (clients) and
occupational health services
(OHS) units by provider type
in 2004 [23]
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(CWA)1—to represent the output. All services were con-
verted into minutes and summarized by OH professional
group. The minutes of each OH professional group was
then weighted by its wage, proportioned to physicians’
wage in 2004. The wages are national averages provided by
the Commission for Local Authority Employers. Cost-
weighted output is the sum of the wage-adjusted output of
all OH professional groups. In addition, we calculated
curative medical services’ share of the CWA output.
We calculated an indicator for productivity from the
CWA output indicator. OH professionals’ working hours
per week were collected as a monthly average in the spring
of the year the survey was conducted (March or April).
Working hours were weighted by each group’s wage pro-
portioned to physicians’ wages in 2004, then summed up
into one figure measuring personnel resources. The pro-
ductivity measure is the ratio of CWA output per personnel
resources.
We use the intensity of OHS as an indicator for quality.
Intensity is measured as CWA output per employee (cli-
ent). It represents process quality perceived by the
employee (client). Quality is higher if there are more ser-
vices per client, or if a more qualified person provides the
service, e.g., a physician instead of a nurse. The number of
employees and employers was calculated from 31
December of the respective year.
At the SII, employers’ reimbursement applications
were summed up per provider. The sum of the employers’
expenditure equals the total of the provider’s revenue.
Nominal values were converted to 2004 real values by the
health care cost index. Unit price was calculated by
dividing the revenue of a provider by its CWA output.
The price can differ if there are differences in production
costs, or if intensity differs due to different personnel
structure or to different amounts/prices for laboratory
tests and imaging services. We did not have sufficiently
detailed information on the number and costs of labora-
tory tests and imaging services, and they are not included
in the CWA output measure, but employers’ expenditure
on these costs is included in the revenue measure. The
expenditure on laboratory tests and imaging services was
about 26% of the OHS revenues in public OHS units in
2005 [21].
Public providers only serve employers located in their
own municipality. Nevertheless, we defined the market as a
geographical area consisting of several municipalities.
Many Finnish municipalities are so small that they have
no providers. On the other hand, employers can and do
buy OHS from private providers across municipality
boundaries. Statistics Finland provides several regional
definitions for grouping municipalities. We chose regions
that are based on commuting and municipalities’ close
collaboration in regional development. We did not take
other substituting health care services into account in our
market definition [25]. Every provider was located to a
municipality based on its zip-code. There were 428
municipalities in 2004, which formed 76 geographical
regions (A˚land, with 16 municipalities, is not included in
the study). Competition was measured by (1) the number of
providers in the region, and (2) market concentration as the
Herfindahl index (HI)—the sum of squares of the market
shares, 0 = minimum concentration, 1 = maximum con-
centration [6]. We calculated the HI for the market shares
of the CWA output, revenues, and the number of
employees (clients). The correlations for these different
HIs were high, over 0.9. Throughout the study, we used the
index based on the number of employees. The higher the
number of providers, or the lower the HI, the more com-
petitive the local market.
The scale and scope of services might affect the output
of the provider and therefore many other indicators in our
study. Rosenman and Friesner [26] compared single spe-
ciality and multi speciality groups in their study, and found
that scope inefficiencies existed. Based on previous liter-
ature, this can be caused by different attitudes, objectives
and patterns towards group practice, using staff differently
and therefore causing a co-ordination problem. Members of
the practice may compete, but at the same time refer
patients to each other. Scope inefficiencies have also been
found in Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) pro-
viding both insurance and health services [27]. On the other
hand, for small scale providers such as nursing homes,
scope can help in achieving economies of scale [28]. In this
study, the professions available in the unit describe the
scope of the provider. Scope was measured using a
dummy: 0 = OH professionals consisted of nurses and
physicians only; 1 = nurses, physicians, and also either a
physiotherapist or psychologist; or 2 = all four profes-
sional groups. Scale was measured by the number of OH
professionals. Rosenman and Friesner [26] found econo-
mies of scale in both primary care and speciality care
practices. Although the empirical evidence in hospitals has
been conflicting, higher quality studies seem to support a
finding of constant returns or diseconomies of scale [29].
Table 1 presents the formulae for the performance and
market indicators.
The data collected by the questionnaire concerns three
different timeframes: the number of employees and
employers for 1 day, occupational health professionals for
a month, and the number of services provided per annum.
Therefore we examined the studentized residuals that
1 The cost-weighted activity index (CWAI) has been used to measure
overall NHS hospital efficiency. Many of the problems and flaws
connected to this measure reported by Oliver [2] are less serious in the
more homogenous Finnish OHS.
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exceed ?2 or -2 for identifying outliers, and recoded the
indicator values missing for the providers whose outlier
values were due to the mismatch of timing.
Methods
We concentrated on public providers that cannot exit the
market. Public providers entered the market in the 1970s
when public provision was made compulsory for municipal
health care centers. Municipalities do not buy or sell OHS
units. Therefore we regarded the market as an exogenous
variable.
We started with ordinary least square (OLS) regression
analysis and ran models separately for each year, and for
the pooled data (with dummies for the years). We tested the
model specification using the Ramsey RESET test, based
on which we log transformed the following variables:
number of OH professionals and providers, intensity, pro-
ductivity, unit price and revenue. Previous studies have
shown that the relation between competition and, e.g.,
productivity might not be linear. Therefore, we also ran
models with a squared number of providers, but their
performance was worse. The RESET-test still showed that
there were problems in the model specification in some
cases. It was more of a problem in models with pooled data
and number of providers as an independent variable. We
examined the variance inflation factors (VIF) for signs of
multicollinearity, but found none. The Breusch–Pagan/
Cook–Weisberg test showed heteroskedasticity in the
models for intensity, productivity and unit price with
pooled data, we took this into account and applied robust
standard errors for these models.
With the pooled data we examined the interaction of
time (year dummy) and market variables. Those models
had multicollinearity problems. None of the coefficients for
interaction variables was statistically significant. We also
tested if they were different from zero, or different from
each other, and they were not.
Table 1 Indicators for occupational health services (OHS) and competition
Indicator Formula Keys
CWA output Outputpt ¼
P
i wi
P
j qijptminij j = workplace visits, meetings, lectures, health examinations,
medical visits
i = physician, nurse, physiotherapist, psychologist
minij = time that a professional group i uses in producing service j
qijpt = the number of services j, provided by professional group i, in
provider p, in year t
wi = weight for each professional group i, the average salary of a
professional group i proportioned to physicians’ salary in the
municipal sector in 2004
p = provider id
t = 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004
Intensity Intensitypt ¼ Outputpt=number of employeesptðclientsÞ p, t as above
Productivity Prodpt ¼ Outputpt=
P
i wihoursipt hoursipt = weekly working hours of a professional group i, in year t
i, t, p and wi as above
Share of medical
care
Medpt ¼
P
i wiqmediptmedmini=Outputpt qmedi = number of curative medical visits provided by professional
group i
medmini = time that professional group i uses to produce one
curative medical visit
i, t, p and wi as above
Revenue Revenuept ¼
P
e TCpet TCpet = total expenditure on OHS for employer e, provided by
provider p, in year t
p, t as above
Revenue in 2004 real value
Unit price Pricept ¼ Revenuept=Outputpt
Number of
providers
within a region
Providersrt ¼ CountðprtÞ prt = provider id in region r, year t
r = geographically defined local market
t as above
Herfindahl index HIrt ¼
P
p s
2
prt sprt = provider p’s market share from the number of employees
(clients) in region r, year t, range for HIrt 0–1
r, t as above
CWA cost-weighted activity
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We had planned to study the effect of competition by
fixed effects models, which are viewed as appropriate tools
for eliminating bias arising from time-invariant unobserved
factors [4, 30]. Statistically, fixed effects are always a
reasonable thing to do with panel data (they always give
consistent results) but they may not be the most efficient
model to run. The Hausman test checks a more efficient
model against a less efficient but consistent model to make
sure that the more efficient model also gives consistent
results. Therefore, we estimated both panel models:
(1) fixed effects model:
indicatorpt ¼ ðaþ lpÞ þ b1competitionrt þ b2scalept
þ b3dummyscopept þ b4dummyt þ vpt;
(2) random effects model:
indicatorpt ¼ aþ b1competitionrt þ b2scalept
þ b3dummyscopept þ b4dummyt
þ ðlp þ vptÞ;
where vpt * IID(0,rv). In fixed effects model lp is allowed
to correlate to other regressors. In a random effects model
it is a part of the error term and therefore should not cor-
relate with the other regressors and vpt. In addition, in the
random effects model it is assumed that lp * IID(0,rl).
Index r refers to the regional market.
The variables in the models are as follows:
indicatorpt log intensitypt (intensity), log prodpt
(productivity), medpt (share of medical
care), logpricept (unit price) or log
revenuept each in its turn
competitionrt either log providersrt (number of
providers in the region) or HIrt
(Herfindahl index based on the
number of employees for the region)
scalept the number of OH professionals (log)
dummyscopept was
measured using the
dummy:
0 = OHS personnel consisted of nurses
and physicians only, 1 = nurses,
physicians, and either a physiotherapist
or a psychologist, or 2 = all four
personnel groups
dummyt a dummy for the year, 1992=0
In the fixed effects model the intercept varies across public
providers. A random effects model assumes the same inter-
cepts and slopes. The difference among groups lies in the
variance of the error term.We compared bothmodels with the
pooled OLS. For fixed models the null hypothesis is that all
lp = 0. This hypothesis is tested by the F test, which is based
on loss of goodness-of-fit, Stata .xtreg command by default
conducts the F test. In all fixed models the null hypothesis
was rejected, so the fixedmodel is better than the pooledOLS.
For random effects model the null hypothesis is that the cross-
sectional variance components are zero, H0: rl = 0. This
hypothesis is tested by the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multi-
plier (LM) test which follows chi-squared distribution with
one degree of freedom. For all random effects models the
hypothesis was rejected, i.e., the random model is also better
than pooled OLS [31].
Year dummies control for time trends and shocks
common to all providers. We did not use a lagged variable
of the scale in estimating productivity, although one could
argue that adjustment to changes in resources would take
some time. The resources did not change much within a
unit, and the lagged variable would have been from a time
period 2–3 years back. Service production adjusts more
quickly [1].
We will present both pooled OLS and panel model
results. We used STATA Version 9 for the analysis.
Hypotheses
As described in the chapter ‘‘Markets, incentives and
public providers’’ of this article, competition increases
productivity, but might have an ambiguous effect on
quality. In our study, intensity represents quality assessed
by employees (clients). For them, the access to care is an
important quality characteristic, and the better the access,
the more services are used. Prevention is more stable, and
intensity can be raised by increasing the amount of curative
medical services. Therefore, we expected competition to
increase intensity and the share of curative medical ser-
vices. Increasing intensity will increase provider’s reve-
nues. Because competition increases productivity, it might
lead to lower unit prices. On the other hand, increasing
intensity might lead to higher unit prices. Hence we had no
expectations regarding the effect competition might have
on unit price.
Previous empirical studies have shown that disecono-
mies of scope and scale exist. We expected both scope and
scale to increase intensity.
Results
The number of all OHS providers decreased during the
study period from 1,006 to 621, mostly among non-profit
providers (decrease 57%), where outsourcing has taken
place, but also among for-profit providers (decrease 31%),
where merging affects the number of providers. The
number of public providers remained the same. Although
the overall number of providers diminished, the concen-
tration of the market has not changed (Table 2). Most
regions can be considered competitive, but the local mar-
kets for OHS differed greatly.
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Table 3 shows that the public providers in different
markets also differed in other respects. In 2004 there was a
total of 230 public providers that we classified into four
groups according the number of providers in the region.
The last row in Table 3 illustrates how the indicators for
public providers developed during the study period. Rev-
enues and unit price (real value) increased most during the
study period—they more than doubled. Intensity and the
share of medical care, personnel resources and output
increased at the same rate, all by about 60%. Productivity
also grew, but the increase was modest compared to other
indicators. The number of clients fell by 5%. The data
consisted of 1,164 observations, so the last row also reveals
the magnitude of missing data.
The scope of the services changed during the study
period. In 1992, one-third of the units had only physicians
and nurses; less than one-tenth had both physiotherapists
and psychologists available. In 2004, all four professions
belonged to the staff in over 40% of the public units, and
about 10% had only a physician-nurse team.
We grouped the indicators into two groups: those related
to output—intensity, productivity and the share of medical
care (Tables 4, 5)—and to monetary indicators—unit price
and revenue (Tables 5, 6). For both groups, the first table
presents the results for the model where the number of
providers in the region represents competition, and in the
second table the HI has its turn. For each indicator we
present the results for the pooled OLS and panel model.
Pooled OLS models revealed that there was an associ-
ation between market competitiveness and public providers
output: the more providers or the less concentrated the
market, the higher the intensity, productivity and the share
of medical care. Panel models that take into account
unobserved heterogeneity showed that the differences were
not due to differences or changes in the competitiveness of
the market.
Scale had a positive and statistically significant impact
on intensity and the share of medical care in both model
versions. The association between competitiveness and
productivity changed, and was negative and statistically
Table 2 Regional market competition measured by the number of
providers and Herfindahl index (HI), mean and standard deviation,
N = 76
Number of providers HI (employees/clients)
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
1992 13.8 29.7 0.36 0.24
1995 11.2 21.9 0.35 0.26
1997 10.3 18.9 0.34 0.24
2000 10.1 19.2 0.34 0.24
2004 8.6 14.7 0.35 0.23
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significant in the fixed effects panel model. Multiprofes-
sionalism had an impact on intensity, productivity and the
share of medical care consistently in all models. The
widening of the scope of services was negatively associ-
ated to all three indicators. For intensity, the dummy
coefficients were not statistically significant in the fixed
effects panel model.
After taking into account competition, scope and scale
economies, a time trend still remained. Intensity of services
grew constantly during the period 1992–2004. Productivity
was clearly on a higher level during 1997 and 2000 com-
pared to 1992. The share of medical care has been growing
constantly except for the slowdown in 1997.
All fixed models were better than pooled OLS (xtreg
standard F-test). The magnitude of the pooled OLS and
fixed effect panel models that accounted for the total var-
iance of intensity and productivity were very similar,
except that in the fixed effects panel model for the share of
medical care, the goodness-of-fit fell by ten percentage
units compared to the pooled OLS.
Tables 6 and 7 present the results for the monetary
indicators.
In pooled OLS models the unit price and the revenue of
the public provider were higher in the more competitive
environment. These results also remained in the panel
models, except for the fixed effects panel model for reve-
nue and concentration.
The scale of the public provider increased both unit
price and revenue. Scope was negatively associated with
the revenue of the public provider in the pooled OLS
model, but it disappeared in the fixed effects panel model.
Unit price was not affected by the scope of the services.
Both unit price and revenue had a time trend. They both
more than doubled during the study period (Table 3). Pri-
ces were regulated until the end of 1994. The first year the
providers could set the prices themselves was 1995 and
already then the prices rose, but moderately.
Pooled OLS and fixed effects panel models explained a
considerable part of the total variance of revenue of the
provider. Unit price was the only dependent variable for
which the Hausman test recommended the use of a random
effects panel model. It also had higher explanatory power
than the pooled model.
Discussion
The competitiveness of the market was connected to public
providers’ performance. The results of pooled OLS models
showed that public providers in a more competitive envi-
ronment had more intensive services, higher productivity
and share of medical care. Fixed effects panel models that
take into account time-invariant omitted variables reveal
that the differences were not due to differences and chan-
ges in the regional market structure (number of providers
and concentration). The monetary indicators were also
connected to market competition: the more providers in the
region the higher the unit price and revenue of the public
provider. The association between concentration and both
unit price and revenue was negative—the higher the
Table 6 Number of providers, unit price and revenue among Finnish public OHS providers in 1992–2004, pooled OLS and panel models
Unit price (log) Revenue (log)
Pooled OLS, robust Random effects Pooled OLS Fixed effects
Number of providers (log) 0.083 (0.018) *** 0.099 (0.026) *** 0.317 (0.025) *** 0.261 (0.101) *
Number of OH professionals (log) 0.117 (0.037) ** 0.098 (0.044) * 1.670 (0.052) *** 0.266 (0.057) ***
Scope: ref. only nurses and physicians
In addition physiotherapist or psychologist -0.011 (0.054) 0.017 (0.052) -0.532 (0.073) *** -0.059 (0.052)
All four OH professionals 0.010 (0.066) 0.006 (0.065) -0.750 (0.088) *** -0.093 (0.065)
Year: ref. 1992
1995 0.140 (0.062) * 0.122 (0.051) * 0.239 (0.084) ** 0.270 (0.048) ***
1997 0.237 (0.061) *** 0.228 (0.052) *** 0.445 (0.084) *** 0.567 (0.049) ***
2000 0.395 (0.062) *** 0.387 (0.051) *** 0.702 (0.083) *** 0.886 (0.049) ***
2004 0.742 (0.063) *** 0.737 (0.054) *** 0.774 (0.087) *** 1.310 (0.059) ***
Constant -0.559 (0.081) *** -0.560 (0.090) *** 7.747 (0.104) *** 9.549 (0.264) ***
R2 20.6 26.9 within 62.9 59.1 within
F(8,936) = 32.79;
Prob[F = 0.0000
Wald v2(8) = 298.41;
Prob[ v2 = 0.0000
F(8,1084) = 232.34;
Prob[F = 0.0000
F(8,831) = 150.38;
Prob[F = 0.0000
Number of public providers 945 obs. 250 1,093 obs. 254
* P\ 0.05, ** P\ 0.01, *** P\ 0.001
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concentration the lower the unit price and revenue. Con-
trary to the results for output-related indicators, the asso-
ciation for monetary indicators also remained in panel
models (except for concentration and revenue). When a
public provider operates in a market with many providers it
is more inclined to raise unit price. Although we took into
account the scale of the provider there remained an impact
for the size of the market (number of providers), which
raised the revenue of the public provider. In Finland, public
OHS providers seem to react to market conditions by
raising their prices, which leads to increased revenues. But
the market competition did not affect production decisions,
i.e., intensity, productivity and share of medical care.
Most public OHS providers in Finland are small, and
economies of scale could be found in the study. Scale
increased all indicators: intensity, productivity, share of
medical care, unit price and revenue. Opportunities still
probably exist to make use of economies of scale—there
are plans to merge public providers or collaborate in pro-
vision [32], which is in line with the government’s policy
to push municipalities to form bigger entities to provide
health care services.
Taking into account competition and scale of produc-
tion, scope lowered productivity and share of medical care.
The results on productivity are in line with earlier results
[26]. Physiotherapists’ and psychologists’ services are
mainly preventive and therefore widening the scope of
services decreased a provider’s share of medical care.
There was a time trend common to all public providers
for all indicators. In the beginning of the 1990s Finland
went through a severe recession. This lead to tightening of
municipal budgets and increased productivity later during
that decade. Productivity growth has slowed down in the
twenty-first century. Not all public providers reacted
immediately to the abolishment of price regulation, and
price rises were moderate in 1995—the first year in which
providers were allowed to set their prices themselves.
The panel data we had at our disposal had a high number
of observations and covered almost all OHS providers in
Finland. It included information from both a survey and an
official register, which is shown to give better results in
studying performance [11]. Defining the geographical
market is always difficult. Here we used regions defined by
the Statistics Finland that are based on commuting and
regional collaboration, which we suppose are in line with
the OHS clientele.
We discuss our results from the following points of
view: (1) the way we measured competitiveness of the
OHS market, (2) if health care markets in general can be
regarded as competitive, and (3) why public providers
would react differently to competition.
The number of providers in the region would not be a
good measure for competition if the three provider groups
(public, for-profit, non-profit) had different client segments
and the OHS market resembled monopolistic competition.
High search costs can lead to monopolistic competition
[33]. Although the three groups have different kind of
employers as their clients (Fig. 1) their market shares have
changed considerably in the past 10 years [21, 34]. This
implies that the segments are not separate. The HI mea-
sures concentration, and therefore the existence of market
power. A common result of US concentration studies is that
Table 7 Concentration, unit price and revenue among Finnish public OHS providers in 1992–2004, pooled OLS and panel models
Unit price (log) Revenue (log)
Pooled OLS, robust Random effects Pooled OLS Fixed effects
Herfindahl index (number of employees) -0.358 (0.100) *** -0.379 (0.132) ** -1.440 (0.135) *** -0.502 (0.294)
Number of OH professionals (log) 0.135 (0.037) *** 0.115 (0.044) ** 1.734 (0.052) *** 0.266 (0.057) ***
Scope: ref. only nurses and physicians
In addition physiotherapist or psychologist -0.008 (0.055) 0.014 (0.052) -0.525 (0.074) *** -0.060 (0.052)
All four professionals 0.005 (0.067) -0.002 (0.065) -0.760 (0.090) *** -0.089 (0.065)
Year: ref. 1992
1995 0.124 (0.063) 0.105 (0.051) * 0.177 (0.086) * 0.229 (0.045) ***
1997 0.211 (0.061) ** 0.201 (0.052) *** 0.345 (0.085) *** 0.506 (0.045) ***
2000 0.366 (0.062) *** 0.357 (0.050) *** 0.599 (0.084) *** 0.821 (0.044) ***
2004 0.705 (0.062) *** 0.697 (0.054) *** 0.627 (0.087) *** 1.218 (0.049) ***
Constant -0.285 (0.080) *** -0.241 (0.080) ** 8.815 (0.100) *** 10.318 (0.105) ***
R2 20.0 26.6 within 61.8 58.9 within
F(8,936) = 31.66;
Prob[F = 0.0000
Wald v2(8) = 290.80;
Prob[ v2 = 0.0000
F(8,1083) = 218.94;
Prob[F = 0.0000
F(8,830) = 148.74;
Prob[F = 0.0000
Number of public providers 945 observations 250 1,092 observations 254
* P\ 0.05, ** P\ 0.01, *** P\ 0.001
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the more concentrated the market, the higher the prices, for
both for-profit and other providers. In our study, concen-
tration lowered the unit price. The most concentrated
markets consisted of public providers only, and these did
not use their monopoly position in price setting. Concen-
tration has also improved productivity in the US, but this
might be due to excess capacity that existed before the
merging wave took place. Sari [35] found that the associ-
ation between cost inefficiency and market concentration
changes depending on the level of competitiveness in the
market: at low levels of concentration, an increase
improves efficiency but, after a certain range the increase
in concentration causes inefficiencies.
The market for OHS, as in health care in general,
deviates from the assumptions of a competitive market
[36]. Competition in OHS is not driven by consumer
demand—employers decide where to buy services. Public
supply does not always adjust to consumer demand. Sup-
pliers might have an impact on demand; many public
providers have monopoly power and increasing returns to
scale. In addition, asymmetric information and costly
searches violate the requirements of perfect competition
[37]. If the buyer/user side deviates from the assumptions
of the market, the market structure—the number of pro-
viders and the HI—may not completely grasp the behavior
of the providers [38].
Competition concerns not only the providers—pur-
chasers also have an important role. Dusheiko et al. [18]
showed that purchasers were not eager to switch providers,
and commissioning concentrated within the NHS. Pur-
chasers need an incentive to do their job well. In the NHS,
fundholding practices were willing and able to challenge
hospitals [3]. The HMO experiences also support the idea
that the purchaser’s role matters. In US managed care,
HMOs in particular have increased the price sensitivity of
shopping since the 1990s. Purchasing decisions have been
shifted away from relatively price insensitive consumers
towards more price sensitive health plans [39]. Hospitals
had lower total margins in markets with higher levels of
HMO penetration. Managed care has been shown to also
improve efficiency in production [35, 40]. In this data, most
of the employers were small (in terms of number of
employees) and cannot be regarded as powerful in
bargaining for the prices or contents of services. The big-
gest client—the municipality—being in charge of local
administration and the provision of many public services
might not have the incentive to look for other providers.
In our study, the public providers differed according the
competitiveness of their environment. During the study
period all our performance indicators changed; productivity
changed least but even that increased about 10%. The
changes in output-related indicators were not due to changes
in competition. Monetary indicators were connected to
market competition: public providers in a more competitive
environment raised their prices more and also had higher
revenues. Public providers mimicked the prices of private
providers but did not change their production processes.
This discrepancy can be explained by the incentive structure
of the public provider, as claimed by property rights theo-
rists [41]. For example, the payment system in the public
sector is mainly salary, whereas in for-profits the physicians,
physiotherapists and psychologists are paid fee-for-service,
which clearly has implications for productivity [42]. In
addition, the soft budget constraint, or at least the backup the
municipal health care center offers with taxpayers’ money,
differs from that of for-profit companies. Both purchaser
behavior and public provider specific incentives dampen the
effect of market competition on public providers. The
effects of competition on welfare were not studied.
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2Abstract
Many health care reforms rely on competition although health care differs in many respects from the
assumptions of perfect competition.
Finnish occupational health services provide an opportunity to study empirically competition,
ownership and payment systems and the performance of providers. In these markets employers
(purchasers) choose the provider and prices are market determined. The price regulation of public
providers was abolished in 1995. We had data on providers from 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004. The
unbalanced panel consisted of 1,145 providers and 4,059 observations.
Our results show that in more competitive markets providers in general offered a higher share of
medical care compared to preventive services. The association between unit prices and revenues and
market environment varied according to the provider type. For-profit providers had lower prices and
revenues in markets with numerous providers. The public providers in more competitive regions were
more sensitive to react to the abolishment of their price regulation by raising their prices. Employer
governed providers had weaker association between unit prices or revenues and competition. The market
share  of  for-profit  providers  was  negatively  associated  with  productivity,  which  was  the  only  sign  of
market spillovers we found in our study.
Keywords: competition, ownership, health care providers, performance, Finland, occupational health
services, panel data
3Introduction
Product market competition plays a significant role in the policy recommendations of economists. The
competitive  market  is  thought  to  be  superior  to  other  market  arrangements  because  it  allocates  scarce
resources efficiently. Moreover, it is often believed that product market competition also improves
quality and lowers unit costs (Nickell, 1996).
Competitive market arrangements have been introduced to health care in countries where health
services have traditionally been produced by the public sector (Glennerster, 1998; Magnussen et al., 2009;
Oliver, 2005). On the other hand, in the US, where health care providers are mainly private, there exists
also  a  vast  number  of  non-profit  providers  (Horwitz  and  Nichols,  2009).  While  using  competition  in
health care to improve its performance, the fundamental question is whether health care providers react
to competition and, if the reaction differs according the ownership of the provider or the ownership mix
in the market.
In most countries it is difficult to study how different market circumstances affect the performance of
providers. It is common to have one dominant mode of organising the production of health care services,
public or private, or they may each serve different populations. Finnish occupational health services
provide an unique opportunity, to study the impact of market structure and mix on health care
providers’ performance. In Finland, occupational health services (OHS) are mainly provided by private
non-profit and for-profit providers. Municipal health care centres represent the public provider. They
differ from each others by ownership and payment systems. For-profit providers have a fee-for-service
system, so do the public providers, too. But due to the public ownership they have a soft budget
constraint.  Some  employers  have  an  integrated  OHS  provider,  ‘employer’s  own  OHS’,  which  has  an
expenditure budget. Employers have also together established non-profit associations to provide OHS
services for the member companies. These providers have a combination of capitation and fee-for-service
payments. The market structure for OHS varies geographically with regions with public monopolies to
regions with numerous, mainly private providers and the market share of for-profit providers in Finland
doubled during the study period 1992-2004.
We  studied  the  effect  of  different  market  environment  on  the  performance  of  OHS  providers  in  a
panel setting that covers the years 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004. The performance of a provider was
measured as intensity of services, productivity, the share of medical care, unit price, and revenues. OHS
providers are multi-professional multi-product providers and therefore we calculated a cost-weighted
activity (CWA) output (Oliver, 2005). The first four indicators are computational indicators based on this
CWA output.
Market competition and health care
providers
In economics, it is well known that the market structure affects the price of a product. A monopoly has
the highest price, a firm in a competitive market has the lowest price, and prices in oligopolistic markets
are somewhere in between (Cabral, 2002). There is extensive empirical evidence mainly from the US that
higher market concentration is connected to higher prices (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999; Gaynor and
Town, 2011; Keeler et al., 1999).
4The  quality  of  a  product  is  not  an  issue  in  standard  models,  because  the  product  is  assumed  to  be
homogenous. The theory of property rights (Hart, 1995) states that for-profit firms have strong incentives
to invest in innovations, which would imply that for them competition increases quality. In health care,
quality or at least some attributes of it are non-contractible and providers cannot be paid for all aspects of
quality. On the other hand, the incentives to control costs are strong for for-profit providers and therefore
the impact of competition on their quality is ambiguous (Shen et al.,  2005). There is evidence both from
the US and UK that competition improves quality when patients may choose the hospital and prices are
fixed (Gaynor et al.,  2010; Kessler and McClellan, 2000). When prices are market determined the results
have reflected the theoretical indeterminacy. In the UK, Propper et al. (Propper et al., 2008; Propper et al.,
2004) found that quality was lower in a more competitive environment whereas Sari (2002) found that
higher hospital market share and concentration were associated with lower quality of care in the US.
The  predictions  of  market  competition  are  based  on  profit-maximizing  providers.  Health  care
providers  are  often  assumed  to  also  have  other  objectives  than,  or  instead  of,  the  profit  motive.  These
objectives are represented by different ownership types. Most of the empirical literature concentrates on
direct effects of ownership reviewed by Eggleston et al. (2008) and Shen at al. (2007). In both meta-
analyses the conclusion was that higher quality studies that take into account market environment and
patient mix as confounding factors and use longitudinal data reveal smaller differences in performance
according to the ownership. Much less has been studied the market mix, how the ownership structure
affects the performance of a health care provider (competitive spillovers). The presence of non-profits has
been regarded important  for  keeping the quality  of  the services  high and the presence of  for-profits  to
keep the costs of services low. Kessler and McClellan (2002) found in their longitudinal study that already
a 10% for-profit share of first heart attack admissions was enough to lower the expenditure of all heart
attack patients by 2.4% with same patient outcomes. Quality spillovers from non-profits can be expected
only if at least some of the consumers are ill-informed. Then an increase in the non-profit market share
will improve both for-profit and overall market quality as found in US nursing homes by Grabowski and
Hirth (2003). Santerre and Vernon (2006) studied the welfare implication of ownership mix and
concluded that it would be welfare improving to increase the share of for-profits in inpatient care and the
share  of  non-profits  in  outpatient  care.  Market  mix  has  an  impact  also  on  the  service  offerings  of
providers. Horwitz and Nichols studied hospitals within metropolitan statistical (2009) and rural areas
(2011). Non-profits with low share of for-profit competitors were more likely to offer unprofitable
services such as psychiatric, hospice, substance abuse, and social work services than non-profits in
markets with higher share of for-profit providers.
Both competition and the revenue generating process of providers such as budget funding and
payment systems has influence on providers’ performance (Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000; Kornai et al.,
2003). Kessler and McClellan (2000) summarised studies on the effects of competition in the USA that
revealed the importance of  the payment  system for  the impact  of  competition.  Until  the  mid-1980s  the
“cost-plus” reimbursement system and competition among hospitals led to excess capacity, higher
production costs and prices. After the implementation of the prospective payment in 1983 competition
had the opposite results. The payment system matters also for the differences between different provider
types. Potter (2001) studied the relationship between the hospital type and expenses per admission in a
panel setting (years 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1994) in the USA. Her findings show that the differences in
efficiency measured as expenses per adjusted admission between non-profit, for-profit and public
hospitals  diminished  after  the  introduction  of  a  prospective  payment  system  in  1983.  The  market
environment has an impact on providers’ response to changes in the payment system. When the
profitability of the home health care and skilled nursing services decreased the non-profits in markets
with higher for-profit market share diminished more the provision of these services than non-profits in
markets with lower for-profit market share (Horwitz and Nichols, 2009; Horwitz and Nichols, 2011).
In  addition  to  market  structure  and  mix,  ownership  and  payment  system  the  scale  and  scope  of
services may be associated with the output of the provider. Scope inefficiencies have been found in multi-
speciality groups compared to single-speciality groups by Rosenman and Friesner (2004) and in HMOs
providing both insurance and health services (Wholey et al., 1996). On the other hand, for small scale
providers  such  as  nursing  homes,  scope  can  help  in  achieving  economies  of  scale  (Christensen,  2004).
Rosenman  and  Friesner  (2004)  found  economies  of  scale  in  both  primary  care  and  speciality  care
5practices. Although the empirical evidence in hospitals has been conflicting, higher quality studies seem
to support the finding of constant returns or diseconomies of scale (Aletras, 1999).
Material and methods
FINNISH OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES
In Finland, employers are required by law to arrange preventive occupational health services for their
employees. Employers may choose whether they produce the services themselves ('employers' own
units'),  found  an  association  to  provide  the  services  ('non-profit')  or  buy  the  services  from  either
municipal  health  care  centres  ('public')  or  from  private  medical  centres  ('for-profit').  The  Finnish  OHS
system deviates from many other countries (Hämäläinen et al., 2001). In addition to health examinations
and workplace assessments 90% of employees can also obtain general practice (GP) level curative medical
services from their OHS unit although organising curative medical services is voluntary for employers.
All occupational health services are free of charge for employees. The two other options to seek for GP
level services for employees in Finland, private and public services, both involve co-payments and the
access  to  public  services  is  not  as  good  as  in  OHS.  About  half  of  the  primary  care  level  GP  visits  of
employees takes place within OHS (Peurala et al., 2007).
Employers  bear  the costs  of  occupational  health services  but  can apply for  reimbursement  from the
Social Insurance Institution (SII). Although the employers receive reimbursement, 60% for preventive and
50% for curative medical services, the employer is nonetheless left to bear a considerable part of the costs.
The employees can not choose the provider, thus the competition among providers is "buyer driven". The
total costs of organising OHS were € 508 million in 2007, and the SII reimbursed € 237 million to
employers. The average cost was € 267 per employee in 2007 (Kansaneläkelaitos, (The Social Insurance
Institution), 2009).
In Table 1 we have summarised the main characteristics of different OHS providers in Finland. The
provider types differ according to the ownership and purchaser-provider relationship. Private medical
centres are firms themselves, mainly owned by shareholders whereas the public provider is owned by the
local municipality. Still, they have a similar purchaser-provider relationship based on a contract and
revenues based on fees and services provided. In employers’ own and non-profit units, employers govern
the provider, but these providers have different payment systems. Employers’ own unit has a budget
based on costs and non-profits have a mixture of capitation and fee-for-service payments. Employers’
own units also sell services to other employers. During the study period the employees of these “buying”
employers represented one fourth of the clientele in employers’ own units. The non-profits in Finnish
OHS  differ  from  the  USA  non-profits.  In  this  study  the  non-profits  are  associations  governed  by  the
employers whereas in the USA they are supposed to provide services to the community in exchange for
the exemption from most revenue and property taxes (Potter, 2001). The Finnish non-profit OHS
providers do have to pay taxes. Therefore, there is an incentive not to show profit. In case there would be
profit they even refund the employers. The payment scheme for occupational health professionals in all
three not-for-profit providers is mainly a salary whereas in for-profits the physicians, physiotherapists
and psychologists are paid on a fee-for-service basis (Gosden et al., 2001). In addition, the not-for-profit
providers may have a soft budget constraint, employers have to backup their own units and non-profits
and the municipal health care centre can support the public provider with taxpayers’ money.
The  legislation  concerning  the  provision  of  OHS  is  the  same  for  all  provider  types  with  few
exceptions.  Only public  providers  have been required by the Public  Health Act  to  provide OHS within
their region. All other types may freely enter and exit the market. The fees for the public provider were
set by the State Council until 1995, after that these providers were free to set prices themselves, but they
6were not expected to earn profits. Before the price regulation abolition the statutory set fees did not cover
the production costs. So, since 1995 all prices have been market determined.
Table 1: Organisational characteristics and incentives of Finnish occupational health services providers
For-profit (private
medical centre)
Public provider
(municipal health
care centre)
Employer's own OHS Non-profit
(employers' joint
OHS)
Organisation Part of a for-profit firm,
biggest ones are
companies
Part of the municipal
health care centre that
is responsible for
providing primary
health care services
Part of the firm
(employer's
organisation)
Employers govern the
independent OHS
organisation
Principal
(purchaser) -
provider
relationship
Contractual Contractual Hierarchic Employers govern the
provider and purchase
the services
Funding Revenues from the
clients and employers;
owners cover losses,
earn profits
Budget based on costs -
municipality in charge
of funding (soft budget
constraint); revenue
estimate
Budget for the total
costs - employer in
charge of funding
Budget based on
revenues - employers in
charge of funding
Payment system Lump-sum per
employee and fee-for-
service
Fee-for-service, also
lump-sum per employee
(client) payments
Budget Fixed lump-sum (high)
and fee-for-service;
employers aware of the
production costs
Physicians'
payment scheme
Most physicians are
entrepreneurs, fee-for-
service
Salary, minor role for
fee-for-services
Salary Salary
DATA CONSTRUCTION
We used data on clients, services and occupational health (OH) professionals from a survey conducted by
the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH) for the years 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004. The
response rate was high, over 90% per survey. Due to the reimbursement system, records on services
provided  by  the  OHS  units  are  well  standardised  and  the  quality  of  the  data  is  good.  The  FIOH
questionnaire collected the number of hours of workplace activities (workplace surveillance, meetings,
lectures, groups and counselling) and the number of health examinations and medical visits separately
for physicians, nurses, physiotherapists and psychologists over a whole year.
Data  on  providers’  revenues  we  obtained  from  the  Social  Insurance  Institution  which  maintains  an
employer-based register of the provider, content and costs of OHS. The register exists as a result of the
reimbursement system. This employer-based data was combined per provider code and merged with
FIOH's  data  using the provider's  name and address  at  the SII.  We had at  our  disposal  an unidentified
data. The first FIOH survey in 1992 was based on the provider register of the SII. Later FIOH updated the
provider register itself and the fit of the survey and the SII provider register fell. In 1992 almost all of the
providers in the FIOH survey could be linked to the SII register, Later the percentage fell: in 1997 it was
90%, and further dropped to 75% in 2000 and 67% in 2004. The merged data contains during the study
period  on  average  230  public  providers,  350  employers’  own  and  43  OHS  associations  governed  by
several employers and 180 for-profit medical centres, altogether 4,059 observations. Because of entry and
exit of providers, our data is an unbalanced panel data set.
To represent the output we constructed an indicator, the cost-weighted activity (CWA) output (Oliver,
2005). We calculated all services in minutes and summarised them by occupational health (OH)
professional group. In order to make the output of different professional groups comparable, the minutes
of each OH professional group was weighted by its wage, proportional to physicians’ wages in 2004. The
7wages are national averages provided by the Commission for Local Authority Employers. We checked
the salary ratios in the private sector and they were similar to the public ones. Cost-weighted output is
the sum of the wage-adjusted output of all OH professional groups. In occupational health the division of
resources into prevention and medical services is important. For example, the reimbursement system
aims at steering more resources into prevention. The service mix could also reveal the differences in the
objectives of provider types. Therefore, we wanted to study the service-mix and calculated the curative
medical services' share of the CWA output.
The indicator  for  productivity  was calculated from the CWA output  indicator.  The weekly working
hours of OH professionals were weighted by wage of each group proportioned to physicians' wages in
2004, then summed into one figure that measured personnel resources. Productivity measure is the ratio
of CWA output per personnel resources.
We  used  intensity  of  OHS  as  an  indicator  for  quality.  Intensity  was  measured  as  CWA  output  per
client  which  in  our  study  is  the  same  as  an  employee.  It  represents  process  quality  perceived  by  the
employee (client). Quality is assumed to be higher if there are more services per client, or if a more
qualified person provides the service, e.g. a physician instead of a nurse.
At the Social Insurance Institution, employers' reimbursement applications were summed up per
provider. The sum of the employers' expenditure equals the total of the provider's revenue. Nominal
values were converted to 2004 real values by the health care cost index. A Unit price was calculated by
dividing the revenue of a provider by its CWA output.
The  geographical  market  areas  where  the  providers  are  expected  to  compete  with  each  others  are
based on a classification provided by Statistics Finland and based on commuting and close collaboration
of municipalities in regional development. Every provider was located to a municipality based on its zip-
code. There were 428 municipalities in 2004, which formed 76 geographical regions. We excluded Åland
Islands with 16 municipalities and only one provider. Market structure was measured by the number of
providers in the region and market mix by the market share of for-profit providers calculated from the
number of clients (employees). Another option to measure market structure would have been to use
Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) that represents the concentration of the market. Wong et al. (2005)
have empirically shown that the effects of competition remain qualitatively the same irrespective of the
measure. In their study also the magnitude of the impact of competition based on number of providers
and  HHI  was  similar  on  the  county  level,  the  definition  of  market  closest  to  our  geographical  market
definition. In our study there was an association between both concentration and the number of
providers (correlation -0.80) and the market share of the for-profit providers (-0.62).
In  this  study,  the  professions  available  in  the  unit  describe  the  scope  of  the  provider.  Scope  was
measured using a dummy: 0 = OH professionals consisted of nurses and physicians only, 1 = nurses,
physicians, and also either a physiotherapist or psychologist, or 2 = all four professional groups. Scale
was measured by the number of OH professionals.
Appendix 1 presents the formulae for the performance and market indicators.
Most of our indicators are ratios and often based on summing up data. The survey had different time
frames for  different  data,  for  example the number of  services  concerned a  whole  year  and the number
and working hours of personnel one month the following spring. If there were changes in the number of
personnel during the first months of the year of the survey the output-personnel ratios were flawed. In
addition, if one professional group had missing data on some of it services it could create problems in
calculating the output. Therefore, we examined the studentized residuals exceeding +2 or -2 for
identifying outliers, and recoded the indicator values missing for the providers whose outlier values were
due to the mismatch of timing or missing data. The share of missing data was highest in the calculation of
the unit price (26%) and the lowest in the revenue of the provider (15%).
METHODS
We  applied  ordinary  least  squares  regression  analysis  to  find  out  how  ownership  type  was  associated
with  the  performance  and  panel  models  to  study  how  changes  in  the  market  structure  (number  of
8providers)  or  changes  in  the  market  mix  (market  share  of  for-profit  providers)  were  associated  with
changes in performance.
We started the analysis with ordinary least squares regression analysis and with separate models for
each year and for the pooled data. Model specification was tested using the Ramsey RESET test. Based on
the test, logarithmic transformations were made for the following variables: number of OH professionals
and providers, intensity, productivity, unit price and revenue. Earlier studies have shown that the
relation between competition and various performance indicators might not be linear. To check this,
models with a squared number of providers were made, but their performance was poorer.
Heteroskedasticity of the models was tested with the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and it showed
heteroskedasticity in all models. Therefore, we applied cluster-robust standard errors for pooled OLS
models.
The pooled OLS model:
indicatorpt =  + typept + 1 providersrt + 2 typept × providersrt + 3 FPsharert + 4 typept × FPsharert + 5
scalept + 6 dummyscopept + 7 time + 8 typept × time + μpt
where μpt ~ IID(0,μ).  The  variables  in  the  models  can  be  found  in  the  Appendix  1,  p  refers  to  the
provider, r to the region and t to the year. The variable time controls for time trends and shocks common
to all providers.
To  take  advantage  of  our  panel  data  fixed  effects  models  were  applied,  which  are  viewed  as
appropriate tools for eliminating bias arising from time-invariant unobserved factors (Greene, 2003; Shen
et al., 2007). Statistically, fixed effects models are always a reasonable thing to do with panel data (they
always give consistent results) but they may not be the most efficient models to run. The Hausman test
showed that for all indicators the fixed effects model turned out to be better than the random effects
model.  We  applied  robust  standard  errors.  Having  only  five  time  points  in  our  data  we  did  not  take
possible autocorrelation into account.
The fixed effects model:
indicatorpt = ( + μp) + 1 providersrt + 2 typept × providersrt + 3 FPsharert + 4 typept × FPsharert + 5 scalept
+ 6 dummyscopept + 7 time + 8 typept × time + vpt,
where vpt ~ IID(0,v). In fixed effects model μp is allowed to correlate with other regressors.
We  studied  whether  different  provider  types’  performance  had  different  associations  with  market
structure and if they differed in their trajectories. Therefore, we included interactions of the variables
“type of provider” and the number of providers, the market share of non-profits and time (continuous) to
all models. We computed the F-statistic to test a) if the coefficients for the variables representing
competition (number of providers, the market share of for-profit providers) or time and the interaction
terms jointly  differed from zero and b)  if  the  interaction terms of  the public,  employers’  own and non-
profit providers differed from that of for-profit providers (Stock and Watson, 2007).
We compared changes in our performance indicators associated with a huge change in competition in
the panel model and ownership type. Change in market structure was assessed as a change from the 25%
percentile to 75% percentile in 2004 both in the number of providers (logarithm) or the market share of for-
profit providers. The dummies in the pooled OLS models represent the differences between the ownership types.
We checked the robustness of our results to the weights that we used in constructing the cost-
weighted  output,  the  base  for  most  of  our  performance  indicators.  We  estimated  the  models  also  with
proportional wages for private providers obtained from trade union statistics and the municipal wages
9for  public  providers.  In  our  models  the  structure  of  the  market  was  measured  as  the  number  of  all
providers in the region. We constructed two other measures for the structure: 1) a variable based on the
number of  providers  without  employers’  own units  and 2)  a  dummy variable  based on the number of
providers: a market with less than six providers, a market with seven to nineteen providers, and a market
with more than twenty or more providers. The reason to leave employers’ own unit out of the number of
providers in the region is that they might not compete for employers the same way as the other provider
types. In average, three thirds of the clients (employees) in employer owned units were employed by the
organisation that owned also the OHS provider. The cut-off point of 6 has also been used by Santerre and
Vernon (2006). They justify this cut-off by 6 by the fact that equally sized hospitals would lead into a HHI
of 1800 which would be regarded highly concentrated by the Federal Trade Commission and Department
for Justice. Also Cabral (2002) calculated that seven providers in Cournot model would be enough to
achieve a price level of a competitive market. The correlation between the number of providers in the
region and the number of providers without the employers’ own units was 0.92 and the correlation with
the dummy was 0.86.
Finally, we examined the potential endogeneity of the market structure and compared fixed effects
panel model and instrumental variables (IV) panel model. We used the number of employees, the
number of employers (both from our data) and the median household income (provided by the Statistics
Finland)  to  predict  the  number  of  providers  and  the  share  of  for-profit  providers  in  the  region.
Unfortunately, we did not have access to household income data for 1992. Therefore, we only used the
years 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 in this analysis. We applied STATAs xtivreg2 (available from SSC
archive) and Hausman test to examine if the fixed effect panel model is preferred to IV.
We used STATA Version 9 for the analysis.
Results
The number of all OHS providers decreased during the study period from 1,006 to 621, mostly because
the number of employers’ own units decreased with almost 60%. This was due to closing down of the
companies during the Finnish recession of the early 1990’s and later due to outsourcing. The number of
for-profit providers increased until 2000, but since then mergers have decreased this number. The
number of public providers and non-profit providers slightly increased during the study period. (Table
2.)  The  market  shares  in  the  whole  of  Finland  changed  during  the  study  period.  For-profit  providers’
market  share  more than doubled to  37% in 2004.  The market  share  of  employers’  own units  halved to
18% in 2004. The market share of public providers fell by five percentage units to 39% in 2004 and non-
profits had a very stable market share of about 6%.
Table 2: Number of providers by provider type 1992-2004
For-profit Public Employers’ own Non-profit
1992 224 226 552 42
1995 164 234 410 41
1997 179 237 325 42
2000 190 237 291 39
2004 155 230 192 49
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Most regions can be considered competitive, but the local markets for OHS varied greatly (Table 3). The
for-profit providers and employers’ own units are concentrated in more competitive regions. For them,
the average number of providers in the region was almost 50 and the for-profit market share 35% in 2004.
The non-profits and public providers faced less competition. On average the non-profit providers had 30
competitors and the market share of for-profit providers was 29% in 2004; public providers had 14
competitors and the market share of for-profit providers was 19% on average in 2004.
Table 3: Competitiveness of the market measured with the number of providers and the market share of
for-profit providers (%) in a region (N=76), mean and (standard deviation)
Number of
providers
For-profit
market share
1992 13.8
(29.7)
7.2
(8.9)
1995 11.2
(21.9)
8.2
(9.6)
1997 10.3
(18.9)
12.4
(13.1)
2000 9.9
(18.9)
14.0
(14.3)
2004 8.6
(14.7)
15.1
(15.5)
The provider types did not only differ according to the market structure and mix but also according their
size and clientele. In general, Finnish OHS units are small when measured in terms of number of clients
and revenue. For-profit and public providers serve also small and medium-sized employers.
Municipalities as employers usually buy their OHS from the municipal health care centre, being the
biggest employer client for the public provider. (Table 4.)
Table 4: Number of clients (employees), employers and occupational health personnel and revenues (€)
in 2004, mean and (standard deviation)
For-profit
(N=192)
Public
(N=230)
Employers’ own
(N=155)
Non-profit
(N=49)
Number of clients 3972
(4597)
3009
(3201)
1647
(3654)
2104
(3444)
Number of employers 213
(260)
178
(188)
6
(10.4)
50
(57.5)
Number of OH
personnel
14.9
(14.8)
8.8
(8.3)
6.0
(9.0)
7.3
(11.1)
Revenue (turn over),
€
620,679
(980,324)
299,818
(555,826)
554,546
(1,055,686)
731,180
(1,389,785)
The scope of  the services  changed during the study period.  In  1992,  the personnel  mainly consisted of
nurses and physicians only. In 2004 less than one fifth of for-profit and public units had only nurses and
physicians and almost half of them had four professions available: nurses, physicians, physiotherapists
and psychologists.  In  the employer’s  own units  and the non-profit  units  it  was still  common in 2004 to
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have only nurses and physicians (40-50% of the units), and only less than one fifth had all four
professions present.
Four  of  our  indicators  are  ratios  and  comparable  between  the  provider  types.  Figures  1-4  show  the
averages  of  these  indicators  by the provider  type during the study period.  Public  providers  have been
catching up with the other provider types in intensity and the share of medical care (Figures 1 and 3). The
variation in productivity between the provider types has disappeared almost completely (Figure 2). The
unit  price  in  employers’  own  units  and  non-profits  has  been  rising  the  whole  study  period  but  in  for-
profits the unit price has been quite stable and the unit price of public providers has reached the level of
for-profits in 2004 (Figure 4).
Figure 1: Intensity of the services (CWA output/client) according the type of the provider in 1992-2004,
mean
Figure 2: Productivity (CWA output/(salary weighted weekly working hours)) according the type of the
provider in 1992-2004, mean
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Figure 3: Share of medical care (%) according to the type of the provider in 1992-2004, mean
Figure 4: Unit price (provider’s revenue/CWA output) according the type of the provider in 1992-2004,
mean, 2004 real value
For  each  indicator,  we  present  the  results  for  the  pooled  OLS  and  panel  model.  Both  models  include
interactions when they are statistically significant. The pooled OLS models show if the market variables,
the number of  providers  and the for-profits’  market  share,  are  associated with performance indicators.
The fixed effects panel models reveal if changes in the performance indicators are associated with the
changes in the market variables.
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We grouped the indicators to two tables: those related to output – intensity, productivity and the
share of medical care (Table 5) – and the monetary indicators – unit price and revenue (Table 6). All
models include also scale and scope variables. The results of these variables are not shown in the tables 5
and 6, but available in the appendices 2-6 where we present also the F-statistics for the interactions, and
the models without interactions.
The share of medical care was positively associated with the number of providers both in the pooled
OLS and the panel model. The positive association between the market share of for-profits and
productivity in the pooled OLS model changed into a statistically significant negative association in the
panel model. Otherwise the variables representing market structure and mix were not associated with
intensity, productivity and the share of medical care.
For output related indicators none of the interaction terms with the variables representing competition
were statistically significant in the panel models which we regard more important than the pooled OLS.
Instead, provider type interactions with time show that the different provider types had different time
trajectories. All together provider types increased intensity during the study period. But the development
was different for the not-for-profits: public providers increased intensity and the employers’ own and the
non-profits decreased intensity compared to for-profits. Also the overall productivity increased during
the study period, although productivity in the employers’ own and non-profits units decreased
compared  to  for-profits.  The  share  of  medical  care  was  decreasing  in  time,  but  here  again  the  trend
differed according the provider type. Especially the public providers increased the share of medical care
during the study period compared to for-profits.
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Table 5: Number of providers, for-profit providers’ market share and intensity, productivity and share of
medical care among Finnish OHS providers in 1992-2004, pooled OLS and fixed effects panel models
(standard error of the coefficient in the parenthesis)
Intensity (log), N=946 Productivity (log), N=940 Share of medical care
(%), N=948
Pooled OLS,
cluster-
robust
Fixed
effects,
robust
Pooled OLS,
cluster-
robust
Fixed
effects,
robust
Pooled OLS,
cluster-
robust
Fixed
effects,
robust
Provider type: ref. for-profit
Public provider -1.357
(0.138)
*** 0.062
(0.091)
-0.490
(0.027)
***
Employers’ own 0.339
(0.126)
** 0.451
(0.086)
*** -0.016
(0.021)
Non-profit 0.083
(0.181)
0.420
(0.093)
*** 0.061
(0.028)
*
Number of providers (log) -0.042
(0.032)
0.053
(0.045)
0.002
(0.017)
0.024
(0.055)
0.017
(0.006)
** 0.035
(0.016)
*
Public*number of
providers (log)
0.163
(0.050)
**
Emp.own*number of
providers (log)
0.066
(0.040)
Non-profit*number of
providers (log)
-0.004
(0.059)
For-profit market share (%) 0.533
(0.319)
-0.229
(0.144)
0.384
(0.145)
** -0.447
(0.167)
** -0.123
(0.086)
-0.067
(0.048)
Public*FP market share -0.313
(0.395)
0.514
(0.115)
***
Emp.own*FP market
share
-0.891
(0.373)
* 0.153
(0.089)
Non-profit*FP market
share
0.197
(0.540)
0.049
(0.138)
Time -0.003
(0.009)
0.017
(0.007)
* 0.003
(0.010)
0.028
(0.009)
** -0.078
(0.017)
*** -0.004
(0.002)
*
Public*time 0.046
(0.010)
*** 0.028
(0.007)
*** 0.006
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.009)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.017
(0.002)
***
Emp. own*time 0.008
(0.010)
-0.019
(0.006)
** -0.024
(0.010)
* -0.030
(0.008)
*** 0.012
(0.003)
*** -0.002
(0.002)
Non-profit*time 0.005
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.007)
* -0.023
(0.010)
* -0.032
(0.009)
** -0.007
(0.003)
* 0.005
(0.002)
*
R2 0.4701
0.0890
within 0.0812
0.0532
within 0.4676
0.0944
within
F(18, 945) =
67.22
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(9,2165) =
15.11
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(12, 939) =
15.31
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(9,2058) =
9.37
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(15, 947) =
66.39
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(9,2184) =
18.08
Prob > F =
0.0000
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
All models include also scale and scope variables and a constant (data shown in Appendices 2-4)
Table 6 presents the results for the monetary indicators. The fixed effect model shows that for for-profit
providers changes both in the unit price and the revenue of the provider were negatively associated with
a change in the number of providers in the region. The interactions show that for the public providers the
association was positive. Also employers’ own and non-profit providers differed from for-profit
providers: their interaction coefficients with the number of providers almost offset the coefficient of for-
profit providers for the unit price and the revenue. Changes in the market mix were not associated with
changes in providers’ unit price and revenue. The coefficients for the for-profit market share were not
statistically significant in the panel models.
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The not-for-profit providers increased their prices compared to for-profits during the study period
(interactions with time in the panel model), especially the public providers. The revenues in real terms
had a positive time trend due to the fact that for-profit providers and the public providers increased their
revenues.
Table 6: Number of providers, for-profit providers’ market share, unit price and revenue among Finnish
OHS providers in 1992-2004, pooled OLS and panel models (standard error of the coefficient in the
parenthesis)
Unit price (log), N=924 Revenue (log), N=954
Pooled OLS,
cluster-robust
Fixed effects,
robust
Pooled OLS,
cluster-robust
Fixed effects,
robust
Provider type: ref. for-profit
Public provider -0.346
(0.150)
* -0.625
(0.277)
*
Employers’ own 0.717
(0.148)
*** 1.217
(0.271)
***
Non-profit 0.976
(0.213)
*** 1.816
(0.449)
***
Number of providers (log) 0.168
(0.032)
*** -0.159
(0.068)
* 0.001
(0.072)
-0.161
(0.079)
*
Public*number of providers (log) -0.094
(0.039)
* 0.397
(0.176)
* 0.275
(0.091)
** 0.419
(0.145)
**
Emp.own*number of providers
(log)
-0.077
(0.035)
* 0.119
(0.037)
** 0.223
(0.081)
** 0.203
(0.037)
***
Non-profit*number of providers
(log)
-0.210
(0.064)
** 0.116
(0.048)
* 0.096
(0.159)
0.157
(0.044)
***
For-profit market share (%) 0.250
(0.155)
0.300
(0.164)
4.020
(0.784)
*** -0.084
(0.143)
Public*FP market share -3.262
(0.892)
***
Emp.own*FP market share -4.305
(0.853)
***
Non-profit*FP market share -5.323
(1.361)
***
Time 0.002
(0.008)
-0.014
(0.008)
-0.035
(0.018)
0.063
(0.009)
***
Public*time 0.061
(0.009)
*** 0.078
(0.010)
*** 0.100
(0.020)
0.050
(0.009)
**
Emp. own*time 0.022
(0.009)
* 0.034
(0.008)
*** 0.059
(0.020)
-0.036
(0.007)
*
Non-profit*time 0.037
(0.010)
*** 0.052
(0.010)
*** 0.070
(0.029)
-0.016
(0.009)
R2 0.4175 0.1655 within 0.6111 0.4048 within
F(15, 923) =
71.51
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(12,2047) =
26.86
Prob > F = 0.0000
F(18, 953) =
141.20
Prob > F = 0.0000
F(12,2455) =
98.05
Prob > F = 0.0000
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
All models include scale and scope variables and a constant (data shown in Appendices 5 and 6)
The models took into account market structure and mix, scope and scale economies. Usually, in a fixed
effect panel model a time trend is included in the model to capture the impact of omitted variables that
change during the study period but whose impact is the same for all providers. In our study the Figures
1-4  and the provider  type interactions with time show that  the provider  types  had different  paths  over
time.
We compared the direct effects of ownership with the changes in the market structure (the number of
providers)  and market  mix (the market  share  of  for-profit  providers).  The differences  in  intensity,  unit
price and revenues due to the provider type were greater than the differences associated with a huge
change in the competitiveness of the market we estimated based on the panel models. We varied the
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number of providers (logarithm) or the market share of for-profit providers form the 25% percentile
values (Q1) to the 75% percentile (Q3) in 2004.
A change in competition mattered more than the provider type in productivity and in the share of
medical care. The change in productivity that was negatively associated with the change from Q1 to Q3 in
the  market  share  of  for-profit  providers  was  bigger  than  the  differences  due  to  ownership.  Also  the
magnitude of the change in the share of medical care associated positively with the change in the number
of providers was bigger than the differences due to ownership. The public providers were an exception:
historically they have had much lower share of medical care than the other providers. For them the
change in the share of medical care associated to a huge increase in the number of providers was smaller
than the difference due to the ownership.
To check the consistency of the results we applied private sector wage ratios for private providers in
constructing the cost-weighted activity, but the results did not change. We applied also two different
measures for the structure of the market. The results of the panel models with the number of providers
excluding employers’ own units or dummies (less than six, six to nineteen and twenty or more providers)
were similar to the ones presented here for productivity and unit price. The results differed slightly for
other performance indicators. A change in the number of providers excluding employers own units was
positively  associated  with  a  change  in  intensity  for  for-profit  providers  and  negatively  for  public  and
non-profit providers. In the model with the number of all providers there was no association between a
change in the structure of the market and intensity. We measured the market structure also with a
dummy: a market with less than six providers (during the study period 12% of all OHS units), a market
with seven to nineteen providers (47% of all OHS units), and a market with more than twenty or more
providers (41% of OHS units). There was no association between a change in the dummy and a change in
intensity, share of medical care and revenues of the provider.
We compared the fixed effects panel models with IV panel models. The models differed from the ones
presented here: variable scope and interactions are not included in the model and we did not have data
on household income for 1992. We used the number of employees, the number of employers (both from
our  data)  and  the  median  household  income  to  predict  the  number  of  providers  and  the  share  of  for-
profit providers in the region. For the dependent variables share of medical care, unit price and revenue
the Hausman test revealed that the fixed effects panel model is preferred to IV (see eg. (Dougherty, 2007)
and (Baltagi, 2008)). For intensity and productivity the test recommended IV modeling. For intensity the
market variables were not statistically significant in the fixed effects panel model, in the IV model
intensity was negatively associated with the FP market share. Also for productivity the results of the two
models differed. In the IV model the number of providers was positively and statistically significantly
associated with productivity, the coefficient for the FP market share was also positive but not statistically
significant. In the fixed effects panel model the coefficients for these two variables were negative and not
statistically significant.
Discussion
As fixed effect panel models show if a change in the market structure or market mix was associated with
a change in the performance of a provider the discussion here is mainly based on the results of the panel
models.
In general, the market competition measured as the number of providers did not have a strong and
clear  association  with  the  performance  indicators  related  to  the  output:  intensity,  productivity and the
share of medical care. Only the share of medical care was positively associated with the number of
providers both in the pooled OLS and the panel models and similarly for all provider types. Also
intensity was positively associated with the number of providers in the panel model without interactions.
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When provider type interactions were included in the model the association was not statistically
significant. A change in the number of providers was not associated with changes in productivity.
Market mix was not associated with the output related indicators either. The only statistically
significant association existed between market mix and productivity: the positive association between the
market share of for-profits and productivity in the pooled OLS model changed into a negative association
in the panel model.
There were no differences in the associations between competition and performance in output related
performance indicators according to the ownership: interactions in the panel models for intensity,
productivity and the share of medical care between provider types and both the number of providers and
the market share of for-profit providers were not statistically significant.
Competition measured with the number of providers had an association with the monetary indicators
but the provider types differed. For for-profit providers, the association was as the economic theory
presumes: the unit price and provider’s revenue both decreased when the number of providers increased
in the region. Opposite to the result for for-profits, the public providers had higher unit prices and
revenues  when  the  number  of  providers  increased.  For  the  two  other  provider  types,  employers’  own
units and non-profits, the association between the monetary indicators was weaker than for for-profits.
Their provider type interactions with competition almost offset the coefficient of for-profit providers.
Change in  market  mix had an association only with productivity,  and a  negative one.  Our result  is
against the conventional wisdom that the presence of for-profit providers would increase productivity
and lower costs and prices. Shen et al. (2007) found a similar result in their meta-analysis: there was not
consistent  support  for  for-profit  hospitals  operating  more  efficiently.  Changes  in  the  unit  price  of
providers did not have an association with changes in the market mix in the panel models. The three
other indicators, intensity, share of medical care and revenue, had first a negative association with the
market share of for-profit providers. But when the interactions were included in the model, it turned out
that the changes were due to provider type interactions with time rather than due to changes in market
mix. The associations between changes in all five indicators and market mix were similar for all provider
types: there were no provider type interactions with the market share of for-profit providers.
All  performance  indicators  also  showed  a  time  trend  that  differed  according  to  provider  type.  We
interpret  this  result  as  a  path dependency:  providers  have a  tendency to  continue the same behaviour.
Path dependency has been found on system level (Oliver and Mossialos, 2005). The magnitude of
difference in performance was more associated with ownership type than with changes in market
structure and market mix. Only in productivity (negative association with market share of for-profit
providers)  and  in  the  share  of  medical  care  (positive  association  with  the  number  of  providers)  the
change associated with competition was bigger than the differences due to ownership.
A  strong  feature  of  our  study  is  that  the  panel  data  included  a  large  number  of  observations  and
covered almost all OHS providers in Finland. The meta-analysis by Shen et al. (2005) showed that
including data from both a survey and an official register and logarithmic transformations of variables
improve the quality of a study comparing the performance of health care providers. Defining the
geographical  market  is  always  difficult.  Here  we  used  regions  defined  by  Statistics  Finland  based  on
regional collaboration and commuting, which also have the advantage of reflecting topographical
features and travel time (Horwitz and Nichols, 2009). We checked the robustness of the results by
constructing alternative measures for competition and received mainly similar results.
There are limitations in our study, too. We did not have data on clients (employees) which has proven
important in comparing providers. The data was received from surveys to providers and a register which
did  not  include  information  on  the  quality  of  the  services  as  perceived  by  clients  or  on  the  impact  on
health. The simultaneous determination of the market structure and the performance of providers causes
a potential endogeneity problem, especially in studies with cross sectional data (Evans et al.,  1993). We
applied Hausman test in the comparison of fixed effects and IV panel models. For the variables share of
medical  care,  unit  price  and  revenue  the  Hausman  test  revealed  that  the  fixed  effects  panel  model  is
preferred to IV. For intensity and productivity the test recommended IV modeling, so the results for these
two  variables  should  be  interpreted  with  caution.  Our  data  did  not  enable  to  take  into  account  the
structure (bargaining power) of the employers.
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Grabowski and Hirth (2003) regarded the existence of spillover effects as a proof for information
asymmetry in the nursing home markets. In our study, the share of for-profit providers did not have an
impact on the performance indicators (except the negative association with productivity). The non-
existent spillovers could then be a signal that the differences that existed and remained between the
provider types were due to heterogeneity of employers and employees. On the other hand, the market
shares have changed considerably in the past ten years (Kansaneläkelaitos, (The Social Insurance
Institution), 2007; Manninen, 2009). This implies that the segments are not totally separate and there must
be some competition.
The monetary indicators of for-profit providers reacted as the economic theory presumes: a change in
competition (higher number of providers) was associated negatively with unit price and revenue.
Although the results were the opposite for the public provider the result is understandable. Public
providers experienced a change in the regulatory environment. First in 1995 the regulation of their prices
was abolished. In a more competitive environment, the public providers were more sensitive to react to
the abolishment of the price regulation and raise their prices. During the study period, the public
providers got more power to decide upon their resources and were more dependent on the payments by
employers  and  less  on  politicians  (Maarse  et  al.,  2005).  These  two  changes  can  explain  why  the  public
providers started to resemble more and more for-profit providers (institutional isomorphism (Horwitz
and Nichols, 2009; Potter, 2001)).
Employers’ own units and non-profits had higher intensity and productivity but higher unit costs. The
payment system, expenditure budget in employers’ own units and mainly capitation payments in non-
profits,  can  be  interpreted  as  that  employers  were  purchasing  capacity.  When  purchasers  face
uncertainty,  ie.  they  do  not  know  what  kind  of  services  will  be  needed,  they  buy  an  option  for  the
capacity. Uncertainty connected to the demand (need) of the services creates a market for the option to
use the services.  In  option demand markets,  the  providers  are  able  to  earn rent  due to  the uncertainty
(Capps et al., 2003). This phenomenon could be one reason why employers’ own units and non-profits
can sustain their price level.
The  Finnish  OHS  services  and  markets  differ  from  hospitals  in  the  US.  Firstly,  consumers  do  not
choose  the  provider.  Secondly,  the  provider  types  have  different  payment  systems  and  the  prices  are
market  determined  –  there  is  no  prospective  payment  system.  Thirdly,  the  entry  and  exit  in  the  OHS
market is easier than starting or closing a hospital. However, it is of interest outside the Finnish OHS that
also public providers are more sensitive to react to regulatory changes in more competitive
environments. We found competitive spillovers only in productivity; information asymmetry and
heterogeneity  of  consumers  are  both important  issues  in  understanding and empirically  testing market
spillovers.  And  finally,  public  providers  had  lower  intensity  and  share  of  medical  care  than  the  other
provider  types.  Publicly  ownership  is  a  tool  to  regulate  resources  and  capacity.  Those  employers  who
most valued high capacity seemed to be willing pay higher prices, too.
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Appendices
APPENDIX 1 - INDICATORS FOR OHS AND COMPETITION
Indicator Formula Keys
CWA output Outputpt = wiqijptminij
                          i        j
j = workplace visits, meetings, lectures, health
examinations, medical visits
i = physician, nurse, physiotherapist, psychologist
minij = time that a professional group i uses in
producing service j
qijpt = the number of services j, provided by
professional group i, in provider p, in year t
wi = weight for each professional group i, the
average salary of a professional group i
proportioned to physicians’ salary in the municipal
sector in 2004
p = provider id
t = 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004
Intensity Intensitypt = Outputpt/number of
employeespt (clients)
p, t as above
Productivity Prodpt = Outputptwihoursipt
i
hoursipt = weekly working hours of a professional
group i, in year t,
i, t, p and wi as above
Share of medical
care
Medpt = wiqmediptmedmini/Outputpt
i
qmedi = number of curative medical visits
provided by professional group i
medmini = time that professional group i uses to
produce one curative medical visit
i, t, p and wi as above
Revenue Revenuept = TCpet
e
TCpet = total expenditure on OHS for employer e,
provided by provider p, in year t
p, t as above
Revenue in 2004 real value
Unit price Pricept = Revenuept/Outputpt
Number of providers
within a region
Providersrt = Count(prt) prt = provider id in region r, year t
r = geographically defined local market
t as above
For-profit providers’
market share within
a region
FPsharert = clientsFPprtclientsprt
FPp                       p
clientsprt = provider p's number of clients
(employees)
clientsFPprt = For-profit provider’s number of clients
in region r, year t
r, t as above
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APPENDIX 2. MODELS FOR INTENSITY AMONG FINNISH OHS PROVIDERS
(N=946) IN 1992-2004, POOLED OLS AND PANEL MODELS WITHOUT AND
WITH INTERACTIONS
Pooled OLS, cluster-robust Fixed effects, robust
no inter-actions with inter-
actions
no inter-
actions
with inter-
actions
Provider type: ref. for-profit
Public provider -0.725
(0.049)
*** -1.357
(0.138)
***
Employers’ own 0.387
(0.044)
*** 0.339
(0.126)
**
Non-profit 0.132
(0.053)
* 0.083
(0.181)
Number of providers (log) 0.031
(0.017)
-0.042
(0.032)
0.149
(0.046)
** 0.053
(0.045)
Public*number of providers (log) 0.163
(0.050)
**
Emp.own*number of providers
(log)
0.066
(0.040)
Non-profit*number of providers
(log)
-0.004
(0.059)
For-profit market share (%) -0.020
(0.133)
0.533
(0.319)
-0.522
(0.146)
*** -0.229
(0.144)
Public*FP market share -0.313
(0.395)
Emp.own*FP market share -0.891
(0.373)
*
Non-profit*FP market share 0.197
(0.540)
Number of OH professionals  (log)
0.104
(0.028)
*** 0.102
(0.026)
*** 0.072
(0.032)
* 0.051
(0.031)
Scope: ref. only nurses and physicians
In addition physiotherapist or
psychologist
0.019
(0.035)
0.018
(0.034)
-0.024
(0.031)
-0.009
(0.031)
All four OH professionals
-0.036
(0.047)
-0.048
(0.044)
0.014
(0.043)
0.003
(0.042)
Time 0.015
(0.003)
*** -0.003
(0.009)
0.025
(0.003)
*** 0.017
(0.007)
*
Public*time 0.046
(0.010)
*** 0.028
(0.007)
***
Emp. own*time 0.008
(0.010)
-0.019
(0.006)
**
Non-profit*time 0.005
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.007)
Constant 3.812
(0.071)
*** 4.034
(0.104)
*** 3.522
(0.054)
*** 3.825
(0.150)
***
Interactions: F-statistics and p-values
A1) Number of providers and
interactions = 0
3.38
(0.0093)
A2) Interactions = 0 4.15
(0.0062)
B1) FP-market share and interactions =
0
2.48
(0.0426)
B2) Interactions = 0 3.21
(0.0223)
C1) Time and interactions = 0 15.08
(0.0000)
27.93
(0.0000)
C2) Interactions = 0 11.96
(0.0000)
28.53
(0.0000)
VIF 2.16 16.50
R2 0.4473 0.4701 within = 0.0437 within = 0.0890
F(9, 945) =
109.46
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(18, 945) =
67.22
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(6,2168) =
12.51
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(9,2165) =
15.11
Prob > F =
0.0000
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
F-statistics for 1) the test that the number of providers (A), the market share of the for-profit providers (B) or time (B)
and the provider type interactions differ jointly from zero and 2) for the test that the coefficients of the public, employers’
own and non-profit providers differ from for-profits.
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APPENDIX 3. MODELS FOR PRODUCTIVITY AMONG FINNISH OHS
PROVIDERS (N=940) IN 1992-2004, POOLED OLS AND PANEL MODELS
WITHOUT AND WITH INTERACTIONS
Pooled OLS, cluster-robust Fixed effects, robust
no inter-
actions
with inter-
actions
no inter-
actions
with inter-
actions
Provider type: ref. for-profit
Public provider 0.097
(0.052)
0.062
(0.091)
Employers’ own 0.309
(0.051)
*** 0.451
(0.086)
***
Non-profit 0.267
(0.055)
*** 0.420
(0.093)
***
Number of providers (log) 0.010
(0.017)
0.002
(0.017)
0.067
(0.056)
0.024
(0.055)
Public*number of providers (log)
Emp.own*number of providers
(log)
Non-profit*number of providers
(log)
For-profit market share (%) 0.290
(0.144)
* 0.384
(0.145)
** -0.561
(0.163)
** -0.447
(0.167)
**
Public*FP market share
Emp.own*FP market share
Non-profit*FP market share
Number of OH professionals  (log)
0.058
(0.026)
* 0.055
(0.025)
* -0.214
(0.042)
*** -0.239
(0.042)
***
Scope: ref.  only nurses and physicians
In addition physiotherapist or
psychologist
-0.109
(0.031) **
-0.105
(0.031) **
0.002
(0.036)
0.008
(0.036)
All four OH professionals
-0.121
(0.042)
** -0.134
(0.042)
** 0.046
(0.049)
0.029
(0.048)
Time -0.007
(0.004)
0.003
(0.010)
0.014
(0.004)
** 0.028
(0.009)
**
Public*time 0.006
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.009)
Emp. own*time -0.024
(0.010)
* -0.030
(0.008)
***
Non-profit*time -0.023
(0.010)
* -0.032
(0.009)
**
Constant 2.440
(0.073)
*** 2.386
(0.097)
*** 2.845
(0.196)
*** 2.998
(0.193)
***
Interactions: F-statistics and p-values
A1) Number of providers and
interactions = 0
A2) Interactions = 0
B1) FP-market share and interactions =
0
B2) Interactions = 0
C1) Time and interactions = 0 10.88
(0.0000)
10.01
(0.0000)
C2) Interactions = 0 11.54
(0.0000)
12.13
(0.0000)
VIF 2.19 5.19
R2 0.0721 0.0812 within = 0.0337 within = 0.0532
F(9, 939) =
15.78
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(12, 939) =
15.31
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(6,2061) = 7.72
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(9,2058) = 9.37
Prob > F =
0.0000
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
F-statistics for 1) the test that the number of providers (A), the market share of the for-profit providers (B) or time (B)
and the provider type interactions differ jointly from zero and 2) for the test that the coefficients of the public, employers’
own and non-profit providers differ from for-profits.
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APPENDIX 4. MODELS FOR SHARE OF MEDICAL CARE AMONG FINNISH OHS
PROVIDERS (N=948) IN 1992-2004, POOLED OLS AND PANEL MODELS
WITHOUT AND WITH INTERACTIONS
Pooled OLS, cluster-robust Fixed effects, robust
no inter-
actions
with inter-
actions
no inter-
actions
with inter-
actions
Provider type: ref. for-profit
Public provider -0.312
(0.018)
*** -0.490
(0.027)
***
Employers’ own -0.010
(0.013)
-0.016
(0.021)
Non-profit 0.090
(0.018)
*** 0.061
(0.028)
*
Number of providers (log) 0.020
(0.006)
** 0.017
(0.006)
** 0.078
(0.018)
*** 0.035
(0.016)
*
Public*number of providers (log)
Emp.own*number of providers (log)
Non-profit*number of providers
(log)
For-profit market share (%) 0.067
(0.056)
-0.123
(0.086)
-0.203
(0.049)
*** -0.067
(0.048)
Public*FP market share 0.514
(0.115)
***
Emp.own*FP market share 0.153
(0.089)
Non-profit*FP market share 0.049
(0.138)
Number of OH professionals  (log)
0.068
(0.010)
*** 0.068
(0.009)
*** 0.035
(0.011)
** 0.029
(0.011)
**
Scope: ref.  only nurses and physicians
In addition physiotherapist or
psychologist
-0.052
(0.012) ***
-0.050
(0.012) ***
-0.026
(0.011) *
-0.019
(0.011)
All four OH professionals
-0.070
(0.018)
*** -0.078
(0.017)
*** -0.023
(0.016)
-0.023
(0.016)
Time -0.002
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.005
(0.001)
*** -0.004
(0.002)
*
Public*time 0.012
(0.003)
*** 0.017
(0.002)
***
Emp. own*time -0.007
(0.003)
* -0.002
(0.002)
Non-profit*time 0.001
(0.004)
0.005
(0.002)
*
Constant 0.566
(0.024)
*** 0.631
(0.026)
*** 0.341
(0.062)
*** 0.473
(0.055)
***
Interactions: F-statistics and p-values
A1) Number of providers and
interactions = 0
A2) Interactions = 0
B1) FP-market share and interactions =
0
5.97
(0.0001)
B2) Interactions = 0 7.29
(0.0001)
C1) Time and interactions = 0 15.17
(0.0000)
25.45
(0.0000)
C2) Interactions = 0 19.09
(0.0000)
33.87
(0.0000)
VIF 2.16 6.79
R2 0.4349 0.4676 within = 0.0263 within = 0.0944
F(9, 947) =
84.82
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(15, 947) =
66.39
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(6,2187) =
7.07
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(9,2184) =
18.08
Prob > F =
0.0000
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
F-statistics for 1) the test that the number of providers (A), the market share of the for-profit providers (B) or time (B)
and the provider type interactions differ jointly from zero and 2) for the test that the coefficients of the public, employers’
own and non-profit providers differ from for-profits.
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APPENDIX 5. MODELS FOR UNIT PRICE AMONG FINNISH OHS PROVIDERS
(N=924) IN 1992-2004, POOLED OLS AND PANEL MODELS WITHOUT AND
WITH INTERACTIONS
Pooled OLS, cluster-robust Fixed effects, robust
no inter-actions with inter-
actions
no inter-
actions
with inter-
actions
Provider type: ref. for-profit
Public provider -0.224
(0.055)
*** -0.346
(0.150)
*
Employers’ own 0.624
(0.050)
*** 0.717
(0.148)
***
Non-profit 0.589
(0.072)
*** 0.976
(0.213)
***
Number of providers (log) 0.113
(0.019)
*** 0.168
(0.032)
*** 0.145
(0.069)
* -0.159
(0.068)
*
Public*number of providers (log) -0.094
(0.039)
* 0.397
(0.176)
*
Emp.own*number of providers
(log)
-0.077
(0.035)
* 0.119
(0.037)
**
Non-profit*number of providers
(log)
-0.210
(0.064)
** 0.116
(0.048)
*
For-profit market share (%) 0.039
(0.155)
0.250
(0.155)
-0.195
(0.166)
0.300
(0.164)
Public*FP market share
Emp.own*FP market share
Non-profit*FP market share
Number of OH professionals  (log)
0.006
(0.027)
-0.009
(0.027)
-0.013
(0.044)
0.009
(0.043)
Scope: ref.  only nurses and physicians
In addition physiotherapist or
psychologist
-0.047
(0.033)
-0.030
(0.033)
-0.038
(0.039)
-0.028
(0.037)
All four OH professionals
0.029
(0.053)
0.043
(0.052)
-0.052
(0.056)
-0.036
(0.053)
Time 0.038
(0.004)
*** 0.002
(0.008)
0.044
(0.004)
*** -0.014
(0.008)
Public*time 0.061
(0.009)
*** 0.078
(0.010)
***
Emp. own*time 0.022
(0.009)
* 0.034
(0.008)
***
Non-profit*time 0.037
(0.010)
*** 0.052
(0.010)
***
Constant -0.160
(0.076)
* -0.137
(0.133)
0.042
(0.229)
0.402
(0.193)
*
Interactions: F-statistics and p-values
A1) Number of providers and
interactions = 0
9.97
(0.0000)
3.18
(0.0129)
A2) Interactions = 0 4.18
(0.0059)
4.23
(0.0055)
B1) FP-market share and interactions =
0
B2) Interactions = 0
C1) Time and interactions = 0 43.32
(0.0000)
35.41
(0.0000)
C2) Interactions = 0 20.55
(0.0000)
21.40
(0.0000)
VIF 2.16 9.84
R2 0.3975 0.4175 within = 0.0990 within = 0.1655
F(9, 923) =
104.33
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(15, 923) =
71.51
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(6,2053) =
31.97
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(12,2047) =
26.86
Prob > F =
0.0000
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
F-statistics for 1) the test that the number of providers (A), the market share of the for-profit providers (B) or time (B)
and the provider type interactions differ jointly from zero and 2) for the test that the coefficients of the public, employers’
own and non-profit providers differ from for-profits.
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APPENDIX 6. MODELS FOR REVENUE AMONG FINNISH OHS PROVIDERS
(N=954) IN 1992-2004, POOLED OLS AND PANEL MODELS WITHOUT AND
WITH INTERACTIONS
Pooled OLS, cluster-robust Fixed effects, robust
no inter-actions with inter-
actions
no inter-actions with inter-
actions
Provider type: ref. for-profit
Public provider -0.024
(0.096)
-0.625
(0.277)
*
Employers’ own 1.232
(0.089)
*** 1.217
(0.271)
***
Non-profit 1.378
(0.124)
*** 1.816
(0.449)
***
Number of providers (log) 0.178
(0.030)
*** 0.001
(0.072)
0.253
(0.068)
*** -0.161
(0.079)
*
Public*number of providers (log) 0.275
(0.091)
** 0.419
(0.145)
**
Emp.own*number of providers
(log)
0.223
(0.081)
** 0.203
(0.037)
***
Non-profit*number of providers
(log)
0.096
(0.159)
0.157
(0.044)
***
For-profit market share (%) 0.800
(0.269)
** 4.020
(0.784)
*** -0.766
(0.150)
*** -0.084
(0.143)
Public*FP market share -3.262
(0.892)
***
Emp.own*FP market share -4.305
(0.853)
***
Non-profit*FP market share -5.323
(1.361)
***
Number of OH professionals  (log)
1.285
(0.049)
*** 1.253
(0.048)
*** 0.239
(0.042)
*** 0.232
(0.042)
***
Scope: ref.  only nurses and
physicians
In addition physiotherapist or
psychologist
-0.196
(0.057) **
-0.182
(0.056) **
-0.030
(0.037)
-0.039
(0.034)
All four OH professionals
-0.273
(0.083)
** -0.270
(0.081)
** -0.030
(0.049)
-0.066
(0.045)
Time 0.026
(0.006)
*** -0.035
(0.018)
0.080
(0.004)
*** 0.063
(0.009)
***
Public*time 0.100
(0.020)
*** 0.050
(0.009)
***
Emp. own*time 0.059
(0.020)
** -0.036
(0.007)
***
Non-profit*time 0.070
(0.029
* -0.016
(0.009)
Constant 8.554
(0.134)
*** 8.719
(0.251)
*** 10.362
(0.224)
*** 10.952
(0.198)
***
Interactions: F-statistics and p-values
A1) Number of providers and
interactions = 0
9.44
(0.0000)
A2) Interactions = 0 3.50
(0.0152)
11.64
(0.0000)
B1) FP-market share and interactions
= 0
7.80
(0.0000)
B2) Interactions = 0 15.62
(0.0000)
C1) Time and interactions = 0 21.89
(0.0000)
123.01
(0.0000)
C2) Interactions = 0 10.98
(0.0000)
58.39
(0.0000)
VIF 2.11 15.15
R2 0.5898 0.6111 within = 0.3206 within = 0.4048
F(9, 953) =
219.77
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(18, 953) =
141.20
Prob > F = 0.0000
F(6,2461) =
137.55
Prob > F =
0.0000
F(12,2455) =
98.05
Prob > F =
0.0000
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
F-statistics for 1) the test that the number of providers (A), the market share of the for-profit providers (B) or time (B)
and the provider type interactions differ jointly from zero and 2) for the test that the coefficients of the public, employers’
own and non-profit providers differ from for-profits.
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